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The roots of the 2008 financial crisis are often traced back to the collapse of the
housing bubble. The factors that precipitated the crisis, and propagated its effects
on firms and consumers to produce an economic contraction, are still the subject of
ongoing debate among academics, policy makers, and practitioners. Macroeconomic
factors, flawed government policies, and perverse incentives at financial institutions
that lead to excessive risk taking are often cited as contributing forces to the cri-
sis. In this dissertation, I investigate two forces that drove the 2008 financial crisis.
One force is the credit rating agencies, whose excessively generous ratings lie at
the root of the 2008 financial crisis. The popular claim is that the rating agencies
have become too loose at their rating assignments, which led to overestimation of
the creditworthiness of the companies by the public. In this dissertation, I examine
the assertion that the rating companies have progressively relaxed their standards
in recent decades for corporate credit ratings. Such relaxation seems to have lulled
investors into a false sense of security about the safety of credit instruments whose
values collapsed abruptly. Next I examine the contagion effects of rating down-
grades. I ask whether rating downgrade news have spill over effects on the rest of
the industry. I then investigate a different force that has received less attention in
the crisis; investor confidence. The third essay focuses explicitly on the period when
the financial crisis was at its peak.
In Essay 1 titled, ”Structural Shifts in Credit Rating Standards”, I examine the
time series variation in corporate credit rating standards for the period 1985-2007. I
report two main findings: (i) There is a divergent pattern between investment grade
and speculative grade rating standards during 1985-2002. Investment grade ratings
tighten between 1985 and 2002. In contrast, the speculative grade rating standards
loosen during the same period. Consistent with an agency explanation, rating com-
panies assign more issuer friendly ratings to speculative grade credits, where there
is substantial growth by the first-time entrants. The loose standards in speculative
grade ratings are consistent with widespread criticism of the rating agencies during
the Dot-Com crash. However, while the media focused on failure of rating agencies
in high profile corporate debacles, the more serious problem was in the speculative
grade rating assignments. (ii) There is a sharp structural break in both investment
grade and speculative grade standards towards more stringent ratings around 2002.
The change in rating levels due to the structural break is both economically and
statistically significant. Holding firm characteristics constant, firms experience a
drop of 1.5 notches in ratings due to tightening standards between 2002 and 2007.
It appears that widespread criticism and threat of regulation led rating agencies to
move towards more conservative ratings after the Dot-Com crash, Enron debacle
and passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
In Essay 2 titled ”Contagion Effects of Rating Downgrade Announcements”,
we examine the intra-industry spill over effects of rating downgrade announcements
based on abnormal returns for stock and CDS spreads of competitor industry port-
folios. We find minor contagion effects for the equity prices of the industry portfolios
for the entire sample. For the competitors of investment grade firms, we find sig-
nificant contagion effects in the magnitude of -15 basis points for the window (0,1).
For the speculative grade sample, we do not observe contagion or competition ef-
fects although this result can be due to cancellation of contagion and competition
effects for the low rated firms. These results suggest that the net effect is dependent
on the event firm’s original rating. We find statistically significant CDS reaction
of industry portfolios to downgrade news although in moderate magnitudes. The
cross sectional tests show that the industry portfolio equity response and event firm
equity response are positively correlated. This finding presents further evidence of
contagion effects for rating downgrades.
Essay 3 discusses a different force that has received less attention in the fi-
nancial crisis, investor sentiment, and focuses on data drawn from the crisis period.
In Essay 3, titled ”Confidence and the 2008 Financial Crisis”, we examine the role
of confidence in the 2007-2008 financial crisis using new high frequency data on
daily closed-end fund discounts and novel measures of consumer sentiment from
non-financial sources extracted at daily frequency. Empirically, there is some move-
ment in sentiment through much of the crisis period but it is relatively moderate.
However, tests detect a sharp structural break around the Lehman bankruptcy,
after which there are breaks in both pricing across multiple asset classes and co-
movement, especially in hard-to-arbitrage fund classes. Fund discounts also exhibit
significantly increased co-movement with non-financial Gallup sentiment measures
after the Lehman bankruptcy, and closed-end fund discount betas with respect to
the market increase significantly during this period. While fund discounts may re-
flect liquidity issues in normal conditions, they seem to better reflect sentiment in
stressed environments, so funds have undesirable conditional betas. The results are
consistent with the view that the Lehman bankruptcy induced a negative shock to
the supply of arbitrage capital, and as predicted by behavioral finance models of
costly arbitrage, sentiment then matters more and is closely tied to returns. The
results are also consistent with theories of financial crisis in which sentiment or con-
fidence is an extra force that amplifies and transmits economic shocks that add to
the usual credit and collateral mechanisms studied in the literature.
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Structural Shifts in Credit Rating Standards
1.1 Introduction
Credit rating agencies face widespread criticism regarding the quality of their
ratings. Questions about the role of rating agencies were raised around the Asian
Financial Crisis in 1997, when the rating agencies appeared to lag the market rather
than being pro-active (IMF (1999), Reisen and von Maltzan (1999)). Stronger
criticisms regarding the “looseness” of ratings surfaced after the accounting scandals
of Enron and WorldCom, when the rating agencies failed to foresee the deterioration
of the company financials and the upcoming bankruptcies. Enron kept its investment
grade long-term issuer rating until four days before its bankruptcy. The 2007-2008
financial crisis further elevated the criticism. Mortgage backed securities carrying
investment grade ratings incurred large losses during the crisis, suggesting that the
ratings of these securities were overstated. As a result, credit rating agencies face
heavy scrutiny and popular wisdom generally dictates that rating agencies loosened
their standards in the last decade.1
1“Triple-A-Failure,” by Roger Lowenstein, New York Times Magazine, April 27, 2008.
“Bringing Down Wall Street as Ratings Let Loose Subprime Scourge,” by Elliot Blair Smith,
www.bloomberg.com, Sept 24, 2008. “Berating the Raters”, by Paul Krugman, New York Times
Magazine, April 25, 2010. “Downgrade the Rating Agencies”, by Kathleen Casey And Frank
Partnoy, New York Times Magazine, June 04, 2010. “Rating The Raters: Enron And The Credit
Rating Agencies”, Congressional Hearing, March 20, 2002. “Credit Rating Agencies And The
Financial Crisis”, Congressional Hearing, October 22, 2008. “Reforming Credit Rating Agencies”,
Congressional Hearing, September 30, 2009.
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Although the mass media has already sentenced the rating agencies for em-
ploying loose standards, a more formal investigation is necessary before drawing
firm conclusions. More specifically, it is important to examine whether the rating
agencies indeed relaxed their standards, particularly in the recent periods of interest
such as the Dot-Com crash and the current subprime crisis. In this paper, I study
whether the credit rating agencies tighten or loosen the corporate ratings during the
period 1985 - 2007. I report two main findings: First, I find that between 1985-2002,
there is a divergent pattern between investment grade and speculative grade rating
standards. That is, the rating agencies tighten the standards for investment grade
ratings, while relaxing the standards for speculative grade ratings. Second, I find
that around 2002, there is a sharp structural break towards “more stringent” ratings
in both investment grade and speculative grade rating categories.
My first major finding is a puzzling divergent pattern between investment
grade and speculative grade standards during 1985-2002. As in Blume, Lim, and
Mackinlay (1998) (henceforth BLM), I find that the investment grade ratings tighten
during this period. Holding firm characteristics constant, the tightening amounts
to an average of 1.1 notches for investment grade ratings. However, in contrast to
investment grade ratings, speculative grade ratings loosen 0.6 notches during the
same period. The loosening of standards in speculative grade ratings is consistent
with the widespread criticism of agencies during the Dot-Com crash. Before 2002,
the tightening trend in standards shown by BLM pertains only to the investment
grade category, where the default rates are rare in any case. However, consistent
with the popular wisdom, the rating agencies were indeed getting looser in their
2
speculative grade rating assignments where the majority of the defaults occur.
These findings raise the question as to why rating agencies loosen the standards
for speculative grade bonds while tightening the standards for investment grade
bonds prior to 2002. I do not offer a full analysis of this question. However, the
following explanation is plausible. I show that throughout 1985-2002, much of the
growth in the universe of rated firms comes from the speculative grade first-time
issuers. Rating agencies appear to assign more issuer friendly ratings to this asset
class where there is substantial growth by the first-time entrants. The issuer-pays
rating model can play a role here to attract further business. Indeed, such behavior
also mirrors the failure of the rating agencies in the structured product finance
products during the 2007-2008 financial crisis (Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and
Vickery (2009)). Similar to the expansion in speculative credits prior to 2002, the
mortgage backed securities of the subprime loans were newly rated instruments and
experienced substantial growth during the post 2002 period.
My analysis also shows that there is a sharp structural break towards “more
stringent” standards in both investment grade and speculative grade ratings around
2002. The structural break is both statistically and economically significant. Be-
tween 2002-2007, the investment grade ratings tighten sharply 1.3 notches, and the
rate at which these ratings tighten is faster than 1985-2002 period. The speculative
grade standards also tighten by an average of 1 notch after 2002. For the entire
sample, the post 2002 drop in ratings amounts to 1.5 notches. The timing of the
2002 break coincides with the increased regulatory scrutiny and investor criticism
beginning with high profile accounting scandals. The scandals and the subsequent
3
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act accelerated discussions regarding the quality of
ratings, and the role of rating agencies in capital markets. It appears that widespread
criticism, the regulatory threat to open up rating industry to competition coupled
with reputational concerns of rating agencies led them to make structural changes
to their rating standards.
Both findings are economically significant. For instance, S&P AA rated 10
year maturity bond yield index is on the average 24 basis points lower than the A
rated index between 1996 and 2007. Based on this difference, 1.5 notches tightening
in standards between 2002 and 2007 translate into 12 basis points higher cost of
debt for issuers. Furthermore, the results survive a wide range of control variables
and robustness tests. Alternative methods of measuring time trends in standards
yield same patterns. The results also hold robustly in sample of first time issuers
and sample of firms that existed in 1985.
Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) demonstrate that idiosyncratic
volatility of US firms trends upward between 1962-1997. In a related article, Camp-
bell and Taksler (2003) show that increasing idiosyncratic volatility helps explain
the widening of credit spreads between 1963 and 1999. In time series tests, addi-
tionally I investigate whether increasing idiosyncratic volatility can also account for
the declining trend in ratings. I find that increase in idiosyncratic volatility can
partially explain the change in rating standards until 2002. However, the aggregate
idiosyncratic volatility comes down after 2002, while ratings continue to decline.2
Therefore idiosyncratic volatility can not explain tightening rating trends after 2002.
2Brandt, Brav, Graham, and Kumar (2010) document idiosyncratic volatility trends until 2007.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: I begin with a summary of
credit rating literature in Section 2.2. Section 1.3 discusses the empirical strategy
of measuring trends in rating standards, followed by the explanation of data used in
this study in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 presents the results; the time series variation
in rating standards. I conduct robustness tests and tests regarding idiosyncratic
volatility in Section 1.6. Section 2.5 concludes.
1.2 Background
Credit ratings are ordinal rankings of credit risk across firms. At any point
in time, a firm’s credit rating is relative measure of creditworthiness, however, it
does not correspond to absolute default probabilities over time. That is, the actual
default probability implied by ratings may change over time. Issuer credit ratings
provide “an opinion of the obligor’s overall capacity and willingness to meet its
financial obligations as they come due - whether rated or not” (Standard and Poor’s
(2008b)). S&P issuer ratings reflect only the risk of default and does not incorporate
information about recovery rates.3 In addition, they do not take into account any
provisions of a particular debt issue. Failure to make payment on any debt obligation
leads to “Default” status in the issuer ratings.
Ratings are intended to measure the creditworthiness of a corporation over
long investment horizons. Short term fluctuations in the default risk due to busi-
ness cycles do not trigger rating changes. Agencies take a rating action only if
they perceive a permanent change in credit quality of a corporation. This method,
3On the other hand, Moody’s issuer ratings reflect both default risk and loss given default.
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known as “through-the-cycle” methodology, ensures that agencies maintain stability
of ratings and avoid rating reversals.4 Rating changes are triggered only when the
difference between the rating-implied credit quality and the current credit quality
is beyond some threshold. When triggered, ratings are adjusted partially i.e., there
is a prudent migration policy (Loffler (2004), Altman and Rijken (2004), Altman
and Rijken (2005)). The partial adjustment of ratings is believed to cause the se-
rial dependency documented by Altman and Kao (1992) and Lando and Skodeberg
(2002). In that sense, ratings do not posses Markovian properties. Both the path
leading to the current rating and the duration spent at the current rating category
is correlated with the subsequent upgrade or downgrade probability. This effect is
particularly prominent for downgrades: a downgrade is mostly followed by a further
downgrade.
Rating agencies are frequently criticized for being “too slow to update” their
ratings as a consequence of the through-the-cycle and prudent migration method-
ologies. In response to this criticism, agencies frequently emphasize the trade off
between rating stability and rating accuracy (Cantor and Mann (2006)). Beaver,
Shakespeare, and Soliman (2006) argue that “the properties of bond ratings are
shaped by the institutional incentives placed on them by their clientele”. Because
certified agency ratings are dominantly used by institutional investors in contract-
ing and portfolio governance rules, frequent reversal of ratings would lead to costly
portfolio re-balancing or other costly actions dictated by the contracts such as rat-
4Amato and Furfine (2004) examine the cyclical properties of ratings and find very little evidence
for cyclicality.
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ing triggers. As a result, agencies are conservative in updating ratings. For a broad
review of other criticisms pertaining to the rating agencies, see Frost (2007).
The article most related to this study is BLM. Using S&P bond level ratings,
BLM studies the investment grade rating standards between 1978 and 1995. They
show that the apparent deterioration of credit quality of US firms seems to be driven
at least partly by the stricter standards employed by the rating agencies. Moody’s
reports also show the dominance of downgrades over upgrades as early as Lucas and
Lonski (1992), and Carty and Fons (1993). Lucas and Lonski document that the
ratio of long term downgrades to upgrades deteriorated from a 1.17 average in the
1970s to 2.17 in the 1980s, reaching a record 4.93 in 1990. They also report that the
declining trend in ratings is accompanied by an increased rating activity. While only
6% of the rated issuers ended the calendar year with a different rating during the
1970s, this ratio rose to 12% during the 1980s. S&P ratings follow similar trends as
well. According to Standard and Poor’s (2008a), the average downgrade to upgrade
ratio between 1981 and 2008 is 1.58; an average of 1.66 in 1980s, 1.41 in 1990s and
1.71 between 2001 and 2008. The fact that the downgrades consistently outnumber
upgrades indicates the decline in average rating over time.
In a study similar to BLM, Gonis and Taylor (2009) examine the S&P corpo-
rate ratings for 69 UK firms between 1999-2004. In line with BLM, they find that
the increased number of downgrades relative to the upgrades is due to the increase
in rating agencies’ stringency. Doherty and Phillips (2002) analyze the reported
decline in property-liability insurer ratings by the agency A.M. Best over the period
1988 to 1999 while Pottier and Sommer (2003) examine life insurer ratings issued
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by A.M. Best and S&P between 1987 to 1999. Using a similar method, they report
findings which are consistent with BLM results. Becker and Milbourn (2009) ana-
lyze the effect of competition on rating standards. They document that the ratings
slightly loosen in certain industries after Fitch increases its market share. They find
that one standard deviation increase in Fitch’s market share is associated with an
increase in the average firm rating of 5-10% of one rating notch.
The failure of rating agencies to predict high profile corporate bankruptcies
such as Enron (December 2, 2001), Worldcom (July 21, 2002), California Utili-
ties and others, brought rating agencies under heavy scrutiny. The rating agencies
maintained investment grade ratings for these firms until several days before they
declared bankruptcy leading the mass media to question the quality and value of
the ratings. Section 702 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (July 25, 2002) requires SEC to
“conduct a study of the role and function of credit rating agencies in the operation
of the securities market”.5 The act also calls for examination of any barriers to entry
into the credit rating industry, and any measures needed to increase competition as
well as examination of any conflicts of interest in their operations.6
The increased regulatory pressure beginning with SOX resulted in the passage
of Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006. The main contribution of the act is to
open the credit rating industry up to more competition by making it easier for rating
companies to achieve Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization status.
5In their model, Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006) show that rating agencies play an im-
portant role as a coordinating mechanism in the economy where multiple equilibria can exist. Sufi
(2009) also provides evidence for real effects of debt certification.
6Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2009) model and study the conflicts of interests in the credit
rating agencies.
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Only ratings of NRSRO’s can be used for regulation purposes, creating a privilege
for the agencies which obtain the status.7 The act abolishes the SEC’s authority
to approve credit-rating agencies as NRSROs. Instead, it allows any agency with
three years of experience that satisfies certain criteria to register with the SEC as
a nationally recognized rating agency. With the new law, SEC is also granted the
authority to inspect NRSRO internal operations such as record-keeping, financial
reporting and managing conflicts of interest.8
Evidence complementary to my results is presented by Cheng and Neamtiu
(2009), who examine the quality of ratings in terms of timeliness, accuracy and
stability before and after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The authors define the window
before SOX (1 January 1996 - 25 July 2002) as the pre-criticism period and the
window after SOX (25 July 2002 - 31 Dec 2005) as the criticism period. They find
that the average ratings of defaulted companies in the one year period leading to
default are lower in the criticism period compared to pre-criticism period. They then
conclude that the agencies did not adhere to the best possible rating practices in
the pre-criticism period. The structural change in rating practices after high profile
corporate debacles is also noted by industry specialists. A 2004 UBS Investment
Bank Report (Pettit, Fitt, Orlov, and Kalsekar (2004)) notes that rating agencies
enjoyed substantial profits from disintermediation, the shift from bank based lending
7Earlier, the SEC granted the NRSRO status through a complex process. During the infamous
accounting scandals there were only 3 NRSRO’s: S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, whereas as of September
2009, there are 10 rating agencies qualifying for the status. (www.sec.gov)
8Frost (2007) states that “The large CRAs also have been the focus of attention internationally.
The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has been examining their role
in capital markets (IOSCO 2003a) and the European Parliament recently called on the European
Commission to assess the need for legislation to deal with the CRAs.”
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to capital market based lending, and the growth of speculative grade debt markets
until the accounting scandals of 2000-2002.9 However the scandals put them under
fire and forced them to take actions to restore confidence. The rating agencies
then made structural changes to their analytics, processes, personnel, and started
employing more conservative standards. Issuers must now expect more skepticism,
and more conservative ratings from the agencies.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
The goal of the analysis is to identify whether the ratings get more stringent
or loose over time. For the purposes of this paper, I use a narrow definiton of
stringency. If rating agencies used the model they used in 1985 to assign ratings
after 1985, I ask whether a firm holding same risk characteristics receive a higher
or lower rating. Higher ratings would imply loosening in standards, whereas lower
ratings would mean stringency.
In order to analyze the trends in rating standards, BLM estimate a panel of
ordered probit model, where they model ratings as a function of firm characteristics
and year indicator variables. Year indicators are then used to capture the strin-
gency/loosening in the rating standards relative to the left out year, i.e. first year
in the sample. I follow this approach. If the coefficient estimates are stable over
time, this method would measure the trends in standards correctly. However, if the
coefficients are changing, the year dummies might be misleading. In order to address
this problem, I also measure the trend using an alternative approach used by Fama
9See Rajan (2005) for further discussion about disintermediation.
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and French (2001) in their study of disappearing dividends (see also Hoberg and
Prabhala (2009)). I estimate the model coefficients using year 1985 only, and then
predict the ratings for the whole sample using these coefficient estimates. For each
observation, I calculate the residual, viz., actual rating minus predicted rating, and
then average the residuals over each year. The average residual of a particular year
then tells us, on the average, how many notches a firm’s actual rating differs from
its hypothetical rating calculated using 1985 standards. Since both methods provide
reasonably close results, I continue with the year dummy approach used by BLM. I
therefore estimate an ordered probit model where I model the ratings as a function
of BLM firm characteristics, additional control variables and year indicators. The





17 if Zit ∈ [ µ16, ∞)
16 if Zit ∈ [ µ15, µ16)
...
2 if Zit ∈ [ µ1, µ2)
1 if Zit ∈ (−∞, µ1)
(1.1)
Zit = αt + β
′Xit + εit (1.2)
E[εit|Xit] = 0 (1.3)
where Rit denotes the long term issuer rating of firm i at year t, αt the inter-
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cept for year t, β the vector of slope coefficients and Zit the latent variable linking
firm characteristics to the rating categories Rit according to partition points µi. Xit
is a matrix whose columns are variables Size, Operating Margin, Long Term Debt
Leverage, Total Debt Leverage, Idiosyncratic Risk, Systematic Risk, Interest Cov-
erage, Tangibility, Cash Balances, Retained Earnings, R&D, Capital Expenditures,
Dividend Payer, M/B.
In an ordered probit model, the magnitude of the coefficients is not econom-
ically meaningful. For instance, the year dummy coefficient estimates, αt, are in
units of the latent variable Zit, making it difficult to interpret their economic signifi-
cance. In order to assess the economic value, I convert the year indicator coefficients
αt to units of rating notches. I first calculate the average distance between adjacent
rating categories, i.e. average distance for one notch, by averaging the difference
between cut points, i.e. (µ16−µ1)/15. Then I report the year dummy coefficients as
multiples of this average distance. For the remaining explanatory variables, I follow
the common procedure to assess economic significance in discrete choice models. I
calculate the number of rating notches a firm would improve its rating given one
standard deviation increase in the relevant explanatory variable.
The firm characteristics I use in the study are listed below. Size, operating
margin, long term debt leverage, total debt leverage, idiosyncratic risk, systematic
risk and interest coverage variables follow BLM. BLM uses the three year averages
of the variables interest coverage, operating margin, LT debt leverage and total
debt leverage and I follow their practice. Based on the S&P reports (Standard and
Poor’s (2007), Standard and Poor’s (2008b)) and literature, I include the remaining
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variables. Compustat item codes are given in parentheses.
• Size: NYSE market capitalization percentile, i.e., the fraction of NYSE firms
having equal or smaller capitalization than firm i in year t.10
• Operating Margin: Operating income before depreciation (oibdp) to sales
(sale)
• LT Debt Leverage: Long term debt (dltt) to assets (at)
• Total Debt Leverage: Long term debt (dltt) plus short term debt (dlc),
divided by assets (at)
• Idiosyncratic Risk: A firms idiosyncratic risk is the root mean squared error
from a regression of its daily stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted index
return. One firm-year observation of idiosyncratic risk is computed using
firm-specific daily stock returns from one calendar year. A minimum of 50
observations in a calendar year are required to calculate idiosyncratic risk.11
• Systematic Risk: A firms systematic risk is market model beta estimated
from the above regression used to define idiosyncratic risk.
10BLM’s size measure is log of market capitalization deflated by cpi. This choice is criticized by
Cantor (2004) who claims that any trend in the market capitalization may lead to overstatement
of the decline in ratings. Following Fama and French (2001), I use NYSE market capitalization
percentile as a proxy for size to eliminate this problem.
11Although BLM control for idiosyncratic volatility, they standardize the variable before using it.
That is, they divide each idiosyncratic volatility observation by that year’s average value, creating
a variable with a mean of 1 in each year. Because it is de-trended, their idiosyncratic volatility
measure acts as a pure cross sectional variable and can not capture any decline in the ratings due
to rising idiosyncratic volatility. In order to control for the trends in idiosyncratic volatility, I do
not standardize it in my analysis.
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• Interest Coverage: Operating income after depreciation (oiadp) plus inter-
est expense (xint) divided by interest expense (xint). I modify the functional
form of the interest coverage in line with BLM. First, before taking the three
year averages, the ratio is set to zero for negative values. Any three-year av-
erage which is greater than 100, is bounded at 100. Then, to address the non-
linearity of the relation between interest coverage and credit risk, I break the
variable into four continuous variables, interest coverage-a to interest coverage-
d, which capture the incremental value of the interest coverage in intervals of
(0-5), (5-10), (10-20) and (20-100).
• Tangibility: Property plant and equipment - total (ppent) to assets (at)
• Cash Balances: Cash and short-term investments (che) to assets (at)
• Retained Earnings: Retained earnings (re) to assets (at)
• R&D: Research and development expense (xrd) to assets (at). If data item
xrd is missing, it is set to zero.
• Capital Expenditures: Capital expenditures (capx) to assets (at)
• Dividend Payer: A firm is a dividend payer in calendar year t if it has
positive dividends per share by the ex date (dvpsx f) in the fiscal year that
ends in year t.
• Market-to-Book: Book assets (at) minus book equity plus market equity
all divided by book assets (at). Market equity is calculated as fiscal year
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closing price (prcc f) times shares outstanding (csho). Book equity is defined
as stockholder’s equity (seq) minus preferred stock plus balance sheet deferred
taxes and investment tax credit (txditc). If data item txditc is missing it is
set to zero. If data item seq is not available, it is replaced by either common
equity (ceq) plus preferred stock par value (pstk), or assets (at) - liabilities
(lt). Preferred Stock is preferred stock liquidating value (pstkl) [or preferred
stock redemption value (pstkrv), or preferred stock par value (pstk)].
Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001), henceforth CLMX, document
that idiosyncratic volatility of US stocks increases dramatically between 1962 and
1997. Campbell and Taksler (2003) demonstrate a strong link between idiosyncratic
volatility and corporate bond yield spreads both in cross section and over time.
They show that rising idiosyncratic volatility helps to explain part of the increase
in corporate bond spreads between 1963 and 1999. Given the strong relevance of
idiosyncratic risk to credit risk, the increasing trend in idiosyncratic volatility can
be connected to the decline in credit ratings as well.
I add the additional control variables to the model for various reasons. The
relation of tangibility to credit risk and credit constraints is frequently demonstrated
in the literature (Rampini and Viswanathan (2010)). Cash holdings play a major
role to insulate companies from profitability shocks which might negatively affect
debt payment. Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) show that the cash holdings of the
US corporations have increased dramatically between 1980 and 2006. They present
evidence that the increasing cash trend is driven by precautionary motives to hold
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cash. Fama and French (2001) show that the propensity to pay dividends decline
between 1978 and 1999. Fama and French (2001) show that part of the decline is
explained by the changes in the firm characteristics but even after controlling for
firm characteristics the propensity to pay dividends decreases. Following Hoberg
and Prabhala (2009), it is possible that, some unobserved common source of risk
that drives the precautionary cash savings or dividend cuts, might also contribute
to the deterioration of credit risk of the firms. Therefore I include these variables
in the study.
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) argue that the earned/contributed cap-
ital mix, measured as retained earnings to total assets (RE/TA), is a proxy for a
firm’s stage in its life cycle, i.e. maturity, because it shows a firm’s ability to self
finance versus dependence on external finance. For the same reason, retained earn-
ings to assets is a credit risk factor. The firms in early stages of their life cycle (low
RE/TA) with high growth opportunities might finance them aggressively though
capital infusion, whereas more mature firms (high RE/TA) with abundant cumu-
lative profits may rely on internal capital. I therefore include this variable in the
analysis. Additionally I use the variables market to book, research and development,
and capital expenditures to proxy for investment and growth opportunities.
1.4 Data
My measure of credit rating is the S&P Long Term Issuer Level rating obtained
from the ADSPRATE database. This database contains monthly firm level rating
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data starting 1985. I convert the letter ratings into numerical equivalents using
an ordinal scale ranging from 1 for the lowest rated firms (CCC) to 17 for the
highest rated firms (AAA). Because I have very few observations with CCC rating,
I pool them together (CCC-, CCC, CCC+) to form the lowest ordinal category. I
exclude the observations with credit ratings indicating default from the analysis. I
gather firm level accounting data from the CRSP/Compustat Merged Fundamentals
Annual database. I exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999). If any missing
data item has a datacode 8 (insignificant), I set that item to zero. I obtain the daily
stock price data from the CRSP database. I use the calendar year end (December
31) values for the ratings. I match a rating observation to the latest Compustat
entry available before the year end. To minimize the effect of outliers, I winsorize
all continuous variables (except for the interest coverage which is modified on the
lines of BLM) at 1% and 99%.
The merger of all files and elimination of observations with missing values
in the variables result in a sample of 23,152 firm years. Roughly one fifth of the
firms in Compustat are rated. The rated percentage has increased to approximately
30% in the recent years. Table 1.1 documents the number of firms in each rating
category between the years 1985 - 2002. The table shows that, despite the increase
in the sample size, the number of firms in A, AA, and AAA rating categories is
steadily decreasing over the years, whereas the number of firms in B, BB, BBB
rating categories is increasing. That is, rating agencies tend to assign top ratings
less frequently compared to earlier years. The percentage of speculative grade firms
in the sample is progressively increasing: It is 37.3% in 1985, 47.8% in 2002 and in
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53.2% in 2007.
Table 1.2 displays the rating distribution of the firms that are rated for the first
time; the first time issuers. I identify the first time issuers as they first appear in the
ADSPRATE database.12 Table 1.2 shows that the majority of the increase in the
sample is caused by entry of speculative grade first time issuers. The speculative
grade first time issuers outnumber the investment grade first time issuers in the
majority of the study period. In particular, the bulk of the entry to the pool of
rated firms happens at B and BB categories. The number of first time issuers
appears to decline after 2001.
Table 1.3 documents the annual downgrade versus upgrade statistics. The
table shows that the number of downgrades consistently exceeds the number of
upgrades. In fact, the mean downgrade to upgrade ratio is 1.48 between 1986 and
2007. This number is comparable to 1.58, the ratio stated by S&P in their 2008
Default Study Report for the period 1981-2008 (Standard and Poor’s (2008a)). The
dominance of downgrades over upgrades is consistent with the decline in average
ratings. Notably, the downgrade to upgrade ratio peaks in year 2002 reaching the
level 4.02.
Table 2.9 presents the summary statistics for all variables. The average lever-
age ratios, viz., long term debt to assets and total debt to assets, are 31% and
36% respectively. Consistent with Faulkender and Peterson (2006), these ratios are
higher compared to average Compustat firms. Figure 1.1 displays the sample medi-
12Because the ADSPRATE database starts in 1985, I can identify the first time issuers beginning
1986.
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ans of select variables for rating categories BBB, A and AA and over time. There
are interesting trends. The medians of interest coverage, operating margin and size
steadily increase over the study period. Notably, the median interest coverage ratio
improves even more sharply after 2002. Similarly, the leverage ratios given rating
categories tend to decrease over the study period. Furthermore, the decrease is
more prominent in the post 2002 period. Idiosyncratic volatility trends upward,
peaks around 2000-2001 and then decline sharply afterwards. Retained earnings to
assets ratio also appears to increase after 2000. The figure is consistent with the
argument that the rating agencies required investment grade firms to have better
characteristics in 2007 compared to 1985 to achieve the same rating.
1.5 Empirical Results
1.5.1 Coefficient Estimates for Control Variables
In this section, I estimate the ordered probit model given in Equations 1.1,
1.2, and 1.3 for period 1985 - 2007. Table 1.5 presents the coefficient estimates for
the entire sample. Except for M/B, the coefficients of all firm characteristics are
statistically significant. The signs of BLM variables are consistent with their results.
Interest coverage, operating margin, size (NYSE%) have positive signs. Systematic
risk, idiosyncratic risk and long term debt leverage enters with a negative sign. As
in BLM, the estimated coefficient of total debt leverage variable has the opposite
of its predicted sign. This observation suggests that on the average, controlling for
long term debt, firms with higher short term debt have higher ratings. The major-
19
ity of the remaining variables have the expected signs. Dividend payers have higher
credit ratings, as they are generally less volatile firms with steady income streams.
Maturity, proxied by higher retained earnings is associated with higher credit rat-
ings. Firms with more tangible assets and firms with higher growth opportunities
measured by R&D expenditures have lower credit risk. However, the coefficient
of cash balances variable is inconsistent with the expectations. Intuition suggests
that firms with higher cash balances should have lower credit risk and higher credit
ratings but empirically we observe the opposite. This empirical irregularity is stud-
ied in Acharya, Davydenko, and Strebulaev (2008). The authors argue that the
precautionary cash holdings can explain the observed pattern. In their model, en-
dogenously determined optimal cash balances are positively related to credit risk,
while exogenous components of cash balances are negatively related.
In an ordered probit model, the coefficient estimates are in units of the la-
tent variable and hence it is difficult to interpret their economic significance. One
approach to assess the economic significance is to calculate the product of the esti-
mated coefficient and the standard deviation of the relevant independent variable.
This product measures the change in conditional expectation in the latent variable
given one standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable. One can then
compare this product to the size of the partitions to interpret economic importance.
Dividing this product by the average distance between the rating categories (i.e.
average rating notch length is calculated as (µ16 − µ1)/15) represents the number
of rating notches a firm would improve its rating given one standard deviation in-
crease in the relevant explanatory variable. The third column in Table 1.5 presents
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this measure for each explanatory variable.13 Table 1.5 shows that size is one of
the most important variables in determining ratings. A one standard deviation in-
crease in NYSE% increases the credit rating by 1.30 notches. Notably, idiosyncratic
volatility also has a substantial effect on ratings. A one standard deviation increase
in idiosyncratic volatility decreases the firm rating by 0.83 notches. Surprisingly,
according to this measure, idiosyncratic volatility has a larger economic importance
than long term debt leverage. A one standard deviation increase in long term debt
reduces the rating by 0.78 notches.
Table 1.6 presents the results of the ordered probit model estimated separately
for the investment grade and speculative grade subsamples. The majority of the
variables have the same signs for these two samples. There are, however, a few
exceptions. In the investment grade sample, long term debt leverage and total debt
leverage have signs consistent with the whole sample but these signs are reversed
for speculative grade firms. More specifically, for the speculative grade firms, total
debt has a negative sign, while long term debt has a positive sign (insignificant).
This observation suggests that, unlike the investment grade sample, what matters
for speculative firms is the total debt leverage. The insignificance of long term
debt leverage can be due to inability of speculative grade firms to issue substantial
amount of long term debt. Another difference is that, systematic risk is insignificant
for speculative grade firms. It suggests that idiosyncratic volatility is more relevant
in measuring risk for these firms. Market-to-book enters with a positive sign for
13An example clarifies the calculation: For the entire sample, rating notch length is (µ16−µ1)/15
= 0.555. The coefficient of variable size (NYSE%) is 0.125 and standard deviation of size from
Table 2.9 is 5.788. Therefore, one standard deviation increase in size increases the credit rating by
0.125× 5.788/0.555 = 1.303 notches.
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investment grade, while it has negative sign for speculative grade. As a result,
the variable is insignificant in the entire sample. Similarly, R&D is positive for
investment grade firms but negative (insignificant) for speculative grade firms. These
observations suggest that the apparent growth opportunities do not improve credit
risk for speculative firms. It is possible that excessive risk taking in speculative grade
firms increases the value of equity, and hence M/B, but hurts the bond holders. This
risk shifting behavior may be responsible for the observed negative correlation. Table
1.6 shows that the negative sign of cash balances for the entire sample is driven
by the speculative grade firms. Consistent with intuition, cash holdings improve
ratings for investment grade firms. The sign of cash holdings, however, is negative
for speculative grade sample. Endogenously determined high cash holdings may be
a symptom of other problems such as credit constraints for speculative grade firms.
1.5.2 Time Trends
The main focus of this study is the time series variation in rating standards,
which is proxied by the pattern of year indicator variables relative to the omitted
year 1985. Table 1.5 presents the coefficient estimates of year indicator variables for
the entire sample. The majority of the year indicators 1986-2002 have coefficient
estimates close to 0. An examination of the year indicators 1986-2002 suggests that
there is no clear trend in the magnitude of year indicators. The majority of these
variables are also not statistically different from 0. These observations are consistent
with stable standards between 1985 and 2002 for the whole sample. However, the
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year indicators 2003 - 2007 have negative signs and they are statistically significant
at 1% level. This observation suggests that the standards have tightened for the
entire sample after 2002.
To describe the time trend, I convert the year indicator variables to units of
rating notches. I compare the coefficient of the year indicators to the size of the
partitions. That is, I divide the coefficient estimates by the rating notch length.
This ratio measures the size of year dummies in terms of the number of rating
notches. The fourth column in Table 1.5 displays this measure of year indicators.
Figure 1.2 plots the same column. Figure 1.2 clearly shows that year indicators are
generally stable until 2002, after which they display a steady downward trend. This
pattern suggests that rating agencies applied stable standards for the entire sample
until 2002. However, after a sharp structural break at 2002, they gradually move
towards stringent standards. If a firm keeps all characteristics constant between 1985
and 2007, it preserves its rating until 2002, however its rating declines 1.5 notches
between 2002 and 2007.14 The structural break is also economically significant. A
firm’s AAA rating would slide to AA or AA+ between 2002 and 2007 given constant
firm characteristics.
Next I examine the rating standards for investment grade and speculative
grade subsamples. Panel B of Table 1.6 displays the year indicator coefficients
for speculative and investment grade subsamples. The results are striking. The
table shows that there is a stark difference in the evolution of rating standards for
14For year 2007, the coefficient estimate is -0.903. I calculate the rating notch length as µ16 −
µ1/15 = 0.555. Therefore the coefficient is equal to -0.903/0.5555 = -1.626 rating notches. This
measure is the drop in rating between years 1985 and 2007. In year 2002, the year dummy variable
is at -0.105 notches. Hence, the drop between 2002 and 2007 is about 1.5 notches.
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investment grade ratings and speculative grade ratings. The year indicator variables
have consistently negative sign for investment grade firms. However, in contrast
to investment grade results, the majority of year indicator variables have positive
sign in the speculative grade sample. Furthermore, most of these coefficients are
statistically significant at the 1% level. These observations suggests that the rating
agencies tightened the standards for the investment grade ratings while relaxing
them in the speculative grade ratings.
Again, I convert the coefficient estimates to units of rating notches by dividing
them with the rating notch length estimated from each sample. This measure of
year indicators is given in columns 3 and 6 of Panel B in Table 1.6.15 Figure 1.3
provides the plot of column 3. Figure 1.4 displays the plot of column 6. Figure
1.3 shows that, for investment grade sample, intercepts display a declining trend
throughout 1985-2007 (except for the period 1997-2002). More specifically, holding
firm characteristics constant, the standards tighten by 1.1. notches between 1985-
2002. However, Figure 1.4 documents that the time trends in speculative grade
sample is in stark contrast to investment grade sample during this period. For the
speculative grade firms, the year dummies display an increasing trend. Namely, the
standards get relaxed by 0.6 notches between 1985-2002. This divergent pattern in
the standards of investment grade and speculative grade firms is puzzling. Particu-
larly, the loosening in speculative grade can have important implications. In Section
1.5.3, I discuss in detail the significance of this finding and my interpretations.
15An example clarifies the calculation: For the investment grade sample, the year indicator
coefficient for 2007 is -1.280. The rating notch length is µ9 − µ1/8 = 0.532, where µ1 − µ9 are
estimated using the investment grade sample. Therefore the coefficient is equal to -1.280/0.532 =
-2.403 rating notches.
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Figures 1.3 and 1.4 also show that consistent with the entire sample, there is
an apparent structural break towards more stringent standards around 2002, in both
investment grade and speculative grade samples. For the speculative grade, the year
indicators stop increasing and reverse direction. That is, around 2002 the standards
cease to loosen and begin tightening. For the investment grade, after 2002, the
year indicators decline at a steeper rate compared to 1985-2002 period. In other
words, the standards begin tightening at an accelerated rate. The results are also
economically significant. For investment grade sample, holding firm characteristics
constant, a firm’s rating declines 1.3 notches between 2002 and 2007. For speculative
grade sample, the decline in rating amounts to 1 notch.
The Figures 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 indicate a structural break at 2002, which is
robustly observed in entire sample, investment grade sample and speculative grade
sample. To verify the patterns suggested in these figures, I conduct statistical tests
for a structural break in the level and slope of year indicators of the ordered probit
model given in Section 1.3. Panel A of Table 1.7 tests whether the intercepts before
and after 2002 are equal. For this test, I replace Equation 1.2 with Equation 1.4
and re-estimate the model given in Section 1.3.
Zit = b0D + β
′Xit + εit (1.4)
That is, the year indicators are removed from Equation 1.2 and replaced with a
single dummy variable D, which takes value 1 for years 2003-2007 and 0 otherwise.
Panel A reports the coefficient estimate b0 of dummy variable D, the coefficient
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estimate in units of rating step length i.e. b0
(µ16−µ1)\15 , and the P-value for Wald test
for the hypothesis that b0 is equal to 0. The Wald test rejects null of equal intercepts
at p-levels indistinguishable from 0 for whole sample, investment grade sample and
speculative grade sample. Hence, I conclude that the level of intercepts before and
after 2002 are different.
Panel B of Table 1.7 presents tests for the structural break in the slopes of
the year indicators. Here I test whether the rate of change in rating standards is
different between 1985-2002 and 2002-2007. For instance, Figure 1.3 suggests that,
for the investment grade sample, the rate at which ratings tighten is higher post
2002 compared to 1985-2002 period. However, it is not clear whether this difference
is statistically significant. For this test, I replace Equation 1.2 with Equation 1.5
and re-estimate the model given in Section 1.3.
Zit = b0D + b1tD + b2t(1−D) + β′Xit + εit (1.5)
where D is a dummy variable that takes 1 for 2003-2007 and 0 otherwise, and t takes
values 1 to 23 for years 1985 to 2007. Namely, the year indicators in Equation 1.2
are replaced with two trend variables to proxy for the slope of the year indicators
for periods 1985-2002 and 2003-2007. The dummy variable D is also included to
allow different intercepts before and after 2002. The coefficients estimates b1 and
b2 measure the rate at which rating standards change. For instance, for investment
grade sample, I expect to find that b2 is significantly greater than b1. Panel B
displays coefficient estimates for b1 and b2, and Wald Test P-Values for the equality
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of the slopes b1 and b2. The Wald test again strongly rejects the equality of the
slopes b1 and b2 for whole sample, investment grade sample and speculative grade
sample. For the whole sample b1 is 0 and b2 is negative consistent with stable
standards until 2002 and a shift to stricter ratings after 2002. For speculative grade
sample b1 is positive and b2 is negative indicating the loosening in ratings until the
break and the reversal to stringency afterwards. For the investment grade sample,
both b1 and b2 are negative however b2 is bigger in absolute value. This result shows
that the rate of decline in investment grade ratings is greater post 2002 compared
to 1985-2002 period. These results suggest that the apparent structural break in
2002 is also statistically significant.
1.5.3 Discussion
The analysis shows a puzzling divergent pattern in investment grade and spec-
ulative grade standards between 1985-2002. During this period, rating agencies
tighten the standards in investment grade, while relaxing the standards in spec-
ulative grade. The loose standards in speculative grade are consistent with the
widely criticized performance of rating agencies during the Dot-Com crash. The
default rates rise to record levels in 2000 (2.42%), 2001 (3.74%) and in 2002 (3.51%)
(Standard and Poor’s (2008a)). Notably, the standards for speculative grade ratings
became the most loose between 2000 and 2002. The loose standards could play a
role in the high default rates observed during this period. One channel for this role
is, the loose standards can attract further entry to the universe of rated firms by
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the high credit risk issuers. If this is the case, the loose standards can contribute to
the excessive defaults rates by making debt markets more accessible to low credit
quality firms. Consistent with this argument, the speculative grade first time issuers
consistently outnumber the investment grade first time issuers in the majority of the
study period.
The loosening standards in speculative grade credits can also reconcile the
apparent puzzle between the heavy criticism for rating agencies and the BLM strin-
gency trends. Before 2002, the tightening in standards is limited to the investment
grade firms where the default rates are extremely rare in any case. However, his-
torically, the majority of the corporate defaults is observed in speculative grade
category. These standards were indeed loosened. These findings yield another in-
teresting observation. While the media focused on failure of rating agencies in high
profile corporate debacles, the more serious problem was in the speculative grade
rating assignments.
One explanation for the loosening standards in speculative grade debt is the
unintentional systematic error in rating agency practices. The explanation I find
most plausible is that, the loose standards may be the result of the agency problems
induced by the issuer-pays rating model. The disintermediation, viz., the shift from
bank based lending to capital market based lending, increased the role of rating
agencies in the economy (Rajan (2005)). Particularly the rapid growth in speculative
grade debt created substantial business opportunity for the rating agencies (Pettit,
Fitt, Orlov, and Kalsekar (2004)). Table 1.1 shows the universe of rated speculative
grade firms expands throughout the study period. The percentage of speculative
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grade firms in the sample increases from 37.3% in 1985, to 47.8% in 2002 and to
53.2% in 2007. Table 1.2 documents that the majority of the increase is due to
speculative grade first time issuers. The agency problems caused by the issuer-pays
rating model could play a role here. Fist time issuers create a flow of revenues
for rating agencies. Hence, rating agencies have incentives to provide more issuer-
friendly ratings in order to attract further business in this fast growing asset class.
The same forces appear to be at play before the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Similar
to the growth in speculative credits, asset backed securities of subprime loans were
newly rated instruments which experienced a rapid expansion post 2002. The rating
agencies substantially benefited from the revenues of the new deal flows in these
securities. Parallel to the speculative grade ratings, the ratings on these instruments
also appear loose ex-post.
The analysis also shows that there is a structural break in the rating stan-
dards in 2002, after which the rating agencies act stricter in assigning ratings. This
result is striking given the recent mass criticism towards rating agencies for employ-
ing loose standards. What could be potential factors that led the rating agencies
to tighten their standards post 2002? The increased regulatory scrutiny beginning
with SOX could be one driving factor that forced the rating agencies to move to-
wards stricter ratings. It is possible that tighter ratings could prevent regulation
in rating industry (Cheng and Neamtiu (2009)). The SOX also opens up discus-
sions about the lack competition in the rating industry. The threat to the rating
agencies’ oligopoly could also affect agencies’ incentives for tighter ratings (Cheng
and Neamtiu (2009)). Reputation concerns could also achieve the same outcome.
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Rating agencies view their reputation as absolutely critical for their business. As
Becker and Milbourn (2009) note, S&P claims that “Reputation is more important
than revenues”. When faced with widespread criticism, concern for their reputation
might lead the rating agencies to act more conservatively in their rating process.
Another possible explanation is that, after the infamous accounting scandals, the
rating agencies might view the financial reports and forecasts of companies more
skeptically (Pettit, Fitt, Orlov, and Kalsekar (2004)). Skepticism might lead agen-
cies to discount favorable information while incorporating it into ratings.
As an alternative explanation of the tightening standards, it is possible that
today’s economic environment is riskier than it was in the past (Rajan (2005)). In
other words, the meaning of the variables might have changed over time. In that
case, the firms might need to maintain better characteristics to achieve same credit
quality in today’s environment compared to earlier years. However, this alternative
explanation necessitates a structural shift in the riskiness of economic environment
around 2002 to reconcile the findings of this paper. It is also difficult to reconcile this
explanation with the divergent pattern between investment grade and speculative
grade standards before 2002.
The structural shift towards strict standards post 2002 can have several im-
plications. The tightening standards can affect a firm’s cost of debt, capital ratios,
the nature of clientele holding the firm’s bonds and make it harder for a firm to
achieve its target rating. Credit ratings are a gateway to access debt markets.16 It
16Faulkender and Peterson (2006) document that 78% of the bonds outstanding are issued by
rated firms. Also, stock and bond prices move in expected directions in response to rating changes
(Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992a)).
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is well known that credit spreads are positively related to credit ratings (Kao and
Wu (1990)). Therefore, stricter ratings might lead to higher cost of debt for firms
if the markets do not recognize the change in standards. Credit ratings play a sub-
stantial role in capital market regulations such as determining capital requirements,
disclosure requirement and investment prohibitions.17 More stringent standards may
cause the firms’ rating to fall below the boundary rating required by some regula-
tions and affect capital ratio requirements and nature of clientele buying the bonds
of a firm. There is ample evidence to suggest that managers target credit ratings
due to the advantages of high ratings. According to Graham and Harvey (2001) sur-
vey, maintaining a credit rating is the second most important factor for managers
in choosing the degree of leverage, ranking immediately after financial flexibility.
Kisgen (2006) shows that credit rating targets directly affect capital structure deci-
sions. Hovakimian, Kayhan, and Titman (2009) show that rating targets influence
other corporate financial policies as well. The findings in this paper suggest that,
especially after 2002 managers are now faced with tougher requirements to achieve
their target ratings.
17Cantor and Packer (1997) provides a summary of the ratings based regulation rules. Banks
are prohibited from purchasing speculative grade securities since 1936. Insurers are obliged to
hold a higher capital requirement on low rated bonds beginning 1951. Since 1989, pension funds
are allowed to invest in asset backed securities rated A and higher and S&Ls are prohibited from
investing in speculative grade bonds. In 1991, SEC brought limits to low rated bond holdings of
money market mutual funds.
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1.6 Robustness Tests
In this section, I address the robustness of the findings. I first consider addi-
tional variables in the model to alleviate the concerns that missing variables might
be driving the results. Then I establish robustness to the year dummy approach I
utilize to measure the time series variation in rating standards. Next, I show that
the results apply similarly to sample of first time issuers and the sample of firms
that existed in 1985.
1.6.1 Robustness to Additional Variables
One criticism that could invalidate the findings of this paper is that the year
indicators might be merely capturing the time trend in an omitted variable. This
criticism can never be fully addressed, however demonstrating the robustness of the
results to further variables that are potentially related to credit risk can mitigate the
concern. I consider several variables, which I list below. I show that the addition
of these variables causes only minor changes in the plots and has practically no
effect on the results . Figure 1.5, Figure 1.6, and Figure 1.7 show the pattern of
year indicators for the entire sample, investment grade sample and speculative grade
sample after controlling for these variables.
• Industry Dummies: I control for Fama-French 49 Industry dummies to
account for changing industry characteristics.
• Net Working Capital: I calculate net working capital as current assets (act)
- current liabilities (lct) scaled by assets.
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• Debt Maturity: I control for the debt maturity. From the balance sheets,
I do not observe the exact maturity of a firm’s debt however I do know the
amount of debt payable in 1 through 5 years. I control for debt payable in
each of the next five years (dd1 through dd5 scaled by assets).
• Pension Funding Status: Following Rauh (2009), I calculate the pension
funding status as pension assets (pplao + pplau) - pension liabilities (pbpro
- pbpru) scaled by pension liabilities. Alternatively I scale the variable by
firm assets rather than pension liabilities. Additionally I experiment with an
alternative pension funding status variable (pcppao) scaled by firm assets.
• Firm Age: I calculate firm age as the number of years since the first time
the firm has positive assets and sales in Compustat.
• Firm Fixed Effects: I control for firm fixed effects in order to account for
the change in composition of firms in the sample.18
• Discretionary Accruals: Jorion, Shi, and Zhang (2009) argue that earning
management activities by the firms can explain the tightening in rating stan-
dards. Gu and Zhao (2006) present opposing findings and show that accrual
management can not be responsible for the over-time downward trend in bond
ratings. As in Gu and Zhao (2007), I calculate discretionary accruals based on
Jones (1991) model to proxy for the earnings management activities. Addition
of this variable to the model causes only minor changes in the pattern of year
dummy variables, as Figure 1.5, Figure 1.6 and Figure 1.7 demonstrate.
18For this estimation, I use OLS estimator instead of ordered probit.
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1.6.2 Robustness of Year Indicator Approach
The year dummy approach requires a strong underlying assumption that the
slope coefficients of the model are constant through time. This assumption is re-
strictive and probably not correct. If the slope coefficients are changing over time,
intercepts can be misleading as measure of rating standards. In this section I utilize
alternative methods to measure trends in rating standards. I establish the robust-
ness of entire sample, investment grade sample and speculative grade results.
First, I present the robustness of year indicator approach in the entire sample
results. I re-estimate the model given in Equations 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 year by year in the
spirit of Fama and MacBeth (1973) after dropping year indicators, αt, from Equation
1.2. I then use the method outlined in Fama and French (2001) to measure trends
in ratings. I first average the annual coefficients and partition points to arrive at the
Fama-Machbeth model. Next I predict the fitted ratings based on this model. Later I
calculate the residual rating as the difference between the actual and fitted ratings.
The annual averages of the residuals provide me with the changes in standards
compared to the average standards between 1985-2007. For the entire sample, the
trend obtained using this method is plotted in Panel D of Figure 1.8. The pattern
is almost identical to the trend given by year indicators.
The Fama-Macbeth approach given in the previous paragraph, calculates the
trend in ratings compared to average standards between 1985-2007. Next I measure
the trends directly according to the standards employed in 1985. If a firm maintained
firm characteristics that it had in 1985 throughout 1985-2007, would its rating be
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higher or lower in the following years? Lower ratings would mean tightening, whereas
higher ratings would mean loosening in standards. To answer this question, I first
estimate the 1985 standards; I estimate the ordered probit model using data in 1985
only. I then use the coefficients obtained from this model to predict fitted ratings.
Again, the annual averages of the residuals provide me with the changes in standards
relative to the 1985 standards. For the entire sample, the result is illustrated in Panel
A of Figure 1.8. The trend is virtually identical to the year indicator approach given
in Figure 1.2. To further verify the robustness of the results, I repeat the same
analysis for 1996 standards and 2007 standards. I plot the trend with respect to
1996 standards and 2007 standards in Panel B and C of Figure 1.8. It is interesting
to note that, when measured according to 2007 standards, the decline in ratings
after 2002 is about 2 rating notches, which is higher than the 1.5 notches estimated
using year indicator approach. This observation suggests that the estimate of 1.5
notches in Section 1.5.2 is possibly a conservative measure of post 2002 tightening
in ratings.
Next, I present the robustness of year indicator approach in the investment
grade sample and speculative grade sample. I repeat the same methods described
above for these subsamples. Figure 1.9 presents the robustness results for investment
grade firms. Figure 1.10 presents the robustness results for speculative grade firms.
It is evident from these figures that there are only minor differences in the results
when I use alternative methods to measure time series variation in rating standards.
When I divide the sample into investment grade and speculative grade sub-
samples and estimate the respective trends using year dummy approach as in Section
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1.5.2, I restrict the model to fit ratings only within that relevant sample. For in-
stance, when I estimate the model for investment grade sample, the model can not
fit speculative grade ratings to the observations. This problem might induce a bias
in the estimation of stringency/looseness. To eliminate any bias induced by this
truncation of sample, I utilize an alternative approach. I estimate the model for the
entire sample year-by-year using the Fama-Macbeth approach. I average the annual
coefficients and partition points to arrive at the Fama-Machbeth model. Next I
predict the fitted ratings based on this model. Then I calculate the residual rat-
ing as the difference between the actual and fitted ratings. Finally, I average the
residuals for each year over investment grade (speculative grade) category ratings to
calculate the trend for investment grade (speculative grade) sample. This method
yields results very similar to the year dummy approach. The trend for investment
grade category is almost identical to the year dummy approach given in Figure
1.3. The trend calculated for speculative grade is similar to the year dummy trend
given in Figure 1.4 with one difference. The pattern is amplified: The loosening in
ratings until 2002 is 1 notch with this specification. Also, loosening in ratings by
2000 amounts to 1.5 notches. Hence it is possible that the year dummy estimates
provide conservative estimates of loosening in speculative grade ratings. The drop
in speculative grade after 2002 is about 1.7 notches, which is also higher from year
dummy estimates given in Figure 1.4.
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1.6.3 First Time Issuers
It is possible that the first time issuers have different risk characteristics than
the existing firms and the observed patterns in rating standards are driven solely
by the first time issuers entering the sample. Therefore, it is important to establish
the robustness of the the results to these new entrants. First, I conduct tests which
exclude first time issuers. I calculate time series variation in credit rating standards
for entire sample, investment grade sample and speculative grade sample using only
the firms that existed in 1985. Because there is exit from the sample but no entry,
for the entire sample, the sample size decreases steadily from 724 in 1985 to 254 in
2007, resulting in a total of 9,101 firm-years. Figure 1.11 plots the year indicator
variables for 1985 firms and compares them to results obtained using all firms. Panel
A displays the results for entire sample, panel B for investment grade sample and
panel C for speculative grade sample. It is evident from the figure that the results
are robust to exclusion of first time issuers.
Next, I explore the trends in rating standards using first time issuers only.
For this test, in each year I keep only the firms that appear in the ADSPRATE
database for the first time. For the entire sample, the restriction yields 1786 firm-
year observations ranging from 20 observations in 1990 to 207 firms in 1998. The
results for this experiment is given in Figure 1.12. Panel A displays the results
for entire sample, panel B for investment grade sample and panel C for speculative
grade sample. The result is striking. Despite the small sample size, these newly
rated firms closely follow the pattern identified using all firms. Notably, the first
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time issuers sample and the 1985 sample are mutually exclusive, yet, they display
consistent trends. Overall, I conclude that the results robustly hold for first time
issuers and the firms that exist in 1985.
1.6.4 Idiosyncratic Volatility and Trends in Ratings
Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) demonstrates that idiosyncratic
risk of US stocks increase substantially between 1962 and 1997. Brandt, Brav,
Graham, and Kumar (2010) find that idiosyncratic risk peaks around 2000 and
then trends downward, falling below 1990 levels by 2007. Campbell and Taksler
(2003) document that, cross sectionally, idiosyncratic volatility is as important a
determinant of bond spreads as credit ratings. Campbell and Taksler (2003) also
provide evidence to link idiosyncratic volatility to credit risk in time series. They
find that increasing idiosyncratic volatility partially explains the widening of credit
spreads between 1963 and 1999. Because BLM standardize idiosyncratic volatility,
they do not allow for this variable to explain the time trends in ratings. By not
standardizing idiosyncratic risk, I test whether the trend in idiosyncratic risk might
be a contributing factor to the decline in ratings. In this section, I formally test the
conjecture that the increasing idiosyncratic volatility explains downward trend in
ratings. Because my model already controls for both the trend and cross sectional
components of idiosyncratic volatility, I regress the year indicators obtained from
BLM model on aggregate idiosyncratic volatility to test this conjecture. I calculate
the aggregate idiosyncratic volatility using CLMX methodology described in Brandt,
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Brav, Graham, and Kumar (2010).
Table 1.8 presents the result of this regression for periods of 1985 - 2002 and
1985 - 2007, for all samples. For the period 1985-2002, I find that idiosyncratic
volatility is significantly related to decline in ratings for all samples; whole sam-
ple, investment grade sample and speculative grade sample. The year dummies
estimated from BLM model for speculative grade sample display mildly increasing
trend until 1992 and then trend downwards. Due to this change in direction around
1992, I test the speculative grade sample against idiosyncratic volatility for the peri-
ods 1992-2002 and 1992-2007. In spite of having only 11 observations, idiosyncratic
volatility significantly explains part of the trend in ratings for speculative grade
sample as well.
It is evident from Table 1.8 that, for the whole period 1985-2007, idiosyn-
cratic volatility is not significant and R2’s indicate that the variable has no explana-
tory power. This result is probably due to the reversal in idiosyncratic volatility
trend after 2000. Intuitively one would expect ratings to improve after the idiosyn-
cratic volatility comes down, however ratings continue to decrease even after the
turnaround in idiosyncratic volatility. Overall, the tests suggest that trends in id-
iosyncratic volatility can partially explain declining trends in ratings before 2002 but
not between 2002 and 2007. This finding is consistent with the notion of structural
break at year 2002.
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1.7 Conclusion
The credit rating agencies are under intense scrutiny following the high profile
corporate debacles of Dot-Com crash. The mass media and the regulatory agencies
frequently criticize rating agencies for employing loose standards. In this paper, I
examine the time series variation in credit rating standards for the period 1985-2007,
to investigate whether the criticism of relaxed standards is empirically supported,
particularly in light of BLM’s findings that the ratings are indeed tightening.
I find that, the investment grade ratings tighten between 1985-2002. However,
in contrast to investment grade ratings, the speculative grade ratings loosen during
the same period. The loose standards in speculative grade is consistent with the
widespread criticism for rating agencies during the Dot-Com crash. Additionally,
I find that there is a structural break towards “more stringent” standards around
2002, in both investment grade and speculative grade ratings. The structural break
is both statistically and economically significant. Following the structural break,
I find that the ratings tighten 1.5 notches between 2002 and 2007 holding firm
characteristics constant. The 1.5 notches tightening in standards translates into 12
basis points higher cost of debt for firms in 2007 relative to 2002. The structural
break corresponds with the intense scrutiny beginning with the high profile corporate
failures such as Enron and the subsequent passage of SOX. This is consistent with the
argument that rating agencies began employing more conservative rating practices
following SOX.
The divergent pattern in investment and speculative grade standards prior to
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2002 is puzzling. One explanation is that, the root cause of the loose standards
in speculative grade is the agency problems due to issuer-pays rating model. I
show that, the universe of rated speculative credits go through an expansion phase
between 1985-2002 and majority of the growth is due to the speculative grade first
time issuers. Loose standards can be due to the incentives of rating agencies to
encourage further entry by the speculative grade first time issuers. Such process
can also be supported by the loose ratings on structured finance products during
the 2007/2008 crisis. Similar to the expansion in speculative credits, the mortgage
backed securities of the subprime loans were new entrants and the rating agencies
enjoyed the rapid growth of this asset class post 2002. Further research is needed
to sort out whether this problem is indeed caused by agency issues or merely due to






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.3: Summary of Annual Rating Changes
This table displays the annual rating changes for the entire sample; number and per-
centages of downgrades and upgrades, as well as the annual downgrade to upgrade ratio.
Rating changes are calculated as the difference in ratings from the first to the last day
of each year. All intermediate ratings are disregarded. The sample includes non-financial
public firms with a Long Term Issuer Credit Rating and non-missing observations on the
variables used in the analysis. The sample does not include withdrawn ratings or issuers
in default.
Year Issuers (As of Jan 1) Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade% Upgrade% Down/Up
1986 724 123 54 16.99 7.46 2.28
1987 803 93 61 11.58 7.60 1.52
1988 825 79 74 9.58 8.97 1.07
1989 779 80 83 10.27 10.65 0.96
1990 727 100 56 13.76 7.70 1.79
1991 683 81 64 11.86 9.37 1.27
1992 690 86 87 12.46 12.61 0.99
1993 763 84 89 11.01 11.66 0.94
1994 843 76 72 9.02 8.54 1.06
1995 890 93 107 10.45 12.02 0.87
1996 957 80 111 8.36 11.60 0.72
1997 1080 101 135 9.35 12.50 0.75
1998 1182 135 125 11.42 10.58 1.08
1999 1283 164 95 12.78 7.40 1.73
2000 1258 178 82 14.15 6.52 2.17
2001 1262 237 76 18.78 6.02 3.12
2002 1224 265 66 21.65 5.39 4.02
2003 1223 218 109 17.83 8.91 2.00
2004 1225 129 120 10.53 9.80 1.08
2005 1246 156 149 12.52 11.96 1.05
2006 1216 158 124 12.99 10.20 1.27
2007 1187 143 151 12.05 12.72 0.95
Mean - - - 12.70 9.55 1.48
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics
This table displays sample summary statistics for the entire sample. The sample includes
non-financial public firms with a Long Term Issuer Credit Rating and non-missing ob-
servations on the variables used in the analysis. NYSE% is NYSE market capitalization
percentile, Operating Margin is operating income before depreciation (oibdp) to sales
(sale), LT Debt is long term debt (dltt) to assets (at). Total Debt is long term debt (dltt)
plus short term debt (dlc), divided by assets (at). Id. Risk is the RMSE from a regression
of the firm’s daily stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted index return. Beta is market
model beta estimated from the same regression used to define idiosyncratic risk. Inter-
est Coverage is operating income after depreciation (oiadp) plus interest expense (xint)
divided by interest expense (xint). Tangibility is property plant and equipment - total
(ppent) to assets (at). Cash Balances is cash and short-term investments (che) to assets
(at). RETA is Retained earnings (re) to assets (at). R&D is research and development
expense (xrd) to assets (at). Capex is capital expenditures (capx) to assets (at). Dividend
Payeris a dummy variable equal to 1 in calendar year t if the firm has positive dividends
per share by the ex date (dvpsx f) in the fiscal year that ends in year t. M/B is Book
assets (at) minus book equity plus market equity all divided by book assets (at).
Mean 25 % Median 75 % Std. Dev.
Interest Coverage 7.226 2.494 4.102 7.112 11.526
Operating Margin 0.174 0.091 0.149 0.241 0.147
LT Debt 0.310 0.181 0.283 0.400 0.189
Total Debt 0.357 0.228 0.332 0.449 0.192
NYSE % 11.926 7.000 13.000 17.000 5.788
Beta 0.891 0.529 0.837 1.180 0.506
Idiosyncratic Risk 0.024 0.015 0.020 0.028 0.013
Dividend Payer 0.607 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.489
M/B 1.563 1.062 1.296 1.750 0.819
R&D 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.032
RETA 0.123 0.021 0.148 0.300 0.323
Capex 0.070 0.031 0.054 0.088 0.058
Cash Balances 0.078 0.013 0.039 0.101 0.100
Tangibility 0.401 0.197 0.361 0.601 0.243
45
Table 1.5: Estimation Results - Entire Sample
This table displays estimation results for the ordered probit model from 1985 through 2007 for the entire sample. The
sample includes non-financial public firms with a Long Term Issuer Credit Rating and non-missing observations on
the variables used in the analysis. Dependent variable is S&P LT Issuer Rating converted into numerical identifiers
1-17 (AAA is 17). NYSE% is NYSE market capitalization percentile, Operating Margin is operating income before
depreciation (oibdp) to sales (sale), LT Debt is long term debt (dltt) to assets (at). Total Debt is long term debt
(dltt) plus short term debt (dlc), divided by assets (at). Id. Risk is the RMSE from a regression of the firm’s
daily stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted index return. Beta is market model beta estimated from the
same regression used to define idiosyncratic risk. Interest Coverage is operating income after depreciation (oiadp)
plus interest expense (xint) divided by interest expense (xint). Tangibility is property plant and equipment - total
(ppent) to assets (at). Cash Balances is cash and short-term investments (che) to assets (at). RETA is Retained
earnings (re) to assets (at). R&D is research and development expense (xrd) to assets (at). Capex is capital
expenditures (capx) to assets (at). Dividend Payeris a dummy variable equal to 1 in calendar year t if the firm has
positive dividends per share by the ex date (dvpsx f) in the fiscal year that ends in year t. M/B is Book assets (at)
minus book equity plus market equity all divided by book assets (at). The standard errors are calculated using the
Huber-White robust estimator clustered at the firm level.
Coefficient Z - Stat Coefficient×Variable Std.DevRating Notch Length
Coefficient
Rating Notch Length
Interest Coverage A 0.223*** 14.333 0.578
Interest Coverage B 0.028*** 2.624 0.100
Interest Coverage C 0.030*** 4.193 0.150
Interest Coverage D -0.003* -1.941 -0.060
Operating Margin 0.345** 2.356 0.091
LT Debt -2.278*** -6.824 -0.777
Total Debt 1.210*** 3.689 0.419
NYSE% 0.125*** 20.940 1.303
Beta -0.208*** -6.813 -0.190
Idiosyncratic Risk -0.351*** -20.759 -0.830
Dividend Payer 0.773*** 16.449 0.681
M/B 0.012 0.460 0.018
R&D 1.528** 2.213 0.087
RETA 0.687*** 10.512 0.400
Capex -1.976*** -6.008 -0.208
Cash Balances -1.103*** -5.788 -0.199
Tangibility 0.722*** 6.269 0.316
Year Indicators
1986 -0.147*** -4.339 -0.265
1987 0.007 0.163 0.013
1988 -0.089* -1.959 -0.160
1989 -0.082* -1.751 -0.148
1990 0.089* 1.825 0.161
1991 0.165*** 3.385 0.297
1992 0.148*** 3.046 0.266
1993 0.075 1.576 0.136
1994 -0.049 -0.984 -0.087
1995 -0.106** -2.119 -0.190
1996 -0.145*** -2.893 -0.262
1997 -0.128** -2.542 -0.231
1998 0.076 1.494 0.138
1999 0.020 0.366 0.036
2000 0.223*** 3.807 0.401
2001 0.050 0.907 0.089
2002 -0.058 -1.081 -0.105
2003 -0.381*** -7.352 -0.687
2004 -0.582*** -11.117 -1.048
2005 -0.716*** -13.455 -1.291
2006 -0.849*** -15.742 -1.529
2007 -0.903*** -16.418 -1.626
N 23152
Pseudo R2 0.263 46
Table 1.6: Estimation Results - Investment Grade and Speculative Grade Subsam-
ples
This table displays estimation results for the ordered probit model from 1985 through 2007 for the investment grade
and speculative grade subsamples. The sample includes non-financial public firms with a Long Term Issuer Credit
Rating and non-missing observations on the variables used in the analysis. Dependent variable is S&P LT Issuer
Rating converted into numerical identifiers 1-17 (AAA is 17). NYSE% is NYSE market capitalization percentile,
Operating Margin is operating income before depreciation (oibdp) to sales (sale), LT Debt is long term debt (dltt)
to assets (at). Total Debt is long term debt (dltt) plus short term debt (dlc), divided by assets (at). Id. Risk is the
RMSE from a regression of the firm’s daily stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted index return. Beta is market
model beta estimated from the same regression used to define idiosyncratic risk. Interest Coverage is operating
income after depreciation (oiadp) plus interest expense (xint) divided by interest expense (xint). Tangibility is
property plant and equipment - total (ppent) to assets (at). Cash Balances is cash and short-term investments (che)
to assets (at). RETA is Retained earnings (re) to assets (at). R&D is research and development expense (xrd) to
assets (at). Capex is capital expenditures (capx) to assets (at). Dividend Payeris a dummy variable equal to 1 in
calendar year t if the firm has positive dividends per share by the ex date (dvpsx f) in the fiscal year that ends in
year t. M/B is Book assets (at) minus book equity plus market equity all divided by book assets (at). The standard
errors are calculated using the Huber-White robust estimator clustered at the firm level.
Investment Grade Speculative Grade
Panel A: Explanatory Variables
Coefficient Z - Stat Coefficient×Var.Std.Dev
Rating Notch Length
Coefficient Z - Stat Coefficient×Var.Std.Dev
Rating Notch Length
Int. Cov. A 0.209*** 7.113 0.564 0.232*** 13.460 0.393
Int. Cov. B 0.024 1.620 0.090 -0.025 -1.396 -0.057
Int. Cov. C 0.029*** 3.232 0.151 -0.009 -0.833 -0.029
Int. Cov. D -0.004* -1.876 -0.079 -0.002 -1.083 -0.025
Oper. Margin 0.955*** 3.143 0.263 0.193 1.390 0.034
LT Debt -5.997*** -9.682 -2.133 0.527 1.601 0.118
Total Debt 3.601*** 6.283 1.299 -0.885*** -2.711 -0.201
NYSE% 0.089*** 8.755 0.971 0.092*** 16.123 0.630
Beta -0.266*** -4.745 -0.253 -0.019 -0.618 -0.012
Id. Risk -0.499*** -11.181 -1.232 -0.277*** -16.904 -0.430
Div. Payer 0.463*** 4.933 0.425 0.464*** 9.830 0.268
M/B 0.091** 2.346 0.140 -0.086*** -2.932 -0.083
R&D 2.035* 1.937 0.121 -0.729 -1.030 -0.027
RETA 0.938*** 6.922 0.569 0.436*** 6.357 0.166
Capex -1.043* -1.804 -0.114 -0.949*** -2.853 -0.065
Cash Balances 0.729** 2.219 0.137 -1.256*** -7.551 -0.148
Tangibility 0.980*** 5.153 0.447 0.028 0.233 0.008
Panel B: Year Indicators
Year Indicators Coefficient Z - Stat Coefficient
Rating Notch Length
Coefficient Z - Stat Coefficient
Rating Notch Length
1986 -0.017 -0.491 -0.032 -0.214*** -3.176 -0.253
1987 0.113** 2.340 0.212 0.064 0.784 0.076
1988 -0.106** -2.319 -0.198 -0.008 -0.087 -0.009
1989 -0.224*** -4.391 -0.421 0.050 0.563 0.060
1990 -0.147*** -2.831 -0.277 0.236** 2.345 0.279
1991 -0.156*** -2.932 -0.292 0.384*** 3.892 0.454
1992 -0.201*** -3.658 -0.377 0.471*** 4.820 0.557
1993 -0.246*** -4.428 -0.462 0.516*** 5.787 0.610
1994 -0.364*** -6.454 -0.684 0.333*** 3.662 0.394
1995 -0.479*** -8.206 -0.900 0.358*** 4.060 0.423
1996 -0.557*** -9.283 -1.046 0.317*** 3.701 0.374
1997 -0.591*** -9.260 -1.110 0.385*** 4.574 0.455
1998 -0.386*** -5.791 -0.725 0.558*** 6.529 0.659
1999 -0.389*** -5.070 -0.732 0.523*** 5.873 0.618
2000 -0.233** -2.572 -0.438 0.702*** 7.627 0.830
2001 -0.510*** -6.853 -0.957 0.589*** 6.597 0.696
2002 -0.597*** -8.317 -1.122 0.531*** 6.068 0.627
2003 -0.879*** -12.845 -1.651 0.233*** 2.836 0.275
2004 -1.102*** -15.865 -2.071 0.016 0.198 0.019
2005 -1.191*** -16.497 -2.237 -0.127 -1.559 -0.150
2006 -1.251*** -16.816 -2.349 -0.279*** -3.417 -0.330
2007 -1.280*** -16.492 -2.403 -0.320*** -3.900 -0.379
N 12887 10265
Pseudo R2 0.155 0.190
47
Table 1.7: Structural Break Tests
This table displays the tests for structural break at year 2002. For this test, I estimate
an ordered probit model for the period 1985-2007. The dependent variable is S&P LT
Issuer Rating. Panel A tests whether the intercepts before and after 2002 are equal.
The independent variables include a dummy variable D, which takes value 1 for years
2003-2007 and control variables: interest coverage, operating margin, long term debt
leverage, total debt leverage, NYSE%, market model beta, idiosyncratic risk, dividend
payer, M/B, R&D, retained earnings, capital expenditures, cash balances, and tangibility.
The standard errors are calculated using the Huber-White robust estimator clustered at
the firm level. Panel A reports the coefficient estimate of dummy variable D, the coefficient
estimate in units of rating step length, and the P-value for Wald test for the hypothesis
that coefficient is equal to 0. Panel B presents tests for the structural break in the slopes
of the year indicators from Equation 1.2. For this test, in the main model, Equation 1.2 is
replaced with Equation 1.5. That is, the year indicators in Equation 1.2 are replaced with
two trend variables to proxy for the slope of the year indicators for periods 1985-2002 and
2003-2007. Panel B displays coefficient estimates for b1 and b2, and Wald Test P-Values
for the equality of the slopes b1 and b2. The results are reported for the entire sample,
investment grade sample and speculative grade sample.
Panel A: Wald Test for Equality of Intercepts
Zit = b0D + β′Xit + εit
Test for b0 = 0
b0
b0
Rating Notch Length P-Value
Whole Sample -0.64 -1.16 0.000
Investment Grade -0.81 -1.54 0.000
Speculative Grade -0.37 -0.44 0.000
Panel B: Wald Test for Equality of Slopes
Zit = b0D + b1tD + b2t(1−D) + β′Xit + εit
Test for b1 = b2
b1 b2 P-Value
Whole Sample 0.00 -0.13 0.000
Investment Grade -0.04 -0.09 0.000
Speculative Grade 0.04 -0.14 0.000
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Table 1.8: Times Series Regression of BLM Trend on CLMX Idiosyncratic Volatility
This table displays the coefficients and t-statistics for univariate OLS regressions.
The dependent variable is residual rating trend (year indicators) estimated from the
BLM model. The independent variable is aggregate idiosyncratic volatility calcu-
lated using CLMX methodology. The results are reported for subperiods 1985-2002
and 1985-2007. The periods for speculative grade sample is taken as 1992-2002 and
1992-2007 due to the changing direction in trend after 1992.
1985-2002 1985-2007
Whole Sample b -6.92 0.00
T -3.58 0.00
N 18 23
Adj R2 0.41 -0.05
Investment Grade b -10.23 -2.34
T -3.58 -0.53
N 18 23
Adj R2 0.41 -0.03
Speculative Grade* b -1.64 1.45
T -2.03 1.00
N 11 16
Adj R2 0.24 0.00


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.2: Plot of the Estimates of the Year Indicators from the Ordered Probit






































































































Figure 1.3: Plot of the Estimates of the Year Indicators from the Ordered Probit






































































































Figure 1.4: Plot of the Estimates of the Year Indicators from the Ordered Probit




































































Figure 1.5: Plot of the Estimates of the Year Indicators from the Ordered Probit





































































Figure 1.6: Plot of the Estimates of the Year Indicators from the Ordered Probit






































































Figure 1.7: Plot of the Estimates of the Year Indicators from the Ordered Probit















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel A: Entire Sample
Panel B: Investment Grade Sample















































































































































































Figure 1.11: Plot of the Estimates of the Year Indicators from the Ordered Probit
Model, Robustness for the Sample of Firms that Existed in 1985, 1985-2007
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Panel A: Entire Sample
Panel B: Investment Grade Sample










































































































































































Figure 1.12: Plot of the Estimates of the Year Indicators from the Ordered Probit
Model, Robustness for First Time Issuers, 1985-2007
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Chapter 2
Contagion Effects of Rating Downgrade Announcements
2.1 Introduction
The information content of credit ratings is the subject of a rich and grow-
ing literature. One branch of this literature examines whether ratings convey new
information about the creditworthiness of a corporation, which the market has not
already incorporated into prices from other available sources. Using standard event
study techniques, this literature concludes that credit ratings provide valuable in-
formation to markets above and beyond what is publicly available. Rating down-
grade news results in significantly negative abnormal equity and bond returns for
the downgraded firm (Zaima and McCarthy (1988), Dichev and Piotroski (2001),
Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992b), Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Hite
and Warga (1997), Pinches and Singleton (1978), Goh and Ederington (1993)). The
rating upgrades, however, generate smaller and typically non-significant reactions.
Although the announcement reactions for the event firms are well understood,
less is known about the effects of a rating downgrade news on the firms’ industry
rivals. Do the rating downgrade news reactions spillover to the firm’s industry
competitors? We attempt to answer this question in this paper. The information
conveyed by a rating change can be firm specific or it might include an industry-wide
component. If the information has implications for industry peers, then we should
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observe abnormal stock or bond reactions for the competitors around the rating
change announcement dates.
The downgrade news can have negative or positive spillover effects for the in-
dustry peers. The former is generally referred to as contagion effects, while the latter
is known as competition effects (Lang and Stulz (1992), Jorion and Zhang (2010)).
The downgrade events can lead to contagion effects through several channels. First,
the rating downgrade can reveal new information about deteriorating industry cash
flows causing revaluation of the industry portfolio in the financial markets. Ad-
ditionally, the industry peers might be subject to counterparty risk through their
business connections with the downgraded firm. Jorion and Zhang (2009) examines
spillover effects of bankruptcies through counterparty risk on firm’s creditors and
find significant contagion effects. Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) documents
the transmission of bankruptcy effects along the supply chain. On the other hand,
it is also possible that the downgrade news creates positive effects for industry rivals
particularly if the firm is financially distressed and approaching default boundary.
In this case, the downgrade can signal that the competitor is close to being elimi-
nated from the industry, increasing the likelihood of greater future market share of
remaining firms in case of fixed demand for the products (Jorion and Zhang (2010)).
In this paper, we analyze the effect of rating downgrades on the stock and
CDS prices of industry competitors. Our sample covers S&P firm level credit rating
downgrades between 1980 and 2008. The sample includes 2241 rating downgrades
by S&P, which is substantially larger than the studies in the previous literature. We
form portfolios of competitor firms for each downgrade event and carry out standard
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event study methods on portfolio equity and CDS prices. For the overall sample,
we find minor contagion effects. The competitor industry portfolios experience an
eight basis points reduction in value during the (0,1) window surrounding the event
day, which is not statistically significant. The subsamples, however, yield more
interesting results. When the downgraded firm originally carries an investment
grade rating, then competitors suffer a negative 15 basis points return, which is
statistically significant. For the speculative grade firms’ rivals, we do not detect any
contagion or competition effects. The abnormal return on the competitor portfolio
is only an insignificant -0.01%.
Prior studies show that, the equity announcement effects for the downgraded
firm are more negative, when the firm has a speculative grade rating prior to the
downgrade (Jorion and Zhang (2007b)). In light of this fact, one might expect more
severe contagion effects for the competitors of speculative grade firms yet we find
the opposite result. The absence of any stock reaction in the speculative grade
sample might be due cancelling effects of contagion and competition factors for this
category. It is possible that the failure of a speculative grade firm is both good
news and bad news for the competitors at the same time. The downgrade may be
bad news and generate contagion effects because it signals unfavorable information
about the industry prospects. At the same time, it might be good news because it
increases the likelihood of the downgraded firm’s exit from the industry. If the two
forces are cancelling each other, we might observe minimal competitor reaction for
the downgrades of speculative grade firms.
Additionally, we examine the CDS reactions of industry portfolios to down-
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grade news. We find minimal change in competitor CDS spreads within short event
windows, however the reactions are more moderate for longer event windows such
as (5,5) and (-10,10). For the whole sample, the CDS spreads of competitors widen
about six basis points within the (-5,5) window. The widening amounts to seven
basis points for (-10,10) window. Due to the illiquidity of the CDS securities, the
longer windows might be necessary for the announcements effects to be priced in.
Our last set of tests are cross-sectional. We explore the cross sectional deter-
minants of competitor equity and CDS reactions to downgrade news. We find a
significant positive correlation between the event firm CAR and industry portfolio
CAR which can be robustly observed for entire sample, investment grade sample
and speculative grade sample. This result shows that, on the average, the industry
portfolios are affected in the same direction as the event firms from the downgrade
news. It provides further evidence that contagion effects dominate the competition
effects. We additionally find that, for the speculative grade sample, the higher the
median industry leverage, the greater the contagion effects. For the speculative
grade sample, we also find that the higher the original rating the greater the con-
tagion effects. The cross-sectional tests also show a negative correlation between
equity returns and CDS spread changes. That is, for the industry portfolios, the
equity reactions to rating downgrades are more negative when the CDS spreads
widen. This suggest that, on the average, the downgrade affects the debt holders
and the equity holders in the same way.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I begin with a summary of credit
related literature in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 describes the data used in the study.
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Section 2.4 presents the results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Literature Survey
Credit ratings are measures of ordinal rankings of credit risk across firms. At
any point in time, a firm’s credit rating is relative measure of creditworthiness,
however, it does not correspond to absolute default probabilities over time. Issuer
credit ratings provide “an opinion of the obligor’s overall capacity and willingness
to meet its financial obligations as they come due - whether rated or not” (Standard
and Poor’s (2008b)). S&P issuer ratings reflect only the risk of default and does
not incorporate information about recovery rates. In addition, they do not take into
account any provisions of a particular debt issue. Failure to make payment on any
debt obligation leads to “Default” status in the issuer ratings.
Evidence from the event studies of rating changes show that ratings provide
valuable information to the markets. Downgrades are associated with abnormal eq-
uity returns of about 2-2.5% (Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992b), Holthausen
and Leftwich (1986), Dichev and Piotroski (2001)). In the case of upgrades, studies
report much smaller generally insignificant effects. Goh and Ederington (1993) ar-
gues that this could be because the firms are eager to release favorable information
to markets voluntarily. Hence, by the time of rating upgrade, the good news is
already incorporated in the prices. However the firms are typically reluctant in dis-
closing bad information making the bad information uncovered by the rating agency
more valuable. Rating downgrades can be predicted from publicly available data.
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Typically, there is a negative stock price drift preceding rating downgrades.
This paper examines the wealth transfer effects of rating downgrades on in-
dustry competitors and is most similar to studies Akhigbe, Madura, and Whyte
(1997), Caton and Goh (2003), and Jorion and Zhang (2010). Akhibe et. al. is the
first article to study the intra-industry spillover effects of credit rating downgrades.
Akhiebe et. al find significant contagion effects on industry rivals’ equity by analyz-
ing the 354 rating downgrades by S&P or Moody’s during the period 1980-1993. The
mean CAR of the competitor portfolio amounts to -0.19% based on a two day win-
dow of (-1,0). Caton and Goh examine the analysts’ earnings forecasts revisions for
industry competitors following rating downgrades. Using 453 downgrades of corpo-
rate bonds listed in Moody’s Bond Record between 1984-1990, they find that stock
analysts revise their earnings expectations downward for rivals of companies after
announcements of bond rating downgrades. They also report a -0.33% mean CAR
for (-1,0) window for the rival firms. More recently, Jorion and Zhang (2010) study
the information transfer effects of bond rating downgrades for the period 1996-2002.
Their sample constitutes 679 rating downgrades by S&P, Moody’s, Fitch and Duff
and Phelps. They find an insignificant contagion effect for the overall sample, which
amounts to -0.08% mean CAR for the window (0, 1). However, their analysis shows
that the industry reaction depends on the level of original rating of the downgraded
firm. For the investment grade sample, they find a significant contagion effect with
a mean CAR of -0.45%. In contrast, for the speculative grade sample they find a
competition effect with a mean CAR of 0.17
Another branch of credit contagion literature focuses on information transfer
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effects of bankruptcy announcements. Lang and Stulz (1992) report significant
negative abnormal equity reactions of industry rivals to Chapter 11 bankruptcy
announcements. They report a 1% reduction in the value of the competitor portfolio
within the 10 day window surrounding the announcement. Jorion and Zhang (2007a)
find significant contagion effects around Chapter 11 bankruptcies and jumps in CDS
spreads, but they document competition effects for Chapter 7 bankruptcies involving
liquidation. Jorion and Zhang (2009) investigate contagion through counterparty
risk. They find that bankruptcy announcement leads to negative share responses
and widening of CDS spreads in creditors of the announcing firm. Hertzel, Li,
Officer, and Rodgers (2008) study the wealth transfer effects of financial distress
and bankruptcy through the supply chain. They find negative significant stock
price response for suppliers of the distressed firms.
Prior literature detects intra industry information transfer effects for other
corporate events as well. These events include earnings releases (Foster (1981),
Firth (1996)) earnings forecasts ( Han, Wild, and Ramesh (1989)), seasoned equity
offerings (Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1992)), dividend announcements (Laux,
Starks, and Yoon (1998)), share repurchases (Erwin and Miller (1998)), stock splits
(Tawatnuntachai and D’Melio (2002)), earnings restatements (Xu, Najand, and
Ziegenfuss (2006)). These studies typically report moderate amounts of stock price
response to the rivals in the same direction as the announcing firm. Ferreira and
Gama (2007) report that sovereign rating downgrade of a country leads to spillover
effects on the stock markets of other countries.
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2.3 Data
We obtain data on rating changes from RatingsXpress Database under COM-
PUSTAT which covers S&P entity rating changes beginning 1980. We focus on
upgrades and downgrades in the S&P long term issuer level rating but exclude de-
faulted entities. Our sample covers the period 1980 through 2008. We eliminate
financial firms (sic 6000-6999), utilities (sic 4900 - 4999) and public administration
(9000 and above) from the sample. We match the latest firm level information be-
fore the event date from COMPUSTAT to the remaining observations. We require
that the firm has daily stock return data from CRSP between 255 days before and
10 days after the rating change. These filters yield a final sample of 2009 upgrades
and 3495 downgrades. Table 2.1 reports the annual frequency of observations. Out
of 3495 downgrades, 1786 observations are downgrades within speculative grade,
1338 observations within investment grade while 377 entities are downgraded from
investment grade to speculative grade. Throughout much of the sample, the num-
ber of downgrades exceeds the number of upgrades. Particularly, during the period
1999-2002, which includes the Dot-Com crash, the number of downgrades reaches
historically high levels.
Table 2.2 describes the sample characteristics for the downgraded firms. The
sample covers 3495 downgraded firms belonging to 296 unique industries in terms
of 4 digit SIC codes. On the average, there are 11.81 downgrades per industry.
The median number of downgrades is 7 per industry. The downgrade sample spans
1359 unique firms. An average firm has 2.5 downgrades between 1980 and 2008.
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Manufacturing firms constitute the majority of the sample (first digit of SIC codes
2 and 3), followed by transportation firms.
We identify the industry peer group as the portfolio of firms which have the
same 4 digit SIC code as the announcing firm. We eliminate the observations with
last digit of SIC code equal to zero because these observations practically report 3
digit SIC code. We further eliminate firms with SIC code ending with 9 since these
firms belong to the miscellaneous category under 3 digit SIC code. We addition-
ally require that the competitor has daily stock returns in CRSP 255 days before
and 10 days after the event day. As Table 2.3 documents, these restrictions yield
2241 industry portfolios belonging to 168 unique industries. The industry portfolios
consists of 7173 unique firms and 101164 total observations. The mean and median
number of firms in an industry portfolio are 45 and 23 respectively. The largest
industry portfolio carries 427 firms.
We employ standard event study methods through Eventus software to cal-
culate the abnormal stock reaction of event firms and industry portfolios. The
benchmark normal returns are obtained from the market model. We use the CRSP
value weighted stock index as the market portfolio in the market model. We report
the mean cumulative abnormal return for the two day event window (0,1). If an
event occurs on a non-trading date, it is automatically converted to the next trad-
ing date. For the industry rivals, we form an equally weighted portfolio of industry
competitors and perform event study tests on the portfolio returns. Following Jo-
rion and Zhang (2010), we use the corrected Z statistic from the standardized cross
sectional test of Boehmer, Musumeci, Poulsen to test the significance of abnormal
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returns.
We obtain the CDS data from Bloomberg. The data is available beginning
August 2001. We focus on CDS spreads with 5 year maturity since this is the
most common form of CDS contracts. In order to prevent double counting, we keep
one CDS security per firm. Our final sample includes CDS data on 402 unique
firms between 2001 and 2008. Our benchmark CDS market index is North America
investment grade CDS index, CDX.NA.IG, which is composed of 125 investment
grade reference entities with equal weights. The market adjusted CDS reactions to
downgrades in different event windows are calculated in excess of the CDX.NA.IG
index. Both raw returns and market adjusted returns are reported. The CDS index
is available starting October 2003.
2.4 Results
In this section we present our main results. Section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 discusses
the equity reactions and CDS reactions respectively. Section 2.4.3 describes cross
sectional evidence.
2.4.1 Equity Reaction
Table 2.4 presents abnormal equity returns for the event firms around rat-
ing downgrade announcements for the entire sample, investment grade sample and
speculative grade sample. The samples are formed based on the event firm’s rating
prior to the downgrade. Consistent with prior literature, we find significantly neg-
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ative abnormal returns for rating downgrade announcements. Table 2.4 reports the
mean abnormal return for each day during the window (-10,10). The entire sample
experiences an average of -1.80% return on the day of the rating downgrade. The
reaction amounts to a -2.23% mean cumulative abnormal return over the two day
event window (0,1). Consistent with Jorion and Zhang (2007b), the magnitude of
the stock response depends on the initial rating of the announcing firm. When the
downgraded firm originally has an investment grade rating, the mean (0,1) CAR is
only 0.84%. However, for the speculative grade firms, the reaction is much more
severe. We observe an -3.57% CAR for the speculative grade sample over the (0,1)
window. This is consistent with the argument that the rating downgrade costs in-
creases as a firm gets closer to the default boundary (Jorion and Zhang (2007b)).
Inline with prior literature, there is consistent negative stock returns during the 10
days preceding the rating downgrade date.
For the upgrades, we find moderate positive stock reactions around the an-
nouncement date (not reported). The mean CAR for the event window (0,1) is
0.30%. This is consistent with the argument that the information produced by rat-
ing upgrades is limited. Unlike many prior studies, our results are significant at 1%
level, perhaps due to the larger sample size in our study. Similar to downgrades, the
reaction is stronger for speculative grade firms. The mean CAR for investment grade
firms and speculative grade firms are 0.24% and 0.33% respectively. The results are
significant at 5% and 1% level respectively.
Next we turn our attention to the stock response of industry competitors.
Table 2.5 documents the abnormal equity returns for industry rivals around rating
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downgrade announcements. For the overall sample, we detect small intra-industry
information spillovers effects of rating downgrades. The mean CAR for the (0,1)
window is -0.08% which is statistically insignificant. We then examine stock reac-
tions conditioned on the original rating of the downgraded firm. Unlike the whole
sample, we do find significant contagion effects when an investment grade firm is
downgraded. The mean CAR for the investment grade sample is -0.15% for the
(0,1) window, which is significant at 5% level. The median (0,1) CAR is -0.11%.
This finding is in contrast to the speculative grade sample, which experiences an
insignificant -0.01% CAR during the two day event window. The median (0,1) CAR
for speculative grade firms is -0.04% suggesting minor contagion effects. For the
upgrades, we do not find significant transfer effects on the industry competitors.
The mean (0,1) CAR is an insignificant -0.05%.
The different results between investment grade and speculative grade sample
demands some explanation. Why do we observe contagion effects for the investment
grade sample but not for speculative grade sample? One explanation is that in-
vestment grade firms are usually larger and more visible firms which are prominent
in their industries. Hence, bad news associated with investment grade firms have
bigger implications for the rest of the industry. Another explanation is that, for
speculative grade firms, competition effects might be at play along with contagion
effects. Downgrade news can convey unfavorable information about the industry
cash flows creating the regular contagion effects. However, at the same time, down-
grade news might signal a potential exit from the corresponding industry because
speculative grade firms are close to the default boundary. As a result, contagion and
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competition effects can cancel each other for this subsample, leading to insignificant
abnormal returns for industry peers. The cross sectional tests of Section 2.4.3 shed
some light on these explanations.
2.4.2 CDS Reaction
In this section we examine the CDS reactions to rating downgrades. Table 2.6
presents the CDS reactions for the downgraded firms. Panel A and B reports raw
returns and market adjusted returns respectively for the entire sample. We observe
a clear widening in CDS spreads around the downgrade announcements for the event
firms. Panel A shows that, on day zero, CDS spreads for the entire sample widens
an average of 16 basis points. Out of 261 firms, 107 firms experience a widening
while only 68 firms’ CDS spreads narrow down. It is worth noting that, at the event
day, the change in CDS spreads was zero for 86 firms. This could be due to the
illiquidity of the CDS securities. Consistent with illiquidity argument, the mean
CDS returns are greater for the longer event windows. For the (-10,10) window the
mean return is 66 basis point. Panel B shows that the market adjusted returns are
even higher. The mean return for the event day is 20 basis points while the return
for the (-10,10) window is 73 basis points.
Panel C and D of Table 2.6 present results for the investment grade sample. As
in equity announcement returns, the CDS reactions are much smaller for investment
grade sample. At the event day, we observe a 3 basis points widening in CDS
spreads, which is statistically significant at 1% level. However, the longer event
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window yield stronger reactions. For (-10,10) window, the widening in CDS spreads
amounts to 25 basis points. Panel E and F of Table 2.6 report CDS reactions for
the speculative grade sample. Consistent with Jorion and Zhang (2007b), the CDS
returns to downgrade announcements are substantially greater for speculative grade
firms compared to investment grade sample. The mean return at the event day is
49 basis points. The CDS reaction increases up to 163 basis points for the event
window (-10,10). Overall, we conclude that downgrade news causes economically
and statistically significant increase in event firms’ CDS spreads.
Next we examine the CDS reactions for the industry portfolios which are re-
ported in Table 2.7. Panel A and B presents the raw and market adjusted CDS
reactions for entire sample. It is evident that, at the event day, there is very minor
contagion effects for industry portfolios. On day zero, the raw mean return is 0.57
basis points which is significant at 10% level. For the event window (-1,1), the mean
return increases to 2 basis points which is significant at 5% level. For the longer
event windows such as (-5,5) and (-10,10), the event returns are larger in economic
magnitude but still moderate. For the entire sample, the CDS spreads widen by 10
basis (7 basis) points within the 20 days window surrounding the downgrade an-
nouncement when raw (market adjusted) returns are reported. Although moderate
in economic significance, the returns for (-5,5) and (-10,10) windows are statistically
significant at 1% level. The longer event windows might be necessary to detect CDS
reactions due to illiquidity of CDS securities. It might take a longer period for the
announcement effects to be incorporated into the prices due to the infrequent trad-
ing. The results for investment grade and speculative grade subsamples are given in
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Panels C through F. Consistent with equity announcement returns, the reaction is
smaller for investment grade sample compared to the speculative grade sample. The
investment grade sample reactions are not statistically significant once the market
adjustment is taken into account. For the speculative grade sample, we observe 10
basis points raw return and market adjusted return in CDS spreads for the (-10,10)
window. It is worth noting that, the CDS reactions are generally skewed to right.
In Panel E, for the window (-5,5), the number of firms with widened CDS spreads
is much less than the number of firms with narrowed spreads. However, the mean
return is a positive 8 basis points for this window due to skewed nature of the re-
actions. Overall, we conclude that there is moderate contagion effects for industry
portfolios of downgraded firms reflected in their CDS spreads. Despite the moderate
size of reaction, the (-5,5) and (-10, 10) window returns are statistically significant
for all specifications except for the market adjusted investment grade sample.
2.4.3 Cross Sectional Results
In this section, we investigate the cross sectional determinants of industry port-
folios returns. We hypothesize that the following variables can be associated with
the cross sectional differences in returns and employ them as explanatory variables
in our cross-sectional regressions:
• Event Firm Size : Log of market capitalization of the downgraded firm
deflated by CPI index
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• # Notches : The number of rating notches the announcing firm’s rating is
downgraded. As an example, a downgrade from AA+ to AA- constitute two
rating notches.
• Original Rating : The original rating of the event firm before the down-
grade. We assign numerical identifiers one through 20 to the ratings (CC=1,
AAA=20).
• Herfindahl : Herfindahl index calculated as the sum of squared fractions of
sales of each individual firm over total sales of the industry.
• Median Indus. Leverage : Leverage of each firm is calculated as long term
debt (dltt) plus short term debt (dlc) divided by assets (at). Then we use the
median value for each industry portfolio.
• Event Firm CAR(0,1) : Cumulative abnormal equity return for the down-
graded firm over the window (0,1).
We hypothesize that the contagion impact of the downgrade on the industry
portfolios should be bigger if the event firm has a larger size. Larger firms tend
to be more prominent players in the industry and have more ties with industry
counterparties. Therefore we expect a negative sign for variable size. We hypothesize
that the higher the number of notches of the downgrade, the higher the contagion
effects. We expect the contagion effects to be larger for firms with a higher rating.
Downgrade of firms with lower ratings can create competition effects and favor the
competitors along with contagion effects. For Herfindahl index, the net effect can
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be positive or negative. For concentrated industries, the contagion effects can be
greater if the firms are more connected and have more ties with each other. On
the other hand, if the downgraded firm is close to the default boundary we can see
higher competition effects. The failure of the firm in a concentrated industry might
benefit the remaining firms by increasing their market power. We also explore the
correlation between the downgraded firms equity CAR and the industry portfolio’s
equity CAR. If the correlation is positive, it would imply stronger contagion effects
compared to competition effects. We additionally include median industry leverage
as an explanatory variable. We expect the industries with more leverage to be more
negatively affected by the downgrade news.
Table 2.8 presents results of the cross sectional tests of industry portfolio eq-
uity CAR. Here, the dependent variable is the industry portfolio CAR for the event
window (0,1). In panel A, we report the results of the univariate regressions. Panel
B shows the results of the multivariate regressions. We conduct both Ordinary Least
Square (OLS) and Weighted Least Square Regressions (WLS) where the weights are
the inverse of the portfolio return variance. The univariate results and multivari-
ate results are generally comparable. Panel B shows that, the variable size has the
expected negative sign, however it is not significant. Consistent with more severe
contagion effects of higher rated firms, the variable original rating has a negative
sign. However, this result is not robustly significant except for the speculative grade
sample. Herfindahl index is negatively related to industry portfolio returns, sug-
gesting greater contagion effects in more concentrated industries. However, this
relation is not robustly significant. The variable is significant for WLS regressions
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but loses significance when the heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are re-
ported. The median industry leverage appears to matter only for speculative grade
sample. For this sample, the higher the industry leverage, the higher the contagion
effects of downgrades as expected. One clear message from Table 2.8 is that, the
industry portfolio equity returns are strongly positively related to the event firm
equity returns for all samples. This results suggests that, on the average contagion
effects dominate competition effects for industry portfolios, regardless of whether
the downgraded firm is an investment grade or speculative grade firm. The variable
is significant at P-values indistinguishable from zero for the entire sample and for
the speculative grade sample.
Table 2.9 presents the results of the cross sectional regressions where the de-
pendent variable is the industry portfolio CDS return over the window (0,1). In
the univariate regressions in Panel A, the CDS reactions are significantly related to
event firm CAR and industry portfolio equity CAR. The signs indicate that, equity
holders and bond holders of the competitors are affected similarly by the rating
downgrade of the announcing firm. The industry portfolio CDS reaction is also in
the same direction as the event firm equity movement. In multivariate regressions,
the variable size is positively and significantly correlated with CDS reactions for the
investment grade sample but the result is not robust for the entire sample and the
speculative grade sample. This is consistent with greater contagion effects on the
industry when bigger firms are downgraded. We conclude that one strong message
from Table 2.8 is that, the competitor industry portfolio debt holders and equity
holders react in the same direction to a rating downgrade. The CDS reaction is also
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positively correlated with the event firm equity response.
2.5 Conclusion
We examine the intra-industry spillover effects of rating downgrade announce-
ments. We form portfolios of downgraded firms’ competitors and analyze the stock
and CDS response of these portfolios around the downgrade days. By employing
standard event study methods, we find minor contagion effects for the equity prices
of the industry portfolios for the entire sample. Then we condition the sample on
the event firm’s original rating prior to the downgrade. For the competitors of in-
vestment grade firms, we find significant contagion effects in the magnitude of -15
basis points for the window (0,1). For the speculative grade sample, we do not ob-
serve contagion or competition effects although this result can be due to cancellation
of contagion and competition effects for the low rated firms. We find statistically
significant CDS reaction of industry portfolios to downgrade news although in mod-
erate magnitudes. For entire sample, during the window (-10,10), CDS spreads of
industry portfolios widen by about 7 to 10 basis points. The cross sectional tests
show that the industry portfolio equity response and event firm equity response are
positively correlated. This finding presents further evidence of contagion effects.
Our tests also show that the industry portfolio equity holders and bond holders
react similarly to the downgrade news, i.e. the CDS spreads widen when equity
returns are negative.
Although we present some evidence of ratings contagion, the industry reactions
78
to downgrade news in our study are moderate in economic significance. One way
to improve this study is to develop the definition of industry competitors based
on the firms’ concrete ties. Examining the reactions of downgraded firms’ direct
counterparties could be a fruitful research agenda. Future research can also condition
the contagion effects on the rating downgrade reason.
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Table 2.1: Annual Frequency of Rating Changes
Inv. to Inv. Spec. to Spec. Spec. to Inv. Inv. to Spec.
year Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down
1980 35 17 25 13 2 3 8 1
1981 23 20 15 15 6 3 2 2
1982 17 34 13 30 2 1 2 3
1983 25 27 21 21 2 4 2 2
1984 18 30 15 21 1 5 2 4
1985 27 59 18 44 8 9 1 6
1986 31 86 23 54 5 18 3 14
1987 34 50 20 33 10 7 4 10
1988 50 50 23 27 20 15 7 8
1989 55 40 30 27 13 9 12 4
1990 32 68 18 43 11 19 3 6
1991 37 71 15 35 16 26 6 10
1992 44 59 18 36 17 17 9 6
1993 68 51 28 28 32 14 8 9
1994 54 51 19 27 28 20 7 4
1995 88 71 39 36 36 27 13 8
1996 90 85 37 40 43 39 10 6
1997 122 102 46 45 56 49 20 8
1998 121 178 44 57 61 105 16 16
1999 72 239 28 91 39 130 5 18
2000 93 260 29 98 48 134 16 28
2001 79 378 27 121 45 224 7 33
2002 69 355 17 94 46 227 6 34
2003 117 230 28 60 78 138 11 32
2004 117 152 26 40 75 96 16 16
2005 139 207 47 52 74 131 18 24
2006 119 200 36 70 72 104 11 26
2007 147 211 43 54 96 129 8 28
2008 86 114 27 26 47 77 12 11




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.6: CDS Reaction to Downgrade Events - Event Firms
Panel A: All Firms - Raw Returns
Window N N <0 N >0 Mean Median Min Max Skewness T-Stat
(0,0) 261 68 107 16.64 0.00 -124.92 1692.34 10.72 2.11
(0,1) 261 78 125 29.29 0.00 -352.00 1961.00 8.48 2.63
(-1,1) 261 79 130 32.55 0.00 -352.00 2473.75 9.18 2.58
(-5,5) 261 80 152 57.71 3.18 -286.25 2121.75 6.50 3.82
(-10,10) 258 86 151 66.42 6.02 -179.75 2131.43 6.17 4.37
Panel B: All Firms - Market Adj
Window N N <0 N >0 Mean Median Min Max Skewness T-Stat
(0,0) 209 87 115 19.91 0.25 -124.51 1691.21 9.59 2.03
(0,1) 209 83 123 33.59 0.88 -351.92 1961.33 7.64 2.43
(-1,1) 209 80 129 37.37 1.23 -351.92 2474.75 8.32 2.39
(-5,5) 209 70 139 63.42 3.73 -285.69 2123.29 5.98 3.40
(-10,10) 208 69 139 73.41 9.33 -208.02 2141.65 5.77 3.95
Panel C: Investment Grade Firms - Raw Returns
Window N N <0 N >0 Mean Median Min Max Skewness T-Stat
(0,0) 184 48 83 3.24 0.00 -37.50 126.04 4.81 3.29
(0,1) 184 58 92 9.17 0.05 -58.75 192.50 3.66 4.53
(-1,1) 184 58 94 9.54 0.28 -50.00 217.50 3.90 4.06
(-5,5) 184 54 111 21.35 3.00 -73.67 364.58 2.92 5.60
(-10,10) 181 61 105 25.51 3.50 -85.00 421.67 2.62 5.33
Panel D: Investment Grade Firms - Market Adj
Window N N <0 N >0 Mean Median Min Max Skewness T-Stat
(0,0) 135 48 83 3.64 0.42 -20.30 125.56 5.88 3.09
(0,1) 135 48 84 8.52 0.91 -17.95 178.77 4.14 4.14
(-1,1) 135 44 91 9.15 1.49 -32.13 182.24 3.89 4.30
(-5,5) 135 40 95 17.80 3.01 -35.89 208.67 2.64 5.46
(-10,10) 134 44 90 23.38 4.57 -62.62 247.53 2.36 5.14
Panel E: Speculative Grade Firms - Raw Returns
Window N N <0 N >0 Mean Median Min Max Skewness T-Stat
(0,0) 77 20 24 48.65 0.00 -124.92 1692.34 5.71 1.84
(0,1) 77 20 33 77.39 0.00 -352.00 1961.00 4.49 2.09
(-1,1) 77 21 36 87.54 0.00 -352.00 2473.75 4.91 2.09
(-5,5) 77 26 41 144.57 10.61 -286.25 2121.75 3.41 2.94
(-10,10) 77 25 46 162.59 46.83 -179.75 2131.43 3.34 3.37
Panel F: Speculative Grade Firms - Market Adj
Window N N <0 N >0 Mean Median Min Max Skewness T-Stat
(0,0) 74 39 32 49.59 -0.08 -124.51 1691.21 5.59 1.81
(0,1) 74 35 39 79.32 0.25 -351.92 1961.33 4.40 2.06
(-1,1) 74 36 38 88.87 0.39 -351.92 2474.75 4.81 2.04
(-5,5) 74 30 44 146.66 12.21 -285.69 2123.29 3.36 2.87
(-10,10) 74 25 49 163.99 30.01 -208.02 2141.65 3.31 3.28
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Table 2.7: CDS Reaction to Downgrade Events - Industry Portfolios
Panel A: All Firms - Raw Returns
Window N N <0 N >0 Mean Median Min Max Skewness T-Stat
(0,0) 596 231 240 0.57 0.00 -50.58 69.68 1.64 1.83
(0,1) 596 256 264 1.44 0.00 -58.75 98.18 2.13 2.75
(-1,1) 596 260 278 2.07 0.00 -88.75 98.75 0.89 3.03
(-5,5) 594 305 271 7.17 -0.09 -189.71 471.61 3.86 3.94
(-10,10) 590 296 280 10.01 -0.04 -172.97 320.00 1.98 4.29
Panel B: All Firms - Market Adj
Window N N <0 N >0 Mean Median Min Max Skewness T-Stat
(0,0) 390 181 199 0.47 0.02 -49.42 71.14 2.78 1.33
(0,1) 390 185 205 0.90 0.09 -48.05 98.06 2.80 1.62
(-1,1) 390 184 206 1.35 0.15 -45.21 70.80 1.58 2.05
(-5,5) 390 178 211 6.37 0.53 -85.32 470.59 5.60 3.16
(-10,10) 389 204 185 7.23 -0.33 -153.23 247.72 2.41 3.14
Panel C: Investment Grade Firms - Raw Returns
Window N N <0 N >0 Mean Median Min Max Skewness T-Stat
(0,0) 237 89 100 0.96 0.00 -37.50 69.68 3.37 1.76
(0,1) 237 105 102 1.23 0.00 -58.75 80.00 2.22 1.46
(-1,1) 237 108 108 1.59 0.00 -88.75 98.75 0.95 1.45
(-5,5) 236 112 114 5.51 0.00 -102.92 274.38 3.11 2.41
(-10,10) 233 108 116 8.64 0.00 -146.25 270.26 2.39 2.78
Panel D: Investment Grade Firms - Market Adj
Window N N <0 N >0 Mean Median Min Max Skewness T-Stat
(0,0) 161 67 91 1.10 0.12 -24.76 71.14 5.56 1.73
(0,1) 161 76 85 1.25 0.08 -26.00 71.14 3.66 1.56
(-1,1) 161 77 84 1.36 0.07 -34.43 66.68 2.93 1.53
(-5,5) 161 77 84 3.58 0.28 -85.32 238.42 4.34 1.55
(-10,10) 160 82 78 3.03 -0.09 -88.27 240.46 3.77 1.06
Panel E: Speculative Grade Firms - Raw Returns
Window N N <0 N >0 Mean Median Min Max Skewness T-Stat
(0,0) 359 142 140 0.31 0.00 -50.58 39.25 -0.45 0.85
(0,1) 359 151 162 1.57 0.00 -48.90 98.18 2.07 2.36
(-1,1) 359 152 170 2.39 0.00 -80.00 92.50 0.86 2.74
(-5,5) 358 193 158 8.27 -0.61 -189.71 471.61 3.85 3.16
(-10,10) 357 188 166 10.90 -0.58 -172.97 320.00 1.79 3.33
Panel F: Speculative Grade Firms - Market Adj
Window N N <0 N >0 Mean Median Min Max Skewness T-Stat
(0,0) 229 114 108 0.03 0.00 -49.42 25.51 -1.73 0.08
(0,1) 229 109 120 0.65 0.13 -48.05 98.06 2.37 0.86
(-1,1) 229 107 122 1.34 0.27 -45.21 70.80 1.05 1.44
(-5,5) 229 101 127 8.33 0.63 -73.66 470.59 5.43 2.76

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Confidence and the 2008 Crisis
3.1 Introduction
It is widely agreed that the 2007-2008 financial crisis was caused by a collapse
of the housing bubble. How – and why – the shock to a single sector spread to
the broader economy is the subject of much ongoing work. A common explanation
stresses transmission via bank balance sheets. A drop in house prices leads to a
drop in the value of the mortgage securities financing the houses, and institutions
holding these now “toxic” securities become under capitalized and tend to cut the
size of their balance sheets. This effect is amplified by illiquidity of the mortgage
securities. The mutually reinforcing forces of illiquidity and insolvency cut credit
supply to firms and consumers, causing spending and investment pullbacks, which in
turn depresses asset prices and unleashes a fresh wave of insolvency and illiquidity.
While bank balance sheet effects have received considerable attention, a more
recent casualty of the financial crisis has been the broad stock market. The timing
of the stock market decline is interesting. The housing market peaks around Au-
gust 2006 and has been in steady decline since then. Figure 3.1 plots the level of
the S&P 500 stock market index. The index peaks at 1,565.15 on October 9, 2007
and then declines by 42% through December 2008. The bulk of the stock market
decline occurs towards the end of the sample time period. Between September and
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December 2008 the S&P 500 index declines by 29% and this period witnessed an
unprecedented increase in volatility. The stock market drop in late 2008 was ac-
companied by an annualized contraction of 6.3% in the U.S. GDP. The decline in
stock prices after September 2008 was accompanied by an unprecedented spike in
volatility, with several swings and reversals of large magnitude both in the broad
market indexes and individual stocks. As we discuss later, these patterns are quite
abnormal relative to historical norms. Curiously, the decline and extreme fluctua-
tions occur more than two years after the housing market peak and the subsequent
downward trend in house prices.
Our study examines the stock market disruption in the fourth quarter of 2008,
using a new dataset of closed-end fund discounts that we obtain at daily frequency.
Closed-end funds are limited liability companies that invest in financial assets. The
value of these assets or the “net asset value” (NAV) is observed and reported by the
funds. The fund shares themselves trade at prices in the stock market that could be
quite different from the NAV. The percentage difference between the fund’s share
price and its NAV is the closed-end fund discount. In frictionless markets with
costless arbitrage, fund shares should trade at their true value, so the discounts
should be zero. However, with frictions and limits to arbitrage, funds could trade at
discounts, or less commonly, at premiums. Fund discounts represent a useful index
of the extent of disruption in normal pricing relations in the financial marketplace,
often but by no means unanimously, attributed to investor sentiment by an extensive
literature on closed-end funds that we review later.
We obtain a time series of average fund discounts at a daily frequency for
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four categories of funds: US equity funds, growth and income funds, global funds,
corporate bond funds. While closed end fund discounts show little movement during
the housing market collapse and the collateral damage felt in the banking system –
including the Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch takeovers, the auction rate securities
collapse, and the IndyMac run – the discounts are significantly wider in the fourth
quarter of 2008. The average fund discounts more than double across all categories.
There is a similar shift in the volatility of the average fund discounts, which also
nearly double for all categories. Structural break tests for mean shifts identify the
date of the shift rather precisely. The structural shift in fund discounts dates to
September 15, 2008, when Lehman Brothers was allowed to go bankrupt.
The widening of closed-end funds around the Lehman Brothers collapse de-
mands explanation. Consider three interpretations. One possibility is that the
collapse signaled new information about the fragility of banks. While such infor-
mation could certainly affect fundamental values of assets, it is less obvious why
it should affect discounts relative to fundamental values. A second possibility is
investor sentiment. If the closed-end fund discounts are interpreted as measures of
investor sentiment towards the stock market, our evidence suggests that pessimism
widened significantly after the Lehman collapse. The closed-end fund discount find-
ing is also interesting due to a “dog that didn’t bark” effect. Curiously, investor
sentiment did not turn especially negative through much of the origin of the housing
crisis and its ripple through effects on the banking system. It essentially takes root
after the Lehman failure. This viewpoint is affirmed by additional tests that exam-
ine the daily changes of average closed-end fund discounts around several other news
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events related to the crisis. A third interpretation of widening discounts is that the
Lehman collapse results in a negative shock to the supply of arbitrage capital. The
shock could be the product of a direct effect of the collapse on unprotected Lehman
counterparties or it could reflect an indirect effect in which investors are simply
less willing to fund long-short arbitrage activities after a bulge bracket investment
bank is allowed to go under by the regulators. The supply- side view is a necessary
complement to the sentiment view. Limited or costly arbitrage is a necessity for pes-
simistic sentiments to take expression in the form of greater closed-end discounts.
Supply side shocks to arbitrage capital coupled with pessimistic sentiments could
produce widening closed-end fund discounts.
Our next tests examine the time series of stock market returns after the
Lehman collapse. Instead of examining the level of closed-end fund discounts, these
tests focus on the co-movement of the closed-end fund discounts with the market.
We regress daily market returns on the changes in closed-end fund discounts of dif-
ferent fund categories and benchmark the results against different control periods,
including time periods before the Lehman collapse but well after the housing crisis
begins, other non-crisis periods, as well as other time periods covering other crises
such as the 9-11 attack. We find that the relation between closed-end fund discounts
and stock market returns is especially pronounced after the Lehman collapse rela-
tive to all other crisis and non-crisis periods. It is well known that closed-end fund
returns track small firm returns, but the strengthening of the CEF discount-market
relation strengthens after the Lehman collapse even for the value weighted stock
market index.
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When we examine the cross-section of the results across closed-end fund cat-
egories, we find that the post-Lehman relation between CEF discounts and market
returns vary across fund categories. For instance, discounts on closed-end funds
investing in large dividend paying U.S. equities experience the least increase in ex-
planatory power during he crisis. On the other hand, the strongest results are for
the spread of closed- end discounts between corporate bond funds and government
bond funds, and for funds that invest in riskier growth stocks rather than large
dividend paying stocks. The daily changes in closed end discounts is essentially
unrelated to the market before the Lehman collapse, but the adjusted R2 is close
to 35% to 46% after September 15, 2008. The results are consistent with the view
that sentiment-based variables have greater effect for hard-to-arbitrage categories of
assets, as suggested by theories of limited or costly arbitrage.
To better assess the economic meaning of the closed-end fund discounts vari-
able, we obtain a new dataset of high frequency measures of broad consumer mood
from the polling organization Gallup. The organization samples consumer senti-
ment by polling consumers daily through a series of questions. For instance, one
question focuses on a randomly selected set of consumers and asks them whether
their current conditions are good or bad and whether the economy is getting bet-
ter or worse. Others include questions on whether a consumer struggles with life,
consumer spending plans, or whether the firm they are working for is hiring new
workers. We include a fuller description of the dataset in a later section of the paper.
We find reliable relationships between fund discounts, especially the corporate- gov-
ernment bond fund discount spread and the growth stock closed end discount, and
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measures of sentiment about the economy during the crisis period. These relations
are especially remarkable because they come from orthogonal sources. Closed-end
fund discounts are, of course, price variables derived from investor trading decisions.
Gallup data are obtained by surveying consumers.
We also assess the relation between closed-end fund discounts and news me-
dia coverage by focusing on three phrases “great depression”, “recession”, and
“bankruptcy.” The number of Google searches for these terms correlates negatively
with changes in fund discounts. There is a predictive relation between lagged news
media coverage of these terms and one-day ahead changes in fund discounts. These
results suggest that at least in the crisis period, there is sentiment content in the
closed-end fund discount variables used in our study. To better interpret the closed-
end fund discount coefficients within a standard framework, we conduct a “reverse
regression” in which we regress changes in fund discounts on returns on stock market
indexes. This is the familiar market model that returns betas of fund discounts. We
find that discount betas increase markedly during the crisis period, often doubling
in magnitude. In a broader 4-factor Fama-French model, fund discounts load signif-
icantly on the market and the distress HML factor, and the loadings either switch
signs and become positive or become more positive during the crisis period. Thus,
closed-end funds are a pro-cyclical anti-hedge because discounts widen exactly at
the time when consumers seek refuge from market declines or market volatility. The
pro-cyclical nature of fund betas might offer another explanation for why funds sell
at a discount on average.
Our last set of tests are cross-sectional. We examine whether the extreme
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stock market movements during the crisis period are related to credit constraints
faced by firms, using several proxies for credit constrained firms. We analyze the
price reactions for specific dates on which there are key announcements, such as the
rejection or passage of the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), the subsequent
plan to recapitalize banks, and more generally, using the (many) days when there are
extreme positive or negative reactions. There is little evidence that credit constraints
are key drivers of stock market reactions. These results should not be construed as
evidence that credit constraints are irrelevant. Our point is that credit constraints
probably do not play a major role in explaining the post-Lehman decline in the stock
market and the extreme fluctuations during this period. Indeed, credit constraint
related effects are likely priced into stocks during the earlier pre-Lehman phases of
the crisis. The severe market decline and volatility spikes after the Lehman collapse
appears to reflect a downward shift in investor confidence, at least partly born out
of declining consumer sentiment about the broad economy. In our view, declining
confidence is a third force that adds to the negative spiral created by declining asset
values and financial institution fragility, as articulated in early work by Pigou (1947)
or as recently elucidated by Krugman (2001), and Krugman (2008).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a brief
overview of the recent work on the financial crisis. Section 3.3 describes the closed-
end fund dataset. In this section, we also present an analysis of the levels of fund dis-
counts before and after the Lehman collapse. Section 3.4 analyzes the co-movement
of fund discounts with the aggregate stock market. Section 3.5 relates fund discounts
to daily sentiment data extracted from Gallup, internet searches, and newspaper
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articles. Section 3.6 examines the systematic risk attributes of closed end funds.
Section 3.7 presents cross-sectional tests. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 The Crisis and Related Literature
3.2.1 Literature
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 is of relatively recent origin – and is perhaps
even ongoing, as of this writing in April 2009 – but it has spawned a relatively
large literature in a short span of time. To put our paper in perspective, we briefly
overview some of the literature.1
The origins of the current financial crisis lie in the housing bubble and its
subsequent deflation.2 One portion of the literature explores the causes of the ex-
cessive investment in real estate. Diamond and Rajan (2009) argue that the housing
boom was the result of an easy money policy in response to the bursting of the dot
com bubble that led to investors chasing higher yields and fueling investments in
real estate by individuals for home ownership or for speculation. The maturity of
the U.S. capital market allowed the banking system to fulfill the yield hunger by
originating and selling vast amounts of mortgage backed securities through securiti-
zation. The empirical evidence in Laeven, Igan, and Dell’Ariccia (2008), Demyanyk
and Van Hemert (2008), Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2008) and Mian and Sufi
1Our list is not necessarily comprehensive but includes representative work covering each of the
themes discussed below. We apologize for and welcome any additional citations of references that
we have overlooked.
2Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) argue that the key features of the U.S. crisis are remarkably similar
to 18 post-war crises experienced by other countries.
96
(2008) suggests that the originate-securitization model created a supply of mort-
gages that were measurably riskier by historical standards. Diamond and Rajan
(2009), Rajan (2005) and Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008) argue that the exces-
sive risk-taking became embedded as part of the culture of U.S. banks, perhaps due
to flawed internal reward systems.
A second element of the crisis was the role of the non-banking sector in the
financial marketplace. The mortgages originated by banks were securitized into
tranches, often fairly complex instruments, and were sold to non-traditional inter-
mediaries such as hedge funds or held as investments made by bank-backed commer-
cial paper programs. Simkovic (2009) argues that the doctrine of secret liens could
explain the incentives to generate complex, opaque, and illiquid securities. While
the assets were often complex and illiquid, the liabilities backing these were short-
term, creating a liquidity mismatch and opening up the possibility of traditional
runs (Bordo (2008), Krugman (2008)). The banks creating the securitized pools
were vulnerable to such runs due to two reasons. One is that they often provided
liquidity backstops to protect the short-term investors against liquidity shocks. A
second channel is indirect. While banks had no legal liability to protect short-term
investors to meet accounting criteria for avoiding consolidation, they were probably
implicit promises to step in and these promises were credible because of the incentive
of the originators to protect their reputation capital. Gorton and Souleles (2005)
and Gorton (2008) provide an excellent discussion of securitization and its relation
to the subprime crisis.
While the housing sector is an important component of the U.S. economy,
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an interesting theoretical question is how a shock to a single sector could multiply
manifold and spread to the broad economy. Brunnermeier (2008) provides a careful
review of the channels that could give rise to multiplier effects. Brunnermeier points
out that a deterioration in asset value erodes its collateral value. Given fixed mar-
gins for lending, financial institutions cut back on leverage, exacerbating the initial
drop in asset values. Alternatively (or additionally), the shock could be amplified
through the lending channel, in which negative shocks lead banks to hoard cash
in anticipation of future funding shortfalls – or future prospects for buying cheap
assets, as pointed out by Diamond and Rajan (2009). Additional amplification
mechanisms include bank runs due to illiquidity mismatch Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) or network gridlock that occurs when banks that simultaneously borrow and
lend in interbank or security repurchase markets become unwilling to trade with
each other due to adverse selection.3
The consequences of the financial crisis for the broader economy is the focus of
several recent articles. Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap, and Shin (2008) estimate the
housing crisis mortgage losses at $500 billion, 50% of which pass on to the leveraged
financial sector, which has an effect of reducing GDP growth rate by 1.5% due to
balance sheet multiplier effects. Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2008) survey 1,050
CFOs in the US, Europe and Asia to assess financial constraints as perceived by
firm managers. Firms that say they are financially constrained plan to cut R&D,
employment and capital spending severely. Campello et al. also document that
3Amplification effects due to collateral value constraints are also developed in Bernanke and
Gertler (1989) or Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) in the context of explaining macroeconomic cycles
and credit fluctuations.
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46% of the constrained firms say that they pass attractive investment opportunities
during normal times due to financial constraints, while 86% which pass attractive
investments during the credit crisis. Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2008) find that
firms’ investments fall between the September 2007 and June 2008, particularly
for firms that are financially constrained and have low cash reserves. Tong and
Wei (2008) find in a cross-sectional regression that the 7-month returns of non-
financial firms between July 31 2007 and March 31 2008 are related to the Whited
and Wu (2006) index of financial constraints. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2008) find
that during the crisis, there are precautionary cash drawdowns by lower rated firms
from their bank lines. There is less evidence on the economic effect of government
interventions in the crisis.Veronesi and Zingales (2008) present early evidence on this
issue. They argue that the October 13, 2008 capital infusion by the U.S. government
into major banks did not create any value in the banking system.
Confidence or sentiment plays no explicit role in the literature discussed above,
but it is frequently mentioned in pronouncements by policy makers, regulators, and
articles in the press, who view it as a barometer of economic stress. One view of
confidence is that it is merely a symptom of broader problems in the macroeconomy
or institutions. On the other hand, it could also exacerbate cycles in its own right
if it varies in a procyclical manner. For instance, negative sentiments in a down
market could lead investors to shift their asset allocations away from risky assets.
This could put pressure on prices if arbitrage is limited or costly. Alternatively,
a bearish environment could depress confidence and affect consumer spending or
investment decisions and generate self-fulfilling effects in the real economy. The role
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of pessimism is more explicitly recognized in macroeconomics in models of currency
crises that are structurally similar to bank run models. See, e.g.,Krugman (2008)
p.88 for an informal exposition or Chang and Velasco (1998) for a third generation
crisis model that builds on the work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Krugman
(2001) illustrates how confidence alone could lead to a crisis. He sketches a (highly)
stylized model of a fourth generation crisis model, a version of the Bernanke and
Gertler (1989) collateral constraints model that generates underinvestment when
investors lack the confidence to invest. Shleifer and Vishny (2009) argue that banks
lending conditioned on investor sentiment can generate cyclical effects.4 An entirely
different perspective is presented by the Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) model
of financial crises. In their view, a financial crisis can be triggered by a structural
shift about the nature of uncertainty. The aversion to ambiguity, or Knightian
uncertainty, can precipitate a crisis.
Our study offers new evidence on the variation of closed-end fund discounts
around the crisis. The existence of closed-end fund discounts, and particularly their
economic meaning, are heavily debated topics that continue to attract research. One
branch of the literature is concerned with the relation of fund discounts to stock re-
turns. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) argue that the closed-end fund discount is a
measure of small investor sentiment by virtue of its correlation with small stock re-
turns. Swaminathan (1996) and Neal and Wheatley (1998) find that fund discounts
predict the small firm return premium at longer horizons. These findings lead Baker
4Allusions to confidence can also be found in early work by Pigou (1947), who argues that
economic fluctuations are driven by a negative psychological trap in which pessimism feeds on
itself. See also Sen (2009).
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and Wurgler (2007) to use fund discounts as an input into a broad sentiment index.
On the other hand, Qiu and Welch (2005) and Lemmon and Portniaguina (2008)
find that consumer confidence does not correlate with closed-end fund discounts and
that consumer confidence is correlated with the small firm premium. The levels of
fund discounts are the subject of several papers. Bodurtha, Kim, and Lee (1995)
find that country closed-end fund discounts incorporate time-varying investor sen-
timent, a result supported by the news salience result in Klibanoff, Lamont, and
Wizman (1998). More recently, Cherkes, Sagi, and Stanton (2008) find that closed-
end fund discounts reflect a tradeoff between fund fees and the benefit of holding
liquid shares of funds and that themselves invest in illiquid assets. In a different
experiment, Pontiff (1996) analyzes the level of closed-end fund discounts. He finds
that factors that affect arbitrage costs are related to explain the variation in fund
discounts, consistent with noise trader models with costly arbitrage. Pontiff also
argues that the cost of arbitrage framework explains other features of closed-end
fund discounts.
3.2.2 An Event Calendar Prior to 4Q 2008
In this section, we briefly review the key events in the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
We refer the reader also to Brunnermeier (2008), which also contains a logbook that
includes many of the events discussed below until March 2008. The roots of the
current crisis are often traced back to an easy money policy on the part of the
Federal Reserve in the aftermath of the dot com crash. Low interest rates fueled a
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demand for housing. The interest rate environment also led investors to search for
higher yields, which were satisfied through mortgage securities financing homes. As
the supply of mortgages increased, the mortgage quality decreased as new buyers
were less creditworthy and mortgages were financed through lower amounts of equity,
including subprime mortgages, Alt-A mortgages, or NINJA (no income no job no
assets) loans. For instance, subprime mortgages amounted to US$600 billion, or
20.6% of new mortgages by 2006, up from US$160 billion and 7.2% in 2001. Agency
problems at originators, complex credit structures of securitized products, and a
third layer of agency problems at the rating agencies who seemed overly generous
with ratings of securitized products, exacerbated the process.
The first signs of stress in the financial markets was seen in May 2007, when
the Swiss Bank UBS reported losses in subprime loans. In June 2007, the investment
bank Bear Stearns reported that two of its hedge funds faced margin call problems.
On June 20, 2007, Merrill Lynch seized $800 million in assets from two Bear Stearns
hedge funds that were involved in securities backed by subprime loans. To preserve
reputation, Bear Stearns made loans of over $3 billion to cover the margin calls to
confront what was essentially a run on its funds. The stock markets showed little
signs of this initial stress. For instance, on 19 July 2007, the Dow Jones Industrial
Index crossed the 14,000 level for the first time in history. However, the stress
was beginning to show in financial institutions, especially those exposed to real
estate. For instance, Countrywide Financial, a major mortgage lender, reported an
unexpected earnings drop on July 24, 2007. The asset backed commercial paper
market began to dry up as ratings companies began to review and downgrade these
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programs. In Europe, the French Bank BNP Paribas suspended withdrawal from
three of its funds on August 9, 2007. In response to the flight of capital now unwilling
to lend against risky collateral, the Federal Reserve created a Term Auction Facility
on December 12, 2007 under which banks could borrow from the Federal Reserve
against a wide range of collateral securities.
In the next phase, the crisis spread to the municipal bond market. Bonds
sold by municipal issuers are typically insured prior to being sold to investors. On
January 19, 2008, Fitch downgraded Ambac, one of the three major bond insurers,
raising doubts about the credit quality of municipal issues. Investors began to flee
the municipal bond markets and the auction rate securities segment (ARS) of the
municipal bond market witnessed a run. The ARS market is used by municipal bor-
rowers to issue floating rate debt with interest rates being set at periodic auctions.5
On Feburary 7, 2008, auctions used to set the floating interest rates failed, reflect-
ing a lack of interest from bidders. Issuers had to pay penalty rates, and investors
who wanted to redeem their investments in ARS faced difficulty in converting their
investments to cash. 80% of auctions failed on February 14, 2008 and 87% on Febru-
ary 14, 2008. Two-thirds of the auctions failed at subsequent auctions on February
20 and February 22, 2008. 62% of auctions on Feb 20 failed. 67% failed on Feb 22.
In contrast, just 44 auctions failed between 1984 and 2007.
The next major event in the financial crisis was a run on the investment bank
Bear Stearns. On March 11, 2008 Goldman Sachs broadcast an email to its clients
5The four major auction houses running the ARS market, Bank of Mellon New York, Wilm-
ington Trust, Deutsche Bank, and Wells Fargo.
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advising that it would not necessarily allow netting that exposed it to Bear Stearns,
which faced a run with investors unwilling to lend it money, trade with it, or accept
anything except treasuries in repo deals.6 Intervention by the New York Fed resulted
in funding being made available to Bear Stearns on March 14, 2008 and its takeover
by J P Morgan Chase Bank was arranged on March 16, 2008. Equity holders were
bought out at a price of $2 per share, subsequently revised to $10 per share, which
was down from $162.83 per share as of January 2007, a loss in market value of
close to $19 billion. The Fed provided up to $30 billion to cover losses on assets
transferred to J P Morgan in the takeover.
The next major event in the crisis was a classic bank run on Indymac Bank, a
subsidiary of Independent National Mortgage Corporation. The bank, which focused
on unconventional mortgages such as Alt-A loans, disclosed that it was undercapi-
talized on May 12, 2008. In June 2008, the bank began experiencing a run in which
individuals withdrew their bank deposits. On June 26, 2008, the New York Sena-
tor released a history of his correspondence with regulators that revealed concerns
about the soundness of Indymac. On July 8, Indymac’s share price fell to $0.44,
down from $45 in January 2007. The next day, Standard & Poor’s cut its counter-
party rating to CCC and on July 11, the bank was placed in conservatorship of the
FDIC by the Office of Thrift Supervision. This was the fourth-largest bank failure
in United States history, and the second-largest failure of a regulated thrift. Before
its failure, IndyMac Bank was the largest savings and loan association in the Los
6See Duffie and Zhu (2009) for a recent discussion of netting and counterparty risk under netting
versus that under a clearing house system.
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Angeles area and the seventh-largest mortgage originator in the United States.
By far the most significant events in the crisis unfolded in September 2008.
On September 7, 2008, there was a federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
publicly held but government sponsored enterprises that constituted the backbone
of the U.S. mortgage market. The GSEs directly or indirectly (through guarantees)
financed close to $6 trillion of mortgage securities, or close to half the aggregate U.S.
market. While the government did not explicitly back any GSE obligations, investors
treated the institutions as having implicit guarantees from the U.S. government. By
all accounts, the institutions appeared to be undercapitalized or insolvent, so the
government placed them into conservatorship and issued to the Treasury preferred
stock and warrants amounting to close to 80% of outstanding stock, which became
essentially worthless. Under conservatorship, the Treasury could advance essentially
unlimited funds to GSEs to stabilize them.
The last set of events related to private sector financial institutions. On
September 14, 2008, the investment bank Merrill Lynch was sold to Bank of America
for about 0.85 Bank of America shares per Merrill Lynch share, or about $29 per
share, a 70% premium over Merrill’s share price of $17 per share. Merrill was thought
to face a severe liquidity crisis after writing down close to $20 billion in mortgage
losses over the prior year. This was the second instance of a major investment bank
being taken over by a commercial bank in the face of runs or closure. The next
day, in a somewhat contradictory strategy, the investment bank Lehman Brothers
was allowed to go bankrupt and the institution filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy pro-
tection and began to liquidate its businesses through asset sales. The bankruptcy
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filing create externalities on counterparties of Lehman Brothers. Money market
funds that were reported to have exposure to Lehman experienced runs, with the
Primary Reserve Fund “breaking the buck” for the first time in history. Hedge
funds exposed to Lehman found their positions locked due to bankruptcy and many
counterparties, including European and Japanese banks and the energy company
Constellation Energy, reported their exposures to Lehman and their overall effect
on their balance sheets. Almost immediately after the Lehman Brothers filing,
the government reversed course on permitting institutions to fail, and announced
on September 16, 2008 that the prominent insurer American International Group
(AIG) would receive $85 billion in loans to avoid bankruptcy. The treasury obtained
close to 80% ownership of its equity through stock warrants. The financing to AIG
eventually increased to over $150 billion by March 2009. On September 25, 2008,
Washington Mutual was seized by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and
its banking assets were sold to J P Morgan Chase for $1.9 billion. On September
29, 2008, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation announces that Citigroup Inc.
would acquire banking operations of Wachovia, although Wells Fargo offered more
favorable terms and ultimately acquired Wachovia.
The contours of the crisis began to emerge after the Lehman Brothers collapse.
Attention turned to government rescue plans. The first reaction of the administra-
tion was to cleanse bank balance sheets of distressed mortgage assets, which seemed
to lie at the root of the crisis. The government sought a $700 billion authorization
from the Congress for this purpose formally on September 20, 2008. On the next
day, the U.S. government also transformed the last major free-standing investment
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banks, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley into bank holding companies to bring
them under regulatory purview. On September 29, 2008, the legislation that would
permit toxic asset purchase, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, was de-
feated 228-205 in the United States House of Representatives. On October 1, 2008
the Senate passed HR 1424, its version of the $700 billion bailout bill, and a bailout
bill was then passed by the U.S. House of Representatives on October 3, 2008.
The stock market experienced unexpected volatility a few days after the pas-
sage of the bank bailout bill. On October 7, 2008, the S&P 500 dropped by 5.74%
and on October 9, 2008 it dropped by a further 7.62%. The index reversed course
on October 13, 2008, when it gained 11.58% upon word that the treasury planned
to inject $250 billion by way of capital infusion into banks rather than the earlier
plans to buy out toxic mortgage assets. The form of the rescue included the US
government taking an equity position in banks that choose to participate in the pro-
gram. In exchange, banks were required to agree to restrictions such as executive
compensation. Nine banks initially agreed to (or were made to agree to) participate
in the capital injection program and received close to $125 billion, including major
commercial banks such as Bank of America, J P Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, and
Citigroup and major investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley.
Other US financial institutions eligible for the plan were granted time to apply for
capital and the government retained discretion to agree or disagree to the capital in-
fusion proposals. According to the government website http://financialstability.gov,
the capital purchase program has disbursed over $195 billion to 359 institutions.
The extreme stock market volatility continued after the capital purchase pro-
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gram was announced. For instance, the S&P index lost 9.03% and gained 10.79% on
October 15, 2008 and October 28, 2008, respectively. Figures 3.1 through 3.4 depict
the extent of stock market fluctuations after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
Figure 3.1 plots the S&P 500 index between 2006 and 2008. The index was essen-
tially flat through the whole period and closed at a level of 1,251 before the Lehman
bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. After that date, the index fell to 903 through
the year end. Figure 3.2 plots the CBOE VIX index of volatility, which peaks at
historically unprecedented levels only in the fourth quarter of 2008 (the actual peak
of 80.86% was attained on November 20, 2008). Figure 3.3 computes the Campbell,
Lettau, Malkielm and Xu (2001) measure of idiosyncratic volatility. In the fourth
quarter of 2008, the index attains its former peak attained after the dot com crash
of 2001. Finally, Figure 3.4 counts the percentage of stocks with at least 10% move-
ment in a day. Once again, there is a peak in the fourth quarter of 2008. Thus, by
several metrics the post-Lehman period was a very unusual period of a steep stock
market decline and high volatility.
3.3 Closed-End Fund Discounts
3.3.1 Data
We identify closed-end funds as stocks on the CRSP database with a CRSP
distribution code (“SHRCD”) equal to 4 or 5. We obtain data on the nature of
the closed-end fund’s investments by comparing the fund name and ticker with the
closed-end fund database of the website http://www.etfconnect.com maintained by
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Nuveen Investments. We retain funds classified as investing in any of the follow-
ing five categories: corporate fixed income, government bonds, U.S. equities, global
equities, and growth and income funds. Fund characteristics such as shares out-
standing and prices are available from CRSP while other data such as the net assets
of a fund or fund sponsors are available from ETF Connect.
Table 3.1 describes the sample characteristics. Our sample comprises 24 cor-
porate bond funds, 26 growth and income funds and over 50 equity funds investing
in global equities and a similar number investing in US equities. The median assets
under management at each fund category ranges from $237 million to $392 million.
We also obtain a rather small sample of three funds investing in taxable treasuries,
to assess investor sentiment related to government bonds to account for interactions
between demand for the risk-free and risky assets, a point made by Loewenstein
and Willard (2006). We include the spread between the discounts of the two asset
categories in some of our regressions. The government bond funds are relatively
large compared to the other fund categories, with median assets under management
that exceed $550 million. Our tests on closed-end fund discounts can be thought of
as having a time series and a cross-sectional dimension. The cross-section focuses on
distinctions between fund categories and the time series addresses variations across
time periods. We discuss these issues briefly before embarking on formal statistical
tests.
We have two reasons for including different categories of closed-end funds.
First, costly or limited arbitrage is a necessary condition for closed-end fund dis-
counts reflect investor sentiment. This point has been long emphasized by the
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closed-end fund literature in general and is the focal point of the tests of Pontiff
(1996). To arbitrage sentiment related discounts, investors need to buy the fund and
take offsetting short positions in the fund’s underlying assets. The payoffs from this
strategy come about sentiment dissipates or the discount otherwise mean-reverts.
As Thompson (1978) originally points out, much of the fluctuation in closed-end
funds arises due to mean reversion in discounts. To set up the arbitrage position
requires a short position in fund assets and the difficulty or cost of doing this, the
costs of arbitrage, vary across fund categories. In our view, long-short positions
are the easiest to establish for U.S. equities and are far more onerous for corporate
bonds or funds invested in growth or international stocks. Sentiments should drive
the variation in discounts in the latter far more than the former. A second motiva-
tion for including multiple fund categories is related specifically to corporate bonds.
As discussed before, much of the 2008 financial crisis has ben attributed to credit
constraints. Sentiments about the credit market should find expression in funds
investing in corporate fixed income securities, or the corporate bond funds. These
two reasons identify cross-sectional variation in arbitrage costs.
Time series variation comes from changes in the difficulties of conducting ar-
bitrage across time. As the crisis evolved, there were increasing constraints on the
supply of arbitrage capital. The broad constraints on credit represent one reason
why arbitrage capital could shrink over time. The undercapitalization of banks
meant that there was increased scrutiny from regulators over time as institutions
began failing. Moreover, banks worried about each others’ financial conditions cut
back on inter-bank lending and refused to participate in security repurchase mar-
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kets, putting further constraints on capital. Finally, hedge funds faced increasing
pressures due to redemption pressures from investors. The shrinkage of arbitrage
capital supply over time suggest that sentiment-related components could have a
greater influence on price movements towards the end of our sample period when
capital markets were more disrupted and affect harder-to-arbitrage funds more.
3.3.2 Empirical Evidence
Figure 3.5 presents the basic time series message conveyed by fund discounts.
As an aggregate measure of fund discounts, we simply compute the average discount
across all funds in all categories on each day in our sample. The 2007-2008 subprime
crisis is often viewed as having kicked in the middle of 2007, when there was a run
on two Bear Stearns sponsored hedge funds. Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2008),
for instance, consider the August 2007-March 2008 period as the “sub-prime” crisis
period. Accordingly, we graph the average discount from January 2006 to December
2008. Figure 3.5 reveals the essential features of the statistical analysis. Closed-
end funds traded at discounts of under 5% for much of 2006-2007. There is a shift
downwards around the middle of 2007, when the subprime crisis took root. Fund
discounts plunge towards the end of the sample period. Further eyeballing Figure
3.5, it also appears that fund discounts are far more volatile towards the last part of
the sample period, a fact that we confirm with statistical tests. Figures 3.6 and 3.7
depict the average discount for different categories of funds. Figure 3.6 focuses on
closed-end funds investing in U.S. equities, global equities, and growth and income
111
funds, while Figure 3.7 depicts funds investing in corporate fixed income, government
bonds, and the spread in the discount between the two categories of funds. In each
case, there is an especially clear disruption in the fund discount levels towards the
end of the sample period.
To verify the patterns suggested in Figures 3.5 through 3.7, we conduct statis-
tical tests for a structural break in the levels of the time series. We apply a structural
break test to the average closed-end fund discount of each category. Given the ex-
treme stock market decline and elevated volatility in the fourth quarter of 2008
beginning around the Lehman Brothers collapse and the evidence in Figures 3.1
through 3.3, we initially focus on the disruption after the Lehman collapse. We con-
sider a sample of daily returns starting in January 2007 (other dates yield similar
results) and specifying September 15, 2008 as a candidate structural break date, we
test whether the levels of discounts are different before and after this period using
the standard sum of squares test of Chow (1960). For every category of funds, the
null of no break is rejected against the alternative of a break on September 15 at
p-levels essentially indistinguishable from zero. A second generation of tests dates
the structural break endogenously based on where the sum-of-squares test is max-
imized. However, the tests statistic is no longer a standard F or χ2 test because
it involves the distribution of a maximum of the test statistics. Andrews (1993)
develops the asymptotic theory and Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005) provide a
finance application. The maximal tests also reject a null of no structural break and
identify September 15, 2008 as the break date for every fund category.7
7To conserve space, we do not report the detailed results in this version but specific figures and
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To supplement the basic tests and to develop a sense of the economic mag-
nitudes of the breaks in our dataset, we provide two additional pieces of evidence.
Table 3.2 presents data on average fund discounts by category for several periods.
We report the number of funds for which the average is computed (identical to the
sample data from Table 3.1) and the mean, median, and standard deviation of the
CEF discounts for all funds in a category, computed across all the days in the rel-
evant sample period. Panel A presents evidence for the period after the Lehman
collapse on September 15, 2008, which we term as the stock crisis period. It is read-
ily evident that the closed-end fund discounts widen across all fund categories in this
period. For example, the median discount on corporate bonds is 17.29% and this is
wider than the discounts on corporate bonds in all other periods reported in Panels
B, C, and D. Not surprisingly, the difference between the post-Lehman period and
other periods is the narrowest for government bonds. In all other categories, the
discount is one order of magnitude greater than experienced in previous periods.
Panels B through D report data for prior time periods before the Lehman
collapse. Panel B focuses on the 45 day period prior to the (45 day) period af-
ter September 15, 2008 in our sample. In four out of five categories, the average
discounts are lower than in the post-Lehman period. For example, the median dis-
count in the growth and income fund category is -8.15% in Panel B versus -19.77%
in Panel A. Panel C reports the data for the subprime period from August 2007
to March 2008. The discounts are relatively flat compared to the June-September
a plot of the test statistic peaking around September 15, 2008 are available from the authors upon
request.
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2008 period. However, the more striking feature of the data is that the discounts in
the subprime crisis period in Panel C are higher than the pre-subprime period from
April 2007 to June 2007. In all categories except the government bond funds, the
discounts more than double in the subprime period, although they are still lower
than in the post-Lehman period.
3.3.3 Event Study Evidence
Table 3.3 reports evidence from a daily time series of fund discounts. Here, we
conduct a different experiment. We identify several candidate event dates during
which there were major announcements or events as outlined in the event history
logged in Section 3.2 of the paper. We examine how the average discounts of each
category of funds responds to the content of the announcement. We assess the
statistical significance of the event through a t-test of the change in discounts on
the event date, normalized by the standard error, which is computed based on the
history of discount changes for the category over a 60 calendar day period prior to
the event. This method is not necessarily powerful because it uses the only history
of the average return in a category. However, as Fama (1998) points out, averaging
returns on calendar dates mitigates issues with cross-sectional correlation. As we
discuss below, power is largely a non-issue as most changes in average closed-end
fund discounts turn out to be rather significant for several categories. The evidence
on daily changes for selected days can also shed light on specific events that lead to
movement in closed-end fund discounts.
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Table 3.3 reports evidence on fund discount reactions to events prior to the
Lehman collapse. January 22, 2008 is the first trading date after the downgrade of
a monoline municipal bond insurer, Ambac. The results for this date suggest that
the news was mixed. Three out of five categories show negative change, one has
a significant positive change, while one is insignificant. There does not appear to
be a consistently signed sentiment spillover of the disruption in the municipal bond
market due to the Ambac downgrade. The first run in the auction rate market on
February 7, 2008 does not seem to have alarmed investor sentiment significantly, as
three out of four fund discount changes are positive. However, the second disruption
on Feburary 14, 2008 resulted in a consistent widening of discounts of between -1.5%
and -2.5%. (We note that this is not a percentage change in discount; rather, it is
the change in the percentage discount).
The Bear Stearns collapse in March 2008 produces interesting results. The
first rumors of the collapse on March 11, 2008 did not seem to alarm investors but
the loan made by the treasury to Bear Stearns on March 14, 2008 seemed to set
off a warning. The eventual takeover of Bear Stearns by J P Morgan Chase was an
informationally negative event: it hurts investor sentiment, as reflected in a signifi-
cant widening of discounts on March 17, 2008. The news about the extent of Bear
Stearns’ problems apparently overwhelmed any positive news in the action taken by
the Feds to stave off Bear’s bankruptcy. The Indymac bank failure is likewise not
economically significant. The Fannie and Freddie takeovers are interesting because
they result in a negative shift in sentiment for the equity markets and a mild positive
shift for the bond markets, especially the government bonds. Equityholders essen-
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tially lost all capital in the government takeover of the two GSEs, which perhaps
accounts for the negative sentiment in equities. It is harder to understand why gov-
ernment or corporate bond holders might benefit from the effective nationalization
of the two enterprises.
In Table 3.4, we turn to the events around and immediately after the Lehman
bankruptcy. Both the Lehman collapse on September 15, 2008 and the subsequent
AIG bailout on September 16, 2008 resulted in a markedly negative turn of senti-
ment as funds in all categories experienced a widening of discounts. Curiously, the
reaction to the AIG bailout was at least as negative as the reaction to the Lehman
bankruptcy, perhaps because of some delay in incorporating the rather unantici-
pated event of a bulge bracket investment bank bankruptcy, or delay in assessing
the broad consequences for counterparties. It is interesting that the magnitudes of
the shocks to discounts are much greater on these two days compared to that in
any of the days studied in Table 3.3. On September 22, 2008, the U.S. government
released outlines of a plan to bail out banks through toxic asset repurchases. The
reaction to this was distinctly negative and significant in four out of five categories.
Either investor sentiment towards the plan was negative or the news about the
magnitude of the bailout overwhelmed any positivity in the fact that the govern-
ment was injecting capital into financial institutions. The September 25 takeover of
Washington Mutual by Wells Fargo had a positive effect on discounts in three out
of four categories. However, the rejection of the U.S. government plan to bail out
banks through toxic asset repurchases had a significantly negative effect on investor
sentiment, especially investors in corporate bonds.
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In Table 3.5, we study the daily movements of the fund discounts in October
2008. The passage of the bailout bill by the Senate on October 1, 2008 was greeted
by a positive shift in sentiment across all categories. The other data points in
October 2008 show interesting patterns, with substantial swings in closed-end fund
discounts. One of these movements, on October 13, 2008, is the most significant
single day movement. This is the day on which the treasury secretary announced
a move to recapitalize banks through direct capital infusion rather than the toxic
asset repurchase program. For instance, the narrowing of average CEF discounts by
15.43% for corporate bonds represents the single largest move for this category in
our sample. However, on the other dates recorded in Table 3.5, there is little news of
comparable significance. Stocks showed significant volatility as the S&P 500 index
went up or down by between 5% and 10% on several days. There was significant
co-movement of fund discounts with the broad stock market on many (though not
all) days. For instance, the market went down by 5.74% on October 6, 2008 and by
7.62% on October 9, 2008 and we see discounts widening for all categories of funds
on these dates. On other dates with significant stock price moves, most but not
all category discounts move in the direction of the stock return. The data suggest
that once discounts turned downwards and sentiment worsened after September 15-
16, the co-movement of the stock market with closed-end fund discounts increased,
either because fund discounts responded to contemporaneous stock market moves or
common elements drove both the stock market and investor sentiment. We examine
the relation between stock returns and changes in closed-end funds in greater detail
in the next section.
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3.3.4 Summary
Statistically, the data say that closed-end fund discounts first widened in the
subprime crisis period and then widened sharply yet again after the Lehman Broth-
ers collapse. If fund discounts are interpreted as measures of investor sentiment, the
evidence suggests that investor confidence lost traction during the subprime crisis.
Greater pessimism took root in the fourth quarter of 2008 after the Lehman col-
lapse. A plausible interpretation of the results is that the crises resulted in a shock
to the supply of capital available to conduct risky arbitrage. The shock provided a
channel for investor confidence or sentiment to express itself through stock prices.
Alternatively, it is possible that there is no alteration in sentiment but increased
constraints on arbitrage led to more pessimistic views being reflected in prices, in
the spirit of Miller (1977). We shed more light on these issues in the next section,
where we tie in closed-end fund discounts to real sentiment variables during the
stock crisis period after the Lehman collapse.
A supply shock to arbitrage capital story can explain why the discounts espe-
cially widened after the Lehman collapse. Given the historical record of the treasury
or the Federal Reserve, failing banks were more liable to be bailed out through merg-
ers with some assistance from the government agencies. This was the process used
in the case of Bear Stearns, and of course, in the rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. Thus, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy
filing came as an unanticipated shock to the system. A related point is made by Ca-
ballero and Krishnamurthy (2009), who argue that a structural shift of this nature
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introduces ambiguity, making it difficult for investors to form probability distri-
butions over outcomes. Investors with Knightian aversion to ambiguity focus on
and plan for worst case outcomes. A loss of confidence in the financial institutions
could lead investors to exit the system for safer havens, and make them less willing
to hold assets close to the fundamental value set by markets. The data seem less
consistent with a liquidity explanation for discounts during the crisis. In periods
of illiquidity, closed-end funds offer a liquid alternative to illiquid investments held
by the fund, implying that discounts should narrow rather than widen during crisis
episodes. This is not what we observe in the data. A more plausible reconciliation
of liquidity and sentiment explanations for discounts is that while liquidity could
matter in normal circumstances, sentiment is more relevant in crisis periods when
the limits to arbitrage assume greater importance, so sentiment has a closer relation
to the market movements in these period. We explore this interpretation further in
the next sections.
3.4 Comovement
In this section, we examine whether closed end fund premia co-move with
aggregate market returns. If closed end funds contain information related to retail
investor sentiment, and if the crisis of late 2008 is related to investor sentiment, then
the level of comovement should be very high at this time, but much lower in other
periods. The objective is to test if CEF premia, which are disruptions in the normal
pricing of securities, can explain high frequency aggregate market movements. In
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later sections, we explore the information contained in CEF premia and find support
for the conclusion that it became very related to proxies for sentiment in late 2008,
but not in earlier periods.
3.4.1 Closed End Fund Premia
Our emphasis is on comovement in CEF premia and aggregate market returns.
Hence, we consider daily returns. These high frequency tests are critical, as our
structural break tests reveal that the crisis period contains just 76 trading days in
2008. Low frequency tests would render the number of time series observations to
be too few, and power too low, to test hypotheses relating to comovement during
and before the crisis period.
In Table 3.6, we report the results of regressions in which the dependent vari-
able is the return on the CRSP value weighted market index (Panel A), the change
in the VIX volatility index (Panel B), or the change in the investment grade credit
default swap (CDS) index (Panel C). The independent variable varies by row and
is the change in the CEF premium for various fund classes (identified in the second
column). The change in the CEF premium is measured over the same one day period
during which the dependent variable is measured. Hence, all regressions are strictly
associative and not predictive. We report results over three key subsamples: the
2008 Crisis, the pre-crisis period, and the full sample preceding these two periods
(“other dates”).
[Insert Table 3.6 here]
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Panel A of Table 3.6 shows that many fund categories have premia that comove
with the aggregate market over time. For example, in the largest sample “other
dates”, bond funds and global equity funds have premia that comove positively with
the aggregate stock market. In contrast, domestic equity funds including growth and
income and equity income funds have premia that comove negatively. Although
premia appear to comove in a statistically significant fashion in this broad sample,
all Adjusted R2 statistics are less than 10%, suggesting that these comovements
are meaningful but modest in economic size. The Pre-crisis preiod is generally
similar to the broad sample, but most bond fund categories have somewhat elevated
comovement with the aggregate market. Most striking, however, is that in the
2008 Crisis period, comovement with the market reached much higher levels. The
corporate bond CEF premium, the default spread premium (the difference between
the corporate bond CEF premium and the government bond CEF premium), and
the growth and income premium, all have adjusted R2 statistics exceeding 35%.
Despite the fact that this sample only contains 76 observations, the associated t-
statistics are very significant, and are larger than 6.0 for these three fund categories.
Consistent with our structural break tests in the previous section, these tests show
that the behavior of closed end fund premia changed in late 2008. We see similar
results in Panel B regarding changes in the implied volatility index, and some weaker
evidence in Panel C regarding the investment grade credit default swap index. These
results suggest that the information contained in closed end fund premia became
correlated with broad classes of financial assets and indices in late 2008.
Further analysis of Table 3.6 reveals that funds that invest in less liquid secu-
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rities experience greater increases in adjusted R2 in the 2008 crisis period. These
results support a key idea initially forwarded by Pontiff (1996), that the cost of
arbitrage is important in understanding CEF premia. In the context of our study,
a higher cost of arbitrage is a necessary condition for investor sentiment to be fully
expressed in closed end fund premia. Consistent with this notion, Table 3.6 shows
that corporate bonds (adjusted R2 50.6%) are generally less liquid than government
bonds (adjusted R2 24.0%), and growth and income funds (adjusted R2 35.7%) are
generally less liquid than equity income funds (adjusted R2 0.8%). Equity income
funds generally invest in large dividend paying stocks and have the primary objec-
tive of providing current income, which is in contrast to growth and income funds,
which additionally invest in riskier non-dividend paying stocks that prioritize future
growth over steady income. We conclude that shortages in arbitrage capital, or
an inability to construct arbitrage portfolios, likely played a role in permitting the
comovement of CEF premia and aggregate market indices to reach such abnormal
levels. We explore the role of sentiment, for which the current findings suggesting
limits to arbitrage capital are necessary, more in the next section.
Table 3.6 provides a natural difference in differences approach to understanding
the crisis of 2008. The differences in adjusted R2 for many categories across the
periods support the conclusion that the structural break in CEF premium levels
coincided with a break in the extent to which CEF premia comove with aggregate
market indices.
However, this effect is somewhat blurred for bond funds, which have CEF
premia that still comove with the market positively, although with lower R2, in
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other periods. Because this effect is unique to fixed income funds, it is likely due to
a stable relationship between interest rates (or interest rate liquidity or sentiment),
and aggregate asset prices. Thus to understand the unique role played by the 2008
crisis in bond funds, this motivates a double difference in differences approach.
We consider the difference in the corporate bond CEF premium and the gov-
ernment bond CEF premium, as this difference should be purged of interest-rate
specific content. We use the corporate bond CEF as the first item in this difference
because corporate bonds are generally more difficult to arbitrage than government
bonds, and our convention is to analyze CEF premia with positive theoretical links
to sentiment. Table 3.6 shows that this “default spread CEF premium” is only very
weakly related to aggregate market movements outside of the 2008 Crisis period
(adjusted R2 less than 1.6% for both the pre-crisis and the other dates sample in
all three panels), indicating that it is indeed likely purged of the stable relationship
between fixed income securities CEF premia and the aggregate market. In contrast,
the table also shows that the default spread CEF premium is very statistically and
economically significant during the 2008 crisis period with an adjusted R2 exceed-
ing 40% in Panel A, 38.1% for the VIX index in Panel B, and 10.1% for the credit
default index in Panel C. These results, considered jointly with our results for eq-
uity CEFs, suggest that the structural breaks noted earlier in this study, are likely
related to the content contained in both the default spread CEF premium and the
growth and income CEF premium. Both series are strongly related to the value
weighted market in the 2008 crisis, but not in other periods.
Similar to our fixed income securities CEFs, the global equity fund CEFs
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appear to have a stable link to aggregate market indices in all periods. This finding
is consistent with Bodurtha, Kim, and Lee (1995), who find that international CEFs
incorporate time varying sentiment in a broad setting. For these reasons, in the
remainder of the paper we focus our attention most on the default spread CEF
premium and the growth and income CEF premium, as information contained in
these series appears to be most directly related to the structural break of late 2008.
3.4.2 Closed End Fund Net Asset Values
It is noteworthy that we find similar results across fund categories based on
both fixed income securities and equity securities. This is both important because
it suggests that the role of closed end funds is broad in late 2008, and also because it
provides some initial evidence that contamination in reported fund net asset values
(NAVs) is not responsible for our findings. For example, if net asset values are
computed incorrectly, it is possible that computed closed end fund premia might
be contaminated by information related to the valuations of the underlying assets
(NAVs). Our finding of distinct structural breaks in more than one fund category
helps to alleviate this concern because the contamination from NAVs from broadly
different asset classes would have to be common in order to affect both CEF premia
in the same way. We examine this question of NAV accuracy further in this section.
In particular, we examine if our results are robust to controlling for NAV value
changes, and we use both the reported NAVs and a fitted NAV based on actual
bond prices and credit default indices.
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First, some basic summary statistics strongly support the conclusion that NAV
returns and CEF premia both experience considerable time series variation, and also
that both contain distinct information, especially in late 2008. In the broad sam-
ple, regarding the default spread CEF variable, the standard deviation of the daily
change in its CEF premium, and its daily NAV return, is 0.94% and 0.40%, respec-
tively. During the pre-crisis period, these numbers are 0.58% and 0.45%, and during
the 2008 crisis period both statistics increase to 2.53% and 1.13%, respectively. For
the growth and income CEF, its change in CEF premium and reported NAV return
have standard deviations of 0.57% and 0.79% prior to June 1, 2008, and standard
deviations of 2.4% and 2.6% during the 2008 crisis period. We conclude that both
asset values, and the wedge between asset values and CEF values, became more
volatile during the crisis period.
Although it is unlikely that equity NAVs are computed with error due to the
high degree of availability of closing equity prices, it seems more plausible that
corporate bond NAVs might be more difficult to compute. We next explore whether
the links we find between changes in closed end fund premia and aggregate equity
indices are robust to controlling for NAV returns. We focus on the default spread
CEF premium because, unlike the growth and income equity CEF, its NAV is indeed
dependent upon the reliability of recent bond prices. We consider controls for both
the reported NAV, and a simple fitted NAV.
The fitted NAV is based on a regression of changes in the default spread CEF
price changes on four relevant variables: change in the the investment grade CDS
spread, change in the BAA corporate bond yield, change in the AAA corporate bond
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yield, and the change in the US treasury 10 year bond yield. We fit this first stage
regression using observations from October 30, 2003 through May 31, 2008 (based
on availability of the CDS index data). Although we do not report the results of
this regression to conserve space, we find highly significant negative loadings on the
changes in credit default index (T=8.73), the changes in AAA corporate bond yields
(T=-3.04), and a positive loading on the changes in US treasury yields (T=+3.74).
Hence, we view our fitted model as being informative about the true NAV return
series. We next use the coefficients from this model to form a “fitted” default spread
CEF NAV return in later periods including the pre-crisis period and the 2008 crisis
period following the structural break.
In Table 3.7, we examine if our Table 3.6 findings regarding the default spread
CEF premium are robust to controlling for the “fitted” NAV return and the the
reported NAV return. Panel A repeats the analysis in Table 3.6, where aggregate
market variables are regressed on changes in the default CEF premium alone. Panels
B and C replace the change in default CEF premium with the reported NAV return
or the fitted NAV return, respectively. Panels D and E consider bivariate regressions
with both the default CEF premium and either NAV, respectively.
[Insert Table 3.7 here]
The results strongly support the conclusion that the 2008 crisis coefficients in
Panel A (CEF premium only) do not change very much when controls for either
NAV return are included in Panels D and E. For example, the coefficient for the
value weighted market return declines from 1.067 to 1.019 when the reported NAV
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return control is included, and to 1.031 when the fitted NAV return control is in-
cluded. We conclude that the NAV return explains at most 5% of the link between
CEF premia and aggregate market variables. The results in Panels B and C (NAV
return only) also show that changes in bond prices (corporate minus government)
are, not surprisingly, positively correlated with changes in aggregate equity prices.
Comparing Panels B and C show that the fitted NAV and the reported NAV also
seem to generate similar results with similar significance level patterns, supporting
the conclusion that the reported NAVs are likely calculated accurately for the fixed
income closed end fund categories. In particular, the expected correlation between
NAV returns and market returns does not explain the observed correlation between
CEF premia and aggregate market returns.
3.5 Sources of CEF premium variation
Because closed end fund premia contain a strong signal that is not related to
net asset valuations, a large literature has developed possible explanations for what
drives this CEF premia. Among the explanations are liquidity (see Cherkes, Sagi,
and Stanton (2008)) and sentiment (see Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991)). In this
section, we examine in greater depth whether these explanations drive our results.
Because CEF premia experienced a large structural break on September 15, 2008,
we note that it is possible that key determinants of CEF premium might also be
different before and after this date. Hence, we consider tests based on the 2008 crisis
period, and the pre-crisis period. We are unable to consider a broader study in this
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section due to data availability restrictions.
We first note that some basic summary statistics support the conclusion that
there is a link between liquidity and closed end fund premia. In particular, changes
in liquidity should have an opposite effect on net asset values and closed end fund
premia. For example, consider a fund investing in asset X, and consider the impli-
cations of asset X suddenly becoming more illiquid. It is well known in the Market
Microstructure literature that asset X should decrease in value, hence we would
expect a negative NAV return following this event. On the other hand, because
closed end funds solve the asset illiquidity problem, the premium itself should in-
crease following this event (the value of resolving asset illiquidity should increase
when assets are less liquid). Hence, if there is a strong link between asset liquidity
and closed end premia, we would expect a significant negative correlation between
NAV returns and changes in the CEF premium. We find in our broad sample (from
January 1, 2000 to May 31, 2008), that this correlation is indeed very significant and
negative at -35.4% for the default CEF premium. Hence, our results are consistent
with liquidity playing a large role in day to day changes in fund discounts, at least
prior to the structural break (this correlation is almost unchanged at -34.3% in the
pre-crisis period from June 1, 2008 to September 14, 2008). Similarly, we find that
this correlation is -10.3% for the growth and income CEF premium prior to June
1, 2008. These pre-crisis findings are consistent with Cherkes, Sagi, and Stanton
(2008).
However, after the structural break, two key findings suggest that liquidity
likely does not explain the CEF premium in late 2008. First, the correlation be-
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tween the NAV return and the changes in the default spread CEF premium actually
changes sign and becomes +11.9%. For the growth and income CEF, this number
becomes +63.5%.8 This positive sign is not consistent with a liquidity interpreta-
tion, but is consistent with a sentiment interpretation as in Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler
(1991). Second, it is likely that corporate bond liquidity deteriorated in late 2008,
and hence liquidity based theories would predict that CEF premia should have in-
creased during this period. As reported earlier, we find that all CEF premia actually
declined significantly. We conclude that liquidity likely does not explain the changes
in the CEF premia in late 2008 (although it does in other periods), and we next
explore whether high frequency sentiment proxies can explain its changes.
3.5.1 Sentiment and CEF premia
Following Qiu and Welch (2005), we first consider direct measures of con-
sumer and individual sentiment from UBS/Gallup polls. Starting in early 2008,
UBS/Gallup provides the results of nine daily surveys (called “daily trends”). We
consider eight of the nine surveys including personal finance, US economic condi-
tions, US economic outlook, consumer mood, US job market, US life evaluation,
US standard of living, and overall US mood.9 We also consider one additional
Gallup/UBS daily survey regarding actual consumer spending. All nine surveys
(eight daily trends and one covering consumer spending), although reported daily,
are based on three day moving averages. For each survey, we compute its daily
8The result for the growth and income CEF essentially restates our Table 3.6 finding that the
growth and income CEF premium co-moves positively with aggregate stock valuations (the growth
and income NAV is an example), but only after the structural break.
9The ninth survey is on the topic of US health, which we omit.
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relative change, which is equal to the reported survey result on a given day minus
its previous day result, scaled by its previous day result. Our objective is to exam-
ine whether these high frequency changes in sentiment are associated with our high
frequency changes in CEF premia. In particular, we wish to examine whether any
observed relationship changes before and after the structural break of September
15, 2008.
Table 3.8 reports the results of univariate time series regressions in which
changes in the CEF premium for a given fund class is the dependent variable (varies
by panel and noted in each panel header), and the relative change in one of the
survey results is the independent variable. As before, these regressions are not
predictive, as our aim is to establish comovement. We report results for the 2008
crisis period and the pre-crisis period.
In Panels A to C, Table 3.8 shows without exception that changes in our
survey-based sentiment proxies do not explain changes in CEF premia prior to the
structural break. In fact, the only variable that is statistically significant even at
the 10% level (Economy is getting worse) has the wrong sign in Panel B. In stark
contrast, many survey results are strongly correlated with changes in CEF premia
after the structural break. Most relevant, changes in survey results asking three
questions are especially significant in all five panels: (1) is the economy getting
worse, (2) Is the economy poor, and (3) is the consumer mood negative. We view
all three surveys as proxies for retail investor sentiment, and all three are significantly
related to CEF premia at better than the 1% level despite the fact that the 2008
crisis period has just 76 observations. When viewed together with our findings
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relating to liquidity, our broad evidence supports the conclusion that the September
15th structural break is associated with a shift in which CEF premia change from
being associated with changes in liquidity prior to the break, to being associated
with sentiment following the break.
Because retail investors are far more numerous than institutional investors,
it is likely that the Gallup survey results reflect the beliefs of retail investors on
average. Our findings regarding closed end funds suggest that that their beliefs
translated to actual trading activity, and this activity ultimately became associated
with aggregate stock market returns. Although retail investors have limited wealth,
their numbers are large, and they have the potential to affect broad asset classes in
an economically relevant manner.
Overall, despite the strong findings regarding in late 2008, our findings are
consistent with both Qiu and Welch (2005) and Lemmon and Portniaguina (2008).
In particular, we also find that CEFs do not correlate highly with sentiment measures
in broad samples. However, the late 2008 crisis period is separated by a structural
break, and is not part of the sample studied by either article. Our results suggest
that the relationship between CEFs and sentiment is likely related to the overall state
of the economy. This conclusion supports ideas presented in Pigou (1947), Krugman
(2001), and Shleifer and Vishny (2009). In particular, the role of sentiment can be
both elevated and highly systemic in times of crisis. In turn, these theories can
generate patterns consistent with our findings, and those of Qiu and Welch (2005)
and Lemmon and Portniaguina (2008).
Although our results are consistent with a sentiment based interpretation, it
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remains an open question whether the actions of retail investors are rational or
irrational in this context. For example, if their beliefs about the economy getting
worse are valid, then future corporate profits are likely to be lower, and selling
financial assets can be rational if their prices do not yet fully reflect this information.
Because these results are related to broad surveys, however, it is unlikely that each
retail investor holds any private information that is not yet known by the market,
which favors a sentiment interpretation. We explore this question in greater depth
by considering the consumer spending survey as a special case. Unlike the other
surveys, which focus on moods and beliefs, this survey queries individuals regarding
their actual spending patterns. If the information contained in closed end funds was
more about fundamentals than irrational sentiment, then this one survey should be
more informative regarding the information contained in CEF premia.
In three of the five panels, Table 3.8 shows that increases in surveyed con-
sumer spending are indeed positively associated with increases in CEF premia for
corporate bond funds, government bond funds, and growth and income funds. How-
ever, we do not see a significant relationship for the default spread CEF variable.
This variable is significantly related to consumer mood and expectations about the
economy deteriorating at better than the 1% level. We conclude that the evidence
regarding consumer spending is mixed, whereas the evidence regarding sentiment is
strong and consistently significant at the 1% level.
In unreported regressions, we also examine whether the Gallup Survey vari-
ables explain aggregate market returns. We find that the same three sentiment
surveys that explain changes in CEF premia also explain the value weighted market
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return, but primarily at the 10% level. This relationship only exists during the
2008 crisis period. Also relevant, the consumer spending survey is not significantly
related to aggregate market returns. Our broad results are thus most consistent
with the conclusion that investor sentiment is the most likely interpretation of our
findings during the 2008 crisis period.
3.5.2 The Internet and the Media
Our evidence related to the Gallup surveys is especially compelling because this
data obtains from a source that is entirely unrelated to financial assets or financial
markets more generally. We now test for robustness using two additional sources of
high frequency data: Google Trends and Lexis/Nexis newspaper article counts. We
extract daily time series from both sources based on the key phrases “Great Depres-
sion”, “Recession” and “Bankruptcy”. Google trends summarize daily aggregate
web searches on these topics, and Lexis/Nexis allows us to count the number of
newspaper articles written on each topic. Because the typical web user, and the
typical newspaper reader, are likely to be retail investors, we believe these tests can
help to establish robustness regarding the link between retail investor sentiment and
aggregate stock returns during the 2008 crisis suggested by our UBS/Gallup survey
results.
[Insert Table 3.9 here]
Table 3.9 displays the results of these tests. The change in the CEF premium
for a given fund class is the dependent variable (varies by panel and noted in each
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panel header), and the relative change in the number of Google searches or the num-
ber of newspaper articles on the Great Depression, recession, or bankruptcy is the
independent variable as noted in the first column. The regressions are synchronous,
and the independent variable and the dependent variable are measured over the
same day. We examine lead vs lag relationships later in this section.
Consistent with our findings regarding Gallup surveys, the table shows that
our Google Trends variables are only negative and significant during the 2008 crisis
period. Moreover, for all five fund classes examined, including the key default spread
CEF premium in Panel C and the growth and income CEF premium in Panel D,
web searches on the Great Depression and Recession are negatively associated with
changes in the CEF premia at better than the 1% level of significance. Google
searches on bankruptcy have the proper sign, but are not significant in most panels.
We generally see weaker relationships for Lexis/Nexis newspaper article counts, but
note that articles on bankruptcy explain some variation in closed end fund premia
in some panels. Also, in unreported regressions, these same Google Trends variables
are negatively related to the value weighted market return also at better than the
1% level.
[Insert Table 3.10 here]
Table 3.10 reproduces the tests in Table 3.9 after lagging the independent
variables by one day. We find a strong and consistent lead relationship between the
previous day’s newspaper articles and the next day’s changes in CEF premia. Most
noteworthy, newspaper articles on all three topics significantly predict the next day’s
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change in growth and income CEF premium and the default spread CEF premium,
most at the 5% level or better. Because newspaper articles are generally available
early on a given day, it is quite striking that this information leads CEF premium
changes given that a full day of trading was available prior to this interaction,
allowing this information to become public information. Considering our results
thus far, we conclude that newspaper articles on our key topics lead changes in
CEF premia, and Google searches on our key topics move synchronously with our
key variables. Both findings support the conclusion that after the structural break,
closed end fund premia became strongly related to proxies for sentiment. Our results
are especially compelling given that the sentiment proxies obtain from non-financial
data.
[Insert Table 3.11 here]
Table 3.11 reproduces the tests in Table 3.9 after lagging the closed end fund
premia by one day. Because the closed end fund premia are lagged, the dependent
variable is now the future change in google searching activity, or the change in
newspaper article counts. Although the evidence of lead relationship in CEF premia
relative to changes in future sentiment proxies is less robust overall than our earlier
findings, we see some evidence that changes in CEF premia do generate higher
future google searches on the Great Depression and Recession, and perhaps some
press coverage on the topic of bankruptcy, especially in Panels C and D, which are
based on our key CEF premium variables: the default spread and the growth and
income equity funds. Regarding the more liquid government bond funds in Panel
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B, and the equity income funds in Panel E, the evidence is weaker. These findings
support the prediction that limits to arbitrage are necessary in order for sentiment
to be visible in asset returns.
In unreported regressions, although the Google search variables significantly
move with the market in a synchronous fashion at better than the 1% level, we do
not find a significant lead or lag relationship between the google and Lexis/Nexis
variables and the value weighted market index, although most variables have the
predicted sign. Overall, we view the results in this section as providing robust-
ness supporting the conclusion that changes in sentiment are highly correlated with
changes in closed end fund premia after the September 15th structural break, but
not before. This key date likely marked a shift in the content of CEF premia from
liquidity to consumer sentiment.
Although our lead lag results are not as strong as our synchronous results, we
believe that they provide some evidence of a recycling effect. For example, negative
sentiment generates poor stock returns, which in turn generates further negative
sentiment and sensational press coverage, which in turn generates further stock
price declines accompanied by a strong signature in closed end fund premia.
3.6 Systematic Risk
Our broad findings suggest that changes in CEF premia have content that
seems to shift from a liquidity orientation in normal times to a sentiment orientation
in negative states, for example following the September 15, 2008 structural break.
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These findings suggest that closed end funds might more generally be exposed to
abnormally high levels of systematic risk, especially relative to the assets they invest
in. This exposure to systematic risk might be much more severe in negative market
conditions.
It is important to note that a buyer of a closed end fund effectively receives
the sum of two return series: the net asset value return plus the change in the closed
end fund premium. Hence, if the closed end fund premium return has a positive
exposure to systematic risk, especially in negative states, investors should demand
a discount when purchasing closed end funds when compared to the raw assets.
It follows that the well known finding that closed end funds trade at discounts on
average, can be explained in part by the fact that investments in closed end funds
embody greater systematic risk than their underlying assets. To the extent our
data availability permits, we next explore whether this relationship holds in broader
samples.
[Insert Table 3.12 here]
Table 3.12 displays the results of reverse regressions in which the change in
CEF premium is the dependent variable, and the independent variables include
the synchronous value weighted market factor (Panel A) or the Fama French plus
momentum four factors (Panel B). We consider five different fund classes as noted
in the first column, and we explore all three samples including the 2008 crisis, the
pre-crisis, and the sample of other dates starting in January 2000 and ending in May
of 2008.
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The table’s results are striking. The default spread CEF has an economically
large beta of 0.39 during the crisis period, and a relatively small beta of 0.04 to 0.07
in the non-crisis periods. If the beta of the underlying assets is one for example,
this would imply that the beta of the closed end fund is as high as 1.39 during the
crisis. The results for the growth and income CEF are just as striking, as its 2008
crisis beta of 0.34 is 0.42 higher than its level in the long “other” sample, and 0.28
higher than in the pre-crisis period.
The systematic risk exposure of the corporate bond fund is high both in and
before the crisis. In the crisis, its beta is 0.56, and outside the crisis, its beta
is near 0.20. If we assume an equity risk premium of 5%, this implies that the
expected return of the corporate bond CEF should be at least 1% per annum higher
to compensate investors for market risk (this should be even higher if we account
for the higher beta in the crisis). The discount of this fund should be related to the
discounted value of this 1% per annum annuity, which in turn can explain a possibly
economically large portion of its observed CEF discount.
Although this link is compelling, we interpret these findings with some caution
for two reasons. First, the magnitude of the exposure to systematic risk is highly
dependent on the fund category. For example, we actually find a relatively small
negative beta for equity income funds, although this becomes insignificantly positive
during the crisis.10 In contrast, growth and income equity funds have a more striking
beta of 0.34 during the crisis. These results suggest that the difficulty of arbitraging a
10This concern might be mitigated if, for example, different types of crises result in different
classes of closed end funds experiencing greater risk. For example, equity income funds did expe-
rience elevated betas following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
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given fund class is important in determining the amount of additional systematic risk
the fund is exposed to, especially in negative states (consistent with ideas presented
in Pontiff (1996)).
Panel B of Table 3.12 shows that these findings are robust to including the
HML, SMB and UMD factors. The market risk coefficients change little in the multi-
factor setting. The table also suggests that some fund classes also have significant
positive exposures to HML. The corporate bond funds and the growth and income
funds are most exposed. However, these HML exposures do not seem to change
during the crisis period and are less consistent overall, and are thus less likely than
market risk to explain observed CEF discounts.
3.7 Financial Constraints and the Cross Section
In this section we consider cross sectional tests to analyze whether the extreme
stock returns we report are related to financial constraints, or other key variables
known to predict returns. We focus on four key event dates on which market moved
sharply; namely, September 15, 2008 (Failure of Lehman Brothers), September 29,
2008 (Rejection of passage of TARP), October 9, 2008 (S & P 500 drops 7.62%),
October 13, 2008 (Capital Infusion Announced). These tests are important given
basic summary statistics reported earlier indicating that cross sectional variance
increased in the days surrounding the crisis period. It is important to note that
although our earlier evidence supports a role for sentiment, the changes in late 2008
might have multiple causes.
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Given the literature on the topic, financial constraints are important to con-
sider. Our analysis in this section is most similar to Tong and Wei (2008) who
examine the impact of credit constraints on stock prices between July 31 2007 and
March 31 2008. Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2008) also take a similar approach, but
study the effect of the 2007 subprime crisis on firm investment. Our focus is on late
2008. Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2008) examine the real effects of financial
constraints based on a survey 1050 CFOs in the US, Europe and Asia, and find that
financially constrained firms plan to cut R&D, employment and capital spending
severely. Although this body of evidence motivates the importance of considering
financial constraints, the predicted effect on stock prices during our sample is less
clear. Since the initial signs of crisis began in 2007, for example, it is quite possible
that issues relating to constraints are already “priced” by late 2008. Furthermore,
Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) suggest that firms were merely piling up cash due to
precautionary motives, rather than using any additional cash to make investments.
3.7.1 Data and Variables
We gather firm accounting data from the CRSP/Compustat Merged Annual
database. We exclude financial firms (SIC code in 6000-6999). We obtain daily stock
returns from CRSP database. To ensure information is public at the time we predict
returns, we match a CRSP observation to the latest Compustat entry available with
a minimum six months lag. We discard an observation if no Compustat observation
is available from the past two years. We gather data from SDC Platinum to construct
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our merger dummy variables.
We consider several proxies to identify financial constraints. Our primary
measure is the index created by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (also considered in
Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) and Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2008)), which is
computed as follows:








3.139 leverage + 0.283 Tobin′sQ
Cashflow is income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization.
Dividends include common and preferred dividends. Cash includes short-term in-
vestments, and leverage is long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by
this quantity plus stockholders equity. Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity plus
assets minus the Book value of equity all divided by assets. We also consider the
following proxies for financial constraints.
• Age: 2009 minus the first year the firm has positive assets and sales.
• Dividend Payout Ratio: Dividends per share on the ex date divided by
earnings per share-basic.
• Long Term Rated: A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a S&P
domestic long-term credit rating in 2008.
• Short Term Rated: A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a S&P
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domestic short-term credit rating in 2008.
• LT - Investment Grade: A dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has long
term rating of BBB or better.
• ST - Investment Grade: A dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has a short
term rating of A1.
• LT- Rating: The rating level, which is equal to 5 if the long term rating is
AAA, 4 if AA, 3 if A, 2 if BBB, 1 if B and 0 otherwise.
We also control for the following variables.
• Capital Expenditures to Assets: Capital expenditures divided by assets.
• Tobin’s Q: Market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of equity,
all divided by assets.
• Retained Earnings to Assets: Retained earnings divided by assets.
• Beta Market model beta calculated using 100 daily returns between April 10,
2008 and August 31, 2008.
• MergerDummy: A dummy equal to 1 if the firm has done a merger between
January 1, 2006 and August 31, 2008.
• CashMergerDummy: A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has done a
merger using at least 51% cash as a method of payment in this period.
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• Average August Turnover: Average of volume over shares outstanding in
August 2008, deflated by a factor of 2 for Nasdaq firms (due to Nasdaq double
counting volume in buy and sell).
All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% level, and we include Fama-French 48
Industry fixed effects in all specifications.
3.7.2 Results
Table 3.13 (includes the K-Z index) and Table 3.14 (includes the components
of the K-Z index separately) present the results of these cross sectional tests. The
dependent variable is the one-day stock return on the key date noted in the column
headers. Table 3.13 shows that financial constraint proxies do not robustly explain
the stock returns on these dates. Neither the KZ index, nor the rating variables,
are robustly related to stock returns. The only exceptions are that firms with high
cash balances outperform on October 9th, and long-term investment grade firms
outperformed on September 29th. The fact that high Tobin’s Q firms experienced
significant performance on some days could also be consistent with financial crisis,
however this variable has many interpretations. Overall, given the insignificance of
the vast majority of financial constraint proxies, we conclude that credit constraints
likely explain little on these key dates. Table 3.14 suggests that this conclusion is
robust to separately considering the components of the K-Z index.
The performance of other variables is of independent interest. For example,
large firms lost more than small firms on the day Lehman collapsed and the day
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TARP was rejected. This is generally not consistent with financial constraints, as
larger firms are likely to be less constrained. Our results also indicate that more
liquid firms also had more negative returns. We also find that firms with high cap-
ital expenditures reacted more on all three negative dates. As capital expenditures
are often interpreted as a proxy for growth opportunities, it is possible that price
uncertainty played a role (consistent with the knightian uncertainty hypothesis pro-
moted by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008), or that the impact of the crisis was
more damaging to cashflows with a longer duration.
The results for October 13, 2008 when the S&P 500 gained 11.58%, are also
independently interesting. The coefficients of many key variables reversed sign, and
firms that lost on earlier dates regained some of their losses. This is consistent with
the idea that the same stocks were among the most volatile throughout this period,
suggesting that the main drivers of stock prices might have remained unchanged
during this period. For example, if sentiment was pervasive in market returns during
this entire period, then the same sentiment-sensitive stocks would be most volatile,
and in the same direction, throughout this period. To test this argument more
directly, we include the September 29, 2008 and the October, 9 2008 returns as
independent variables, and find that the returns on October 13 are indeed highly
negatively correlated with the earlier returns.
As additional robustness, we consider the index presented in Whited and Wu
(2006) (the WW index) in unreported regressions. We find qualitatively similar
results. In particular, the WW index is significant in some specifications, however
this significance is driven by the fact that firm size is a component in this index.
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Overall, we conclude that there is little evidence that credit constraints mattered
greatly on the key dates we analyze. However, the results suggest a possible role for
firm size, liquidity, and growth options. We leave further analysis on this topic to
future research.
3.8 Conclusion
There is a significant and growing literature on the 2007-2008 financial crisis,
much of which focuses on credit channel multiplier and amplification mechanisms
that cause a housing crisis to spread to the broad economy. Comparatively less has
been said about the issue of investor or broad consumer sentiment and its role in
the crisis. We provide empirical evidence on this issue, using new high frequency
data on closed-end fund discounts for several asset classes and daily data on non-
financial measures of sentiment collected by Gallup./UBS, daily web searches from
Google, and LEXIS/NEXIS newspaper counts. Variables from these data sources are
especially compelling as proxies for investor sentiment because they are orthogonal
to traditional financial databases, and their content is uniquely related to the median
individual within the economy. Although each median individual is resource poor,
they are numerous. Hence, when very large numbers of such individuals act in
unison, their impact on financial markets can be substantial.
Our study’s goal is to use the new datasets to enhance our understanding the
determinants of asset prices during the financial crisis, especially after the enormous
dislocation in stock prices in the fourth quarter of 2008, which was deep into the
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financial crisis, to shed new light on the spread of financial crises. We find that there
is some, but relatively little movement in closed-end fund discounts through much
of the crisis. However, there is a strong structural break in closed-end funds around
the September 15, 2008 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. After this date, fund
discounts turn sharply downward and exhibit fluctuations that are much higher than
historical norms. These fluctuations correlate well with broad market movements
after September 15, 2008 (but not before), particularly for asset classes that appear
to be hard-to-arbitrage. Turning to broader measures of sentiment, these measures
also dip after September 15, 2008 and tend to be more correlated with closed-end
fund discounts. The impact of the break is vast and numerous asset classes are
affected.
We find strong evidence supporting the conclusion that closed end fund premia
became strongly related to investor sentiment proxies after the structural break, but
not before the break. At the same time, these CEF premia (which do not represent
the value of assets, but rather disruptions in normal pricing relationships) suddenly
comove highly with the aggregate value weighted equity index. Prior to the break,
our evidence supports the conclusion that high frequency changes in CEF premia
were most consistent with liquidity considerations. CEF premia are unrelated to our
sentiment proxies prior to the break. Our findings regarding the pre-structural break
dynamics are consistent with numerous existing studies including Cherkes, Sagi,
and Stanton (2008), Qiu and Welch (2005), and Lemmon and Portniaguina (2008).
One interpretation of our findings after the structural break is that sentiment, once
brought to the median individual’s sight by key events and intense media coverage,
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can generate a recycling effect in which poor consumer sentiment can generate poor
asset price performance, and this in turn further weakens sentiment, which in turn
further weakens asset prices. Our evidence thus supports theoretical ideas discussed
in Pigou (1947) and Krugman (2001). We view our evidence as highly suggestive
of these theories, but we believe additional research is necessary to more firmly test
these theories.
Our paper’s findings are not only relevant to understanding the role of sen-
timent in crisis periods, but also shed new light on the nature of closed end fund
pricing. Our findings suggest that closed end funds are exposed to higher levels of
systematic risk than their underlying assets, especially during stressed conditions
as in the current crisis. Thus, closed end funds appear to have discounts that have
conditional betas with poor hedging properties. This anti-hedging feature of closed
end fund returns can help to explain why closed end funds traditionally trade at
discounts. This new explanation does not rule out other explanations, but likely is
a contributing factor.
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Table 3.1: Number and Characteristics of Closed-End Funds With Daily Discount
Data
The table reports the number and characteristics of closed-end funds for which we
can obtain daily NAV and closing price data. The sample was constructed as an
intersection of closed-end funds listed on ETF Connect and on CRSP. The fund
investing style is obtained from ETF connect. A stock listed on CRSP is a
closed-end fund if the second digit in its share code is either 4 or 5. Total assets of
each fund are as of December 31, 2007 and are reported in millions of dollars.
Total Assets
Fund Type # Funds Median Mean
Corporate Bonds 24 290 466
Equity - Global 52 344 596
Equity - U.S. 70 392 653
Growth & Income 26 237 579
Government Bond 3 554 655
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Table 3.2: Level of Closed-End Fund Discounts in Different Time Periods
The table reports the number of funds in each category and the median, mean, and
standard deviation of daily closed-end fund discounts for four time periods, the stock
market crisis period, the post-subprime crisis period, the subprime crisis period, and
the pre-subprime crisis period. Fund categories are obtained from ETF Connect.
The sample was constructed as an intersection of closed-end funds listed on ETF
Connect and on CRSP. The fund investing style is obtained from ETF connect. A
stock listed on CRSP is a closed-end fund if the second digit in its share code is
either 4 or 5.
Category # Funds Median Mean σ
Stock Crisis: September 15, 2008 to December 31, 2008
Corporate Bonds 24 -17.29 -15.59 10.97
Equity Global 52 -17.21 -15.56 8.07
Equity US 70 -15.54 -13.38 13.62
Growth & Income 26 -19.77 -19.11 10.14
Government Bond 3 -9.79 -9.23 5.23
Post-Subprime: June 1, 2008 to September 12, 2008
Corporate Bonds 24 -11.20 -8.36 8.28
Equity Global 52 -8.82 -7.89 5.33
Equity US 70 -9.10 -6.37 10.12
Growth & Income 26 -8.15 -7.65 5.03
Government Bond 3 -8.49 -7.58 2.47
Subprime: August 1, 2007 to March 31, 2008
Corporate Bonds 24 -10.12 -8.63 5.74
Equity Global 52 -8.90 -7.79 6.68
Equity US 70 -8.65 -6.86 7.78
Growth & Income 26 -7.59 -6.65 5.67
Government Bond 3 -11.05 -9.21 4.29
Pre-Subprime: April 1, 2007 to June 30, 2007
Corporate Bonds 24 -4.16 -2.92 5.51
Equity Global 52 -3.74 -3.58 7.03
Equity US 70 -3.50 -3.22 7.13
Growth & Income 26 -0.28 -0.01 8.18
Government Bond 3 -9.52 -5.01 7.36
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Table 3.3: Daily Changes in CEF Discounts Around Critical Events: Pre-Lehman
The table reports the mean change in the average percentage discount on closed-
end funds for several categories of funds on significant event dates during the 2008
financial crisis prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008.
Closed-end fund categories are obtained from ETF Connect. The sample was con-
structed as an intersection of closed-end funds listed on ETF Connect and on CRSP.
A stock listed on CRSP is a closed-end fund if the second digit in its share code is
either 4 or 5. t-statistics for testing significance are reported in parentheses and ae
based on data for 60 calendar days prior to and not including an event date. c, b,
and a denote significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and the 1% levels, respectively.
Fund Category
Date Corporate Equity Equity Growth Government
(Event) Bond US Global & Income Bond
January 22, 2008 0.13 -0.41a 1.60a -0.39a -0.48a
Ambac Downgrade (1.44) (-5.42) (25.10) (-4.43) (-6.75)
February 7, 2008 0.78a -0.21b 0.63a 0.27a 0.33a
Auction-Rate Run (8.38) (-2.36) (7.20) (3.09) (4.03)
February 14, 2008 -1.52a -1.57a -2.48a -2.22a -1.63a
Auction-Rate Run (-16.98) (-17.60) (-27.74) (-25.04) (-19.63)
March 11, 2008 1.13a -0.42a 0.60 0.06 0.92a
Bear Stearns Rumor (10.01) (-4.42) (5.86) (0.59) (9.61)
March 14, 2008 -0.97a 0.35a -0.25b -0.47a -0.62a
Bear Stearns Loan (-9.05) (3.88) (-2.41) (-4.75) (-6.84)
March 17, 2008 -2.37a -1.20a -0.43a -1.67a -0.68a
Bear Stearns Takeover (-22.81) (-14.03) (-4.44) (-17.82) (-7.81)
July 8, 2008 0.66a -0.77a 0.59a 0.36a 0.98a
Indymac Failure (10.20) (-18.52) (14.39) (6.61) (14.14)
September 8, 2008 0.33a -0.25a -0.82a -0.43a 1.38a
Fannie, Freddie Takeover (3.43) (-3.53) (-10.44) (-4.57) (17.00)
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Table 3.4: Daily Changes in CEF Discounts Around Critical Events: September
2008
The Table reports the mean change in the average percentage discount on closed-end
funds for several categories of funds on significant event dates during the 2008 finan-
cial crisis in September 2008 after the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September
15, 2008. Closed-end fund categories are obtained from ETF Connect. The sample
was constructed as an intersection of closed-end funds listed on ETF Connect and
on CRSP. A stock listed on CRSP is a closed-end fund if the second digit in its share
code is either 4 or 5. t-statistics for testing significance are reported in parentheses
and ae based on data for 60 calendar days prior to and not including an event date.
c, b, and a denote significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and the 1% levels, respectively.
Fund Category
Date Corporate Equity Equity Growth Government
(Event) Bond US Global & Income Bond
September 15, 2008 -2.72a -0.13a -1.31a -1.57a -2.26a
Lehman Collapse (-27.83) (-1.93) (-16.67) (-16.59) (-27.09)
September 16, 2008 -2.89a -3.99a -2.50a -4.72a -1.35a
AIG Bailout (-31.00) (-60.25) (-34.17) (-53.10) (-15.79)
September 22, 2008 -2.31a -0.07 -1.63a -1.78a -0.48a
TARP Proposal Developed (-25.22) (-1.10) (-20.81) (-19.12) (-5.48)
September 25, 2008 2.94a -0.80a 0.61a 1.42a 0.79a
Washington Mutual Collapse (29.10) (-12.98) (7.94) (16.72) (7.96)
September 29, 2008 -6.74a 0.02 -2.25a -4.54a -1.54a
TARP Rejected (-21.85) (0.12) (-17.19) (-22.03) (-10.09)
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Table 3.5: Daily Changes in CEF Discounts Around Critical Events: October 2008
Table 3c reports the mean change in the average percentage discount on closed-
end funds for several categories of funds on significant event dates during the 2008
financial crisis for events identified in the month of October 2008. Closed-end fund
categories are obtained from ETF Connect. The sample was constructed as an
intersection of closed-end funds listed on ETF Connect and on CRSP. A stock listed
on CRSP is a closed-end fund if the second digit in its share code is either 4 or 5.
t-statistics for testing significance are reported in parentheses and ae based on data
for 60 calendar days prior to and not including an event date. c, b, and a denote
significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and the 1% levels, respectively.
Fund Category
Date Corporate Equity Equity Growth Government
(Event) Bond US Global & Income Bond
October 1, 2008 1.85a 1.90a 1.21a 2.86a 1.27a
Senate Passes HR1424 (5.75) (11.72) (8.90) (13.26) (7.93)
October 6, 2008 -4.42a -4.28a -3.45a -6.38a -2.90a
S&P 500 Drops 5.74% (-13.86) (-27.52) (-25.56) (-30.35) (-19.01)
October 9, 2008 -4.84a -1.05a -1.61a -4.41a -1.46a
S&P 500 Drops 7.62% (-13.15) (-6.46) (-10.89) (-18.16) (-9.06)
October 13, 2008 15.43a 6.20a 6.33a 10.41a 6.21a
Capital Infusion Announced (42.69) (37.78) (43.25) (41.90) (39.20)
October 15, 2008 -2.08a 1.05a -1.21a -1.15a -0.44a
S&P 500 Drops 9.03% (-5.48) (6.10) (-7.90) (-4.41) (-2.63)
October 28, 2008 2.15a -2.29a -0.45c -0.08 1.15a












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.7: Default spread CEF net asset values (NAV) versus fund premia
The table displays the coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for univariate (Panels A to C) and bivariate
(Panels C and D) OLS regressions. The dependent variable is noted in the first column and is either the return on
the CRSP value weighted market index, the change in the VIX implied volatility index, or the change in the
investment grade credit default swap (CDS) index. The independent variable varies by panel and is the change in
the default spread CEF premium, the reported daily net asset value (NAV) return (Panel B), the fitted daily net
asset value (NAV) return (Panel C), both the change in CEF premium and the reported NAV return (Panel D), or
both the change in CEF premium and the fitted NAV return (Panel E). The change in the CEF premium,
reported NAV, and fitted NAV are measured over the same one day period during which the dependent variable is
measured. The fitted NAV is based on a first stage regression using observations from October 30, 2003 through
May 31, 2008 (based on availability of CDS index data) in which the default spread closed end fund raw return is
regressed on four items: change in the the investment grade CDS spread, change in the BAA corporate bond yield,
change in the AAA corporate bond yield, and the change in the US treasury 10 year bond yield. The coefficients
from this model are then used in the pre-crisis peiod and the 2008 crisis period to compute the fitted NAV. We do
not report results for the fitted NAV in the “Other Dates” period because this period is used for the first stage
regression, and we do not report results for the CDS spread for the fitted NAV because the fitted NAV is a direct
function of the CDS spread. All regressions are strictly associative and not predictive. We also report the adjusted
R2 for each regression, and we report results over three key subsamples. The first sample is the 2008 crisis, which
begins on 9/15/2008 and ends on 12/31/2008. The pre-crisis period is chosen to be roughly the same length, and
begins on 6/1/2008 and ends on 9/14/2008. The “Other Dates” sample includes all observations from 1/1/2000 to




Dependent Coefficient Coefficient Adj.
Variable Period (t statistic) (t statistic) R2
Panel A: ∆ CEF premium only
VW Market 2008 Crisis 1.067 (7.23) 0.406
VW Market Other 0.053 (2.05) 0.003
VW Market Pre Crisis 0.178 (0.67) -0.008
VIX Index 2008 Crisis -2.752 (-6.87) 0.381
VIX Index Other -0.255 (-1.30) 0.001
VIX Index Pre Crisis -1.013 (-0.75) -0.006
CDS Index 2008 Crisis -0.793 (-3.06) 0.101
CDS Index Other -0.030 (-0.25) -0.001
CDS Index Pre Crisis 0.917 (1.58) 0.020
Panel B: Reported NAV return only
VW Market 2008 Crisis 1.187 (2.90) 0.090
VW Market Other 0.518 (8.60) 0.061
VW Market Pre Crisis 1.365 (4.38) 0.207
VIX Index 2008 Crisis -3.758 (-3.54) 0.133
VIX Index Other -3.019 (-6.60) 0.036
VIX Index Pre Crisis -5.176 (-3.08) 0.108
CDS Index 2008 Crisis -1.366 (-2.29) 0.054
CDS Index Other -2.442 (-12.10) 0.115
CDS Index Pre Crisis -3.064 (-4.66) 0.228
Panel C: Fitted NAV return only
VW Market 2008 Crisis 2.870 (2.17) 0.047
VW Market Pre Crisis 4.050 (5.27) 0.271
VIX Index 2008 Crisis -8.457 (-2.42) 0.061
VIX Index Pre Crisis -18.995 (-4.71) 0.227
Panel D: ∆ CEF Premium and True NAV return
VW Market 2008 Crisis 1.019 (7.18) 0.915 (2.87) 0.459
VW Market Other 0.250 (6.98) 0.674 (10.68) 0.099
VW Market Pre Crisis 0.587 (2.20) 1.608 (4.98) 0.248
VIX Index 2008 Crisis -2.590 (-6.94) -3.067 (-3.66) 0.470
VIX Index Other -1.310 (-4.75) -3.835 (-7.91) 0.054
VIX Index Pre Crisis -2.473 (-1.69) -6.200 (-3.52) 0.132
CDS Index 2008 Crisis -0.731 (-2.86) -1.171 (-2.05) 0.138
CDS Index Other -0.585 (-4.81) -2.806 (-13.13) 0.132
CDS Index Pre Crisis -0.408 (-0.70) -3.233 (-4.60) 0.222
Panel E: ∆ CEF Premium and Fitted NAV return
VW Market 2008 Crisis 1.031 (6.74) 0.987 (0.91) 0.405
VW Market Pre Crisis 0.373 (1.64) 4.247 (5.53) 0.288
VIX Index 2008 Crisis -2.619 (-6.34) -3.675 (-1.26) 0.386
VIX Index Pre Crisis -1.931 (-1.62) -20.013 (-4.95) 0.244
154
Table 3.8: Changes in closed end fund premia and gallup survey data
The table displays the coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for univariate OLS regressions. The dependent
variable is the change in closed end fund premium for a given fund class, as noted in the panel header. The
independent variable varies by row and is the day-of-week-adjusted relative change in a given Gallup daily Survey
(identified in the first column), where the dependent variable and the independent variable are measured over the
same one day period. Hence, all regressions are strictly associative and not predictive. We also report the adjusted
R2 for each regression, and we report results over two key subsamples. The first sample is the 2008 crisis, which
begins on 9/15/2008 and ends on 12/31/2008. The pre-crisis period is chosen to be roughly the same length, and
begins on 6/1/2008 and ends on 9/14/2008. All daily Gallup survey results are obtained from Gallup.com, and are
based on three day moving averages. A relative change is equal to the survey value on day t, minus that on day
t-1, scaled by the day t-1 value. Day of week adjustments are extracted by taking residuals from a regression of
the raw relative change on day of week dummies.
2008 Crisis (76 obs) Pre Crisis (73 obs)
Independent Coefficient Adj. Coefficient Adj.
Variable (t statistic) R2 (t statistic) R2
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Change in Corp Bond CEF Premium
Econ. Getting Worse -0.697 (-3.75) 0.148 0.039 (0.68) -0.008
Econ. is Poor -0.418 (-3.01) 0.097 -0.024 (-1.04) 0.001
Firm is Hiring 0.091 (1.03) 0.001 0.005 (0.32) -0.013
Consumer Spending 0.082 (1.98) 0.037 -0.011 (-1.67) 0.024
Negative Consumer Mood -0.578 (-3.46) 0.127 0.015 (0.40) -0.012
Negative Mood -0.020 (-1.18) 0.005 -0.000 (-0.12) -0.014
Struggling with Life -0.346 (-1.94) 0.036 0.029 (0.63) -0.008
Lower Stan. Living -0.299 (-1.76) 0.027 -0.019 (-0.67) -0.008
Worried Pers. Fin. 0.107 (1.54) 0.018 0.009 (0.64) -0.008
Panel B: Dependent Variable = Change in Govt Bond CEF Premium
Econ. Getting Worse -0.251 (-2.94) 0.092 0.099 (1.82) 0.031
Econ. is Poor -0.187 (-3.02) 0.097 -0.018 (-0.80) -0.005
Firm is Hiring 0.067 (1.72) 0.025 -0.001 (-0.04) -0.014
Consumer Spending 0.036 (1.93) 0.035 -0.005 (-0.83) -0.004
Negative Consumer Mood -0.222 (-2.92) 0.091 0.018 (0.48) -0.011
Negative Mood -0.004 (-0.55) -0.009 -0.004 (-1.31) 0.010
Struggling with Life -0.024 (-0.30) -0.012 0.005 (0.12) -0.014
Lower Stan. Living -0.187 (-2.52) 0.066 -0.011 (-0.39) -0.012
Worried Pers. Fin. 0.037 (1.19) 0.006 0.001 (0.08) -0.014
Panel C: Dependent Variable = Change in Def Spread CEF Premium
Econ. Getting Worse -0.445 (-3.04) 0.099 -0.060 (-1.05) 0.001
Econ. is Poor -0.232 (-2.12) 0.044 -0.006 (-0.27) -0.013
Firm is Hiring 0.024 (0.36) -0.012 0.006 (0.35) -0.012
Consumer Spending 0.046 (1.44) 0.014 -0.006 (-0.85) -0.004
Negative Consumer Mood -0.356 (-2.70) 0.077 -0.002 (-0.06) -0.014
Negative Mood -0.015 (-1.22) 0.007 0.003 (1.14) 0.004
Struggling with Life -0.322 (-2.38) 0.059 0.023 (0.51) -0.010
Lower Stan. Living -0.112 (-0.84) -0.004 -0.009 (-0.30) -0.013
Worried Pers. Fin. 0.070 (1.30) 0.009 0.008 (0.56) -0.010
Panel D: Dependent Variable = Change in Growth+Inc. CEF Premium
Econ. Getting Worse -0.479 (-3.52) 0.132 -0.048 (-0.85) -0.004
Econ. is Poor -0.291 (-2.88) 0.089 -0.034 (-1.50) 0.017
Firm is Hiring 0.087 (1.37) 0.011 0.042 (2.68) 0.079
Consumer Spending 0.054 (1.77) 0.028 -0.001 (-0.22) -0.013
Negative Consumer Mood -0.410 (-3.37) 0.122 -0.038 (-1.02) 0.001
Negative Mood -0.008 (-0.70) -0.007 0.003 (0.97) -0.001
Struggling with Life -0.177 (-1.36) 0.011 0.017 (0.38) -0.012
Lower Stan. Living -0.291 (-2.40) 0.060 -0.016 (-0.59) -0.009
Worried Pers. Fin. 0.082 (1.62) 0.021 -0.015 (-1.06) 0.002
Panel E: Dependent Variable = Change in Equity Income CEF Premium
Econ. Getting Worse -0.283 (-2.86) 0.087 -0.067 (-1.54) 0.019
Econ. is Poor -0.149 (-2.02) 0.039 -0.012 (-0.66) -0.008
Firm is Hiring 0.113 (2.57) 0.070 0.025 (2.03) 0.041
Consumer Spending 0.022 (1.03) 0.001 0.000 (0.01) -0.014
Negative Consumer Mood -0.303 (-3.53) 0.132 -0.017 (-0.58) -0.009
Negative Mood -0.008 (-0.97) -0.001 0.002 (0.80) -0.005
Struggling with Life 0.008 (0.08) -0.013 -0.062 (-1.84) 0.032
Lower Stan. Living -0.238 (-2.81) 0.084 -0.013 (-0.59) -0.009
Worried Pers. Fin. 0.028 (0.77) -0.006 -0.023 (-2.17) 0.049
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Table 3.9: Changes in closed end fund premia and information sources
The table displays the coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for univariate OLS regressions. The dependent
variable is the change in closed end fund premium for a given fund class, as noted in the panel header. The
independent variable varies by row and is the day-of-week-adjusted relative change in a Google Trends variable
(see http://www.google.com/trends), or a Lexis/Nexis newspaper article count variable (see Lexis/Nexis
Database). Independent variables are measured over the same one day period as the dependent variable, and
hence these regressions are strictly associative and not predictive. We also report the adjusted R2 for each
regression, and we report results over two key subsamples. The first sample is the 2008 crisis, which begins on
9/15/2008 and ends on 12/31/2008. The pre-crisis period is chosen to be roughly the same length, and begins on
6/1/2008 and ends on 9/14/2008. All Google Trends variables and Lexis/Nexis article counts are based on the
phrases “Great Depression” or “Recession” as noted in the first column. A relative change is equal to the survey
value on day t, minus that on day t-1, scaled by the day t-1 value. Day of week adjustments are extracted by
taking residuals from a regression of the raw relative change on day of week dummies.
2008 Crisis (76 obs) Pre Crisis (73 obs)
Independent Coefficient Adj. Coefficient Adj.
Variable (t statistic) R2 (t statistic) R2
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Change in Corp Bond CEF Premium (Synchronous)
Google Great Dep. -0.053 (-4.35) 0.193 -0.003 (-0.65) -0.008
Google Recession -0.026 (-3.10) 0.103 0.006 (1.61) 0.022
Google Bankruptcy -0.028 (-1.89) 0.033 0.006 (1.01) 0.000
Lexis Great Dep. -0.006 (-0.76) -0.006 -0.000 (-0.57) -0.009
Lexis Recession -0.021 (-1.46) 0.015 0.003 (1.23) 0.007
Lexis Bankruptcy -0.023 (-2.44) 0.062 -0.003 (-1.47) 0.016
Panel B: Dependent Variable = Change in Govt Bond CEF Premium (Synchronous)
Google Great Dep. -0.023 (-4.26) 0.186 -0.007 (-1.57) 0.020
Google Recession -0.008 (-2.03) 0.040 -0.003 (-0.78) -0.005
Google Bankruptcy -0.015 (-2.37) 0.058 0.015 (2.95) 0.097
Lexis Great Dep. -0.003 (-0.78) -0.005 -0.000 (-0.40) -0.012
Lexis Recession -0.011 (-1.76) 0.027 0.002 (0.76) -0.006
Lexis Bankruptcy -0.014 (-3.53) 0.132 -0.004 (-2.52) 0.069
Panel C: Dependent Variable = Change in Def Spread CEF Premium (Synchronous)
Google Great Dep. -0.030 (-3.01) 0.097 0.004 (0.83) -0.004
Google Recession -0.018 (-2.80) 0.083 0.009 (2.42) 0.063
Google Bankruptcy -0.012 (-1.09) 0.002 -0.009 (-1.70) 0.026
Lexis Great Dep. -0.003 (-0.54) -0.010 -0.000 (-0.19) -0.014
Lexis Recession -0.010 (-0.88) -0.003 0.001 (0.50) -0.011
Lexis Bankruptcy -0.009 (-1.17) 0.005 0.002 (0.87) -0.003
Panel D: Dependent Variable = Change in Growth+Inc. CEF Premium (Synchronous)
Google Great Dep. -0.040 (-4.65) 0.215 -0.003 (-0.61) -0.009
Google Recession -0.016 (-2.65) 0.074 0.004 (1.04) 0.001
Google Bankruptcy -0.012 (-1.10) 0.003 0.005 (0.95) -0.001
Lexis Great Dep. -0.007 (-1.32) 0.010 0.000 (0.63) -0.008
Lexis Recession -0.015 (-1.44) 0.014 -0.002 (-0.63) -0.009
Lexis Bankruptcy -0.022 (-3.28) 0.115 -0.004 (-2.17) 0.049
Panel E: Dependent Variable = Change in Equity Income CEF Premium (Synchronous)
Google Great Dep. -0.022 (-3.35) 0.120 0.001 (0.26) -0.013
Google Recession -0.010 (-2.17) 0.047 0.002 (0.63) -0.008
Google Bankruptcy -0.004 (-0.54) -0.009 0.004 (0.86) -0.004
Lexis Great Dep. -0.005 (-1.16) 0.005 0.001 (1.15) 0.004
Lexis Recession -0.012 (-1.67) 0.023 -0.001 (-0.62) -0.009
Lexis Bankruptcy -0.014 (-2.99) 0.096 -0.000 (-0.35) -0.012
156
Table 3.10: Changes in future closed end fund premia and lagged information sources
The table displays the coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for univariate OLS regressions. The dependent
variable is the change in closed end fund premium for a given fund class, as noted in the panel header. The
independent variable varies by row and is the day-of-week-adjusted relative change in a Google Trends variable
(see http://www.google.com/trends), or a Lexis/Nexis newspaper article count variable (see Lexis/Nexis
Database). Independent variables are measured over the previous day relative to the dependent variable, and
hence these regressions are predictive. We also report the adjusted R2 for each regression, and we report results
over two key subsamples. The first sample is the 2008 crisis, which begins on 9/15/2008 and ends on 12/31/2008.
The pre-crisis period is chosen to be roughly the same length, and begins on 6/1/2008 and ends on 9/14/2008. All
Google Trends variables and Lexis/Nexis article counts are based on the phrases “Great Depression” or
“Recession” as noted in the first column. A relative change is equal to the survey value on day t, minus that on
day t-1, scaled by the day t-1 value. Day of week adjustments are extracted by taking residuals from a regression
of the raw relative change on day of week dummies.
2008 Crisis (76 obs) Pre Crisis (73 obs)
Independent Coefficient Adj. Coefficient Adj.
Variable (t statistic) R2 (t statistic) R2
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Next Day Change in Corp Bond CEF Premium
Google Great Dep. -0.003 (-0.21) -0.013 0.002 (0.53) -0.010
Google Recession 0.001 (0.10) -0.013 0.003 (0.86) -0.004
Google Bankruptcy -0.024 (-1.64) 0.022 -0.003 (-0.46) -0.011
Lexis Great Dep. -0.017 (-2.28) 0.053 -0.001 (-0.90) -0.003
Lexis Recession -0.032 (-2.25) 0.051 -0.001 (-0.20) -0.013
Lexis Bankruptcy -0.022 (-2.30) 0.054 -0.002 (-1.05) 0.002
Panel B: Dependent Variable = Next Day Change in Govt Bond CEF Premium
Google Great Dep. -0.008 (-1.33) 0.010 -0.003 (-0.59) -0.009
Google Recession -0.003 (-0.74) -0.006 0.002 (0.65) -0.008
Google Bankruptcy -0.011 (-1.64) 0.022 -0.000 (-0.01) -0.014
Lexis Great Dep. -0.004 (-1.34) 0.010 -0.000 (-0.67) -0.008
Lexis Recession -0.009 (-1.34) 0.011 0.004 (1.86) 0.033
Lexis Bankruptcy -0.008 (-1.84) 0.031 -0.002 (-0.93) -0.002
Panel C: Dependent Variable = Next Day Change in Def Spread CEF Premium
Google Great Dep. 0.005 (0.49) -0.010 0.005 (1.10) 0.003
Google Recession 0.004 (0.56) -0.009 0.001 (0.23) -0.013
Google Bankruptcy -0.013 (-1.17) 0.005 -0.003 (-0.46) -0.011
Lexis Great Dep. -0.012 (-2.17) 0.047 -0.000 (-0.26) -0.013
Lexis Recession -0.024 (-2.13) 0.045 -0.005 (-2.00) 0.040
Lexis Bankruptcy -0.014 (-1.90) 0.034 -0.000 (-0.16) -0.014
Panel D: Dependent Variable = Next Day Change in Growth+Inc. CEF Premium
Google Great Dep. -0.007 (-0.68) -0.007 -0.007 (-1.66) 0.024
Google Recession -0.001 (-0.20) -0.013 0.002 (0.60) -0.009
Google Bankruptcy -0.028 (-2.69) 0.077 -0.000 (-0.09) -0.014
Lexis Great Dep. -0.009 (-1.74) 0.026 -0.001 (-1.59) 0.021
Lexis Recession -0.024 (-2.36) 0.057 0.004 (1.46) 0.016
Lexis Bankruptcy -0.020 (-3.03) 0.099 -0.000 (-0.16) -0.014
Panel E: Dependent Variable = Next Day Change in Equity Income CEF Premium
Google Great Dep. -0.013 (-1.93) 0.035 -0.004 (-1.17) 0.005
Google Recession -0.005 (-1.01) 0.000 0.002 (0.53) -0.010
Google Bankruptcy -0.021 (-2.90) 0.090 0.003 (0.82) -0.005
Lexis Great Dep. -0.006 (-1.54) 0.018 -0.000 (-0.57) -0.009
Lexis Recession -0.011 (-1.51) 0.017 0.002 (0.84) -0.004
Lexis Bankruptcy -0.013 (-2.78) 0.083 -0.002 (-1.41) 0.014
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Table 3.11: Changes in future information sources and lagged changes in closed end
fund premia
The table displays the coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for univariate OLS regressions. The dependent
variable is the change in a given information source as noted in the first column. The independent variable varies
by panel and is the previous day’s change in closed end fund premium for a given fund class, as noted in the panel
header. The dependent variable information sources are the day-of-week-adjusted relative change in a Google
Trends variable (see http://www.google.com/trends), or a Lexis/Nexis newspaper article count variable (see
Lexis/Nexis Database). Independent variables measured over the previous day relative to the dependent variable,
and hence these regressions are predictive. We also report the adjusted R2 for each regression, and we report
results over two key subsamples. The first sample is the 2008 crisis, which begins on 9/15/2008 and ends on
12/31/2008. The pre-crisis period is chosen to be roughly the same length, and begins on 6/1/2008 and ends on
9/14/2008. All Google Trends variables and Lexis/Nexis article counts are based on the phrases “Great
Depression” or “Recession” as noted in the first column. A relative change is equal to the survey value on day t,
minus that on day t-1, scaled by the day t-1 value. Day of week adjustments are extracted by taking residuals
from a regression of the raw relative change on day of week dummies.
2008 Crisis (76 obs) Pre Crisis (73 obs)
Dependent Coefficient Adj. Coefficient Adj.
Variable (t statistic) R2 (t statistic) R2
Panel A: Independent Variable = Previous Day Change in Corp Bond CEF Premium
Google Great Dep. -2.014 (-2.34) 0.057 -5.889 (-1.49) 0.016
Google Recession -1.579 (-1.03) 0.001 -2.028 (-0.59) -0.009
Google Bankruptcy 0.268 (0.46) -0.011 -2.564 (-0.54) -0.010
Lexis Great Dep. -1.082 (-0.63) -0.008 4.747 (0.20) -0.014
Lexis Recession -0.500 (-0.55) -0.010 -11.464 (-2.11) 0.046
Lexis Bankruptcy -2.086 (-1.85) 0.032 -1.175 (-0.13) -0.014
Panel B: Independent Variable = Previous Day Change in Govt Bond CEF Premium
Google Great Dep. -2.752 (-1.39) 0.013 -2.118 (-0.51) -0.010
Google Recession 4.162 (1.22) 0.007 -4.236 (-1.20) 0.006
Google Bankruptcy 3.037 (2.43) 0.062 -1.888 (-0.38) -0.012
Lexis Great Dep. -6.829 (-1.80) 0.029 39.622 (1.60) 0.021
Lexis Recession 1.004 (0.49) -0.010 -6.453 (-1.12) 0.003
Lexis Bankruptcy -1.682 (-0.65) -0.008 11.060 (1.17) 0.005
Panel C: Independent Variable = Previous Day Change in Def Spread CEF Premium
Google Great Dep. -2.490 (-2.21) 0.050 -3.940 (-0.99) -0.000
Google Recession -4.091 (-2.10) 0.044 1.873 (0.55) -0.010
Google Bankruptcy -0.574 (-0.76) -0.006 -0.826 (-0.17) -0.014
Lexis Great Dep. 0.474 (0.21) -0.013 -31.738 (-1.33) 0.011
Lexis Recession -1.190 (-1.00) 0.000 -5.523 (-0.99) -0.000
Lexis Bankruptcy -2.973 (-2.03) 0.041 -11.359 (-1.26) 0.008
Panel D: Independent Variable = Previous Day Change in Growth+Inc. CEF Premium
Google Great Dep. -2.614 (-2.19) 0.049 -3.412 (-0.84) -0.004
Google Recession 0.157 (0.07) -0.014 -1.183 (-0.34) -0.012
Google Bankruptcy 0.174 (0.22) -0.013 -2.475 (-0.51) -0.010
Lexis Great Dep. -0.360 (-0.15) -0.013 16.155 (0.66) -0.008
Lexis Recession 0.348 (0.27) -0.013 -3.338 (-0.59) -0.009
Lexis Bankruptcy -2.098 (-1.34) 0.010 -7.719 (-0.83) -0.004
Panel E: Independent Variable = Previous Day Change in Equity Income CEF Premium
Google Great Dep. -2.322 (-1.36) 0.011 1.692 (0.32) -0.013
Google Recession 5.432 (1.86) 0.032 4.432 (0.99) -0.000
Google Bankruptcy 0.633 (0.56) -0.009 0.458 (0.07) -0.014
Lexis Great Dep. -1.013 (-0.30) -0.012 -3.928 (-0.12) -0.014
Lexis Recession 1.461 (0.82) -0.004 -3.591 (-0.49) -0.011







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.13: Key Dates and returns versus financial constraints
The table displays the coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for cross sectional OLS regressions in which the
single day stock return (on a key date) is the dependent variable. All regressions include controls for the
Fama-French 48 industries, and all continuous independent variables are winsorized at 1% level. The independent
variables include the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) financial constraints index (based on a fitted linear function of
cashflow/assets, dividend payments/assets, cash balances/lagged assets, book leverage, and Tobin’s Q). We also
consider seven proxies for financial constraints: Firm age defined as 2009 minus the first year the firm has positive
assets and sales, the dividend Payout Ratio (dividends/earnings), a long-term rated dummy (based on S&P
Domestic Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating in 2008), a short-term rated dummy, a long-term investment grade
dummy (long-term rating of BBB or better), a short-term investment grade dummy (short-term rating of A1), and
a long-term rating level (5=AAA, 4=AA, 3=A, 2=BBB, 1=B, 0=Otherwise). We also include the following
controls: capital expenditures/assets, Tobin’s Q, retained earnings/assets, market model beta (calculated using
100 daily returns between 10 April 2008 and 31 August 2008), a merger dummy (based on mergers between
January 1, 2006 and August 31, 2008), a cash merger dummy (consideration must be at least 51% cash), and
average August turnover (based on August 2008).
Independent 09/15/2008 09/29/2008 10/9/2008 10/13/2008
Variable (Lehman) (TARP Re-
jected)
(S&P –6.62%) (Cap. Infu-
sion)
Size -0.002 -0.007 0.000 0.006
(-2.780) (-8.032) (0.357) (4.078)
Beta -0.007 -0.009 -0.020 -0.008
(-4.225) (-3.964) (-7.631) (-1.847)
Age 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(1.621) (4.213) (-0.124) (-2.810)
KZ Index -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001
(-1.653) (-0.966) (-0.345) (0.973)
Long Term Rated -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 0.003
(-0.571) (-0.162) (-1.135) (0.547)
LT Investment Grade 0.003 0.008 0.007 -0.007
(0.954) (2.345) (1.710) (-1.200)
Short Term Rated 0.004 0.003 -0.003 -0.007
(1.267) (0.983) (-0.621) (-1.090)
ST Investment Grade 0.004 0.003 -0.004 -0.008
(1.577) (0.873) (-1.056) (-1.190)
Capex to Assets -0.066 -0.060 -0.059 0.087
(-5.651) (-2.519) (-2.849) (3.323)
Tobin’s Q -0.000 -0.003 0.002 0.006
(-0.110) (-3.326) (2.190) (4.431)
Avg. August Turnover -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000
(-5.128) (-6.201) (-0.535) (0.959)
Retained Earnings to Assets 0.003 0.003 0.001 -0.005
(2.796) (1.573) (0.552) (-1.977)
Merger Dummy -0.001 -0.012 -0.001 0.005
(-0.341) (-2.131) (-0.255) (0.680)
Cash Merger Dummy 0.001 0.016 -0.001 -0.005
(0.317) (2.660) (-0.117) (-0.635)
Return on 29 September -0.376
(-8.039)
Return on 9 October -0.253
(-6.318)
Constant -0.016 -0.025 -0.051 0.026
(-1.617) (-0.838) (-2.577) (0.762)
Number of observations 2,427 2,387 2,150 2,212
Adjusted R2 0.256 0.271 0.075 0.315
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Table 3.14: Key Dates and returns versus financial constraint components
The table displays the coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for cross sectional OLS regressions in which the
single day stock return (on a key date) is the dependent variable. All regressions include controls for the
Fama-French 48 industries, and all continuous independent variables are winsorized at 1% level. The independent
variables include the variables included in the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) financial constraints index, but included
separately: cashflow/assets, dividend payments/assets, cash balances/lagged assets, book leverage, and Tobin’s Q.
We also consider seven proxies for financial constraints: Firm age defined as 2009 minus the first year the firm has
positive assets and sales, the dividend Payout Ratio (dividends/earnings), a long-term rated dummy (based on
S&P Domestic Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating in 2008), a short-term rated dummy, a long-term investment grade
dummy (long-term rating of BBB or better), a short-term investment grade dummy (short-term rating of A1), and
a long-term rating level (5=AAA, 4=AA, 3=A, 2=BBB, 1=B, 0=Otherwise). We also include the following
controls: capital expenditures/assets, Tobin’s Q, retained earnings/assets, market model beta (calculated using
100 daily returns between 10 April 2008 and 31 August 2008), a merger dummy (based on mergers between
January 1, 2006 and August 31, 2008), a cash merger dummy (consideration must be at least 51% cash), and
average August turnover (based on August 2008).
Independent 09/15/2008 09/29/2008 10/9/2008 10/13/2008
Variable (Lehman) (TARP Re-
jected)
(S&P –6.62%) (Cap. Infu-
sion)
Size -0.001 -0.006 0.001 0.005
(-2.359) (-6.517) (1.419) (3.098)
Beta -0.007 -0.010 -0.021 -0.011
(-4.129) (-4.282) (-7.431) (-2.482)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(1.022) (3.523) (0.006) (-2.378)
Cash Flow to Assets 0.010 0.029 0.024 -0.047
(0.665) (1.202) (1.004) (-1.288)
Cash Balances to Assets -0.002 -0.003 0.024 0.014
(-0.453) (-0.435) (3.002) (1.219)
Leverage -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.004
(-0.920) (-0.227) (-0.104) (0.538)
Dividend Payout Ratio 0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.004
(0.522) (1.021) (-0.805) (-1.046)
Long Term Rated -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 0.005
(-0.953) (-0.385) (-1.002) (0.949)
LT Investment Grade 0.002 0.005 0.003 -0.007
(0.662) (1.432) (0.775) (-1.059)
Short Term Rated 0.005 0.003 -0.001 -0.007
(1.546) (0.836) (-0.207) (-1.124)
ST Investment Grade 0.003 0.001 -0.005 -0.004
(1.199) (0.246) (-1.252) (-0.512)
Capex to Assets -0.093 -0.087 -0.045 0.100
(-7.270) (-5.513) (-2.036) (3.671)
Tobin’s Q -0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.006
(-0.762) (-3.848) (1.333) (3.538)
Avg. August Turnover -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000
(-3.896) (-5.646) (-0.264) (1.578)
Retained Earnings to Assets 0.003 0.009 -0.000 -0.004
(2.029) (2.297) (-0.089) (-0.994)
Merger Dummy -0.002 -0.014 0.004 0.003
(-0.725) (-2.420) (0.687) (0.422)
Cash Merger Dummy 0.002 0.018 -0.003 -0.008
(0.479) (2.915) (-0.446) (-0.889)
Return on 29 September -0.445
(-8.656)
Return on 9 October -0.188
(-4.529)
Constant -0.015 -0.050 -0.074 0.032
(-1.238) (-1.318) (-3.413) (0.718)
Number of observations 2,034 2,004 1,864 1,893







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.4: Percent of Stocks with at least 10% Movement in a Single Day
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Figure 3.5: Average CEF Discounts: All Categories
Figure 3.6: CEF Discounts, Equity Funds
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Figure 3.7: CEF Discounts, Bond Funds and Spread
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